

Chapter Thirteen

The Pan-Xianbei-Tungus
Manchurian Dynasties

The Liao and Kin Unify Manchuria before
Occupying North China



The Ruins 荒蕪 of Yamato Rulers' Tombs before the Meiji Restoration



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13.1. Capitals of the Yamato Kingdom
Fujiwara-kyō (694-710); Heijō-kyō (710-84); Nagaoka-kyō (784-794); and Heian-kyō (794-1868)

¹ See Lamb (1995: 156-69). Maya civilization reached a zenith around 750. Then their society imploded because of severe droughts between 760-910. See Peterson & Haug (2005: 322-7).

² In 645, prince Naka no Ōe (Tenji, r. 661-71), assisted by Nakatomi Kamatari (614-69), eliminated the Soga clan. Kamatari's son, Fujiwara Fubito (659-720), tried to implement the Taika Reform, and also to establish the first "permanent" capital to accommodate the growing bureaucracy. Jitō (r. 686-97) made the final decision of the transfer to Fujiwara-kyō in 694. After a mere 16 years, however, Fubito

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE PAN-XIANBEI-TUNGUS MANCHURIAN DYNASTIES

THE LIAO AND KIN UNIFY MANCHURIA BEFORE OCCUPYING NORTH CHINA

1. Decline and Fall of the Yamato Kingdom

DYNASTIES WERE COLLAPSING EVERYWHERE

Periods of drought in the Mediterranean, North Africa and far to the east into Asia had two high points, between 300-400 and around 800. Many places where agriculture had been carried on with elaborate irrigation networks were abandoned due to widespread drought.¹ The decline and fall of the Tang dynasty began in the middle of the eighth century. Franke and Twitchett (1994: 5-6) note: "around 840 the stability of northern Asia began to unravel. First the Tibetan kingdom suddenly collapsed ... the Uighur empire disintegrated ... The Tang empire was destroyed by ... rebellion.... In the last years of the century, central authority began to break down in Japan ... the Silla kingdom broke up into three regional warlord states... Parhae went into a terminal decline ... and in the far southwest Nan-chao too fell apart ... and in AD 900 the international situation had been fluid for some sixty years, and governments were collapsing everywhere."

THE ADVENT OF NEW RULING CLASS: SAMURAI

The overthrow of the Soga clan and the *Taika* Reforms in 645 in the Japanese islands were soon followed by

the fall of the Paekche in 663 in the Korean peninsula, the frantic efforts of the Yamato court to fortify the possible Tang invasion route on the Japanese islands, and the reinforcement of the *Ritsuryō* system for nation-wide military mobilization.² By issuing the *Taihō* law codes in 701, the entire populace in the Japanese islands came under the rule of Tang-style national statute law with a centralized bureaucratic government. On the basis of state ownership of land, peasants were allotted parcels of land, paying taxes and providing corvée service.

The *Be* people that had been controlled by the *Kabane* bearing *Uji* leaders were transformed into freemen (*kōmin*) under direct state control. Ruling clans were deprived of their traditional privileges, such as holding troops to be used by the Yamato sovereign as guards or in battle, but acquired a new status as high-ranking bureaucrats or local officials.³ The lower strata of the old elite (such as the *Kuni-no-miyatsuko*) obtained positions as local district officials. Government officials received fief according to their rank, post, and merits. The Yamato kingdom had never adopted the Tang-style examination system. It was a hereditary aristocratic society.

The imported *Ritsuryō* system, however, did not fit the clan-based Japanese society. Especially when the Tang's expansionist threat disappeared in the aftermath of the An Lushan rebellion (755-63), the Yamato rulers lost their zeal to enforce the *Ritsuryō* system.⁴ During the Heian period (794-1192), especially after the reign of Kanmu (781-806), the Fujiwara clan, which had been prominent in the implementation of *Taika* Reforms, established close marital ties with the imperial family, and occupied most of the high offices in the central government. Diplomatic contact with the declining Tang dynasty was discontinued after 838. Fujiwara Yoshifusa established a regency in 858, effectively exercising the powers of emperor until 872. He was succeeded by Fujiwara Mototsune. The effective rule by the Fujiwara regency continued until the reign of Fujiwara Tadamichi (1123-50), though the supremacy of the Fujiwara ended with the death of Michinaga in 1027 because other clans were beginning to feel their own strength (see Sansom, 1963, pp. 140, 196-7). Middle and lower level positions in the central and provincial government, on the other hand, became the hereditary

decided to relocate the capital yet again to Heijō-kyō (Nara), about 16 km north of Fujiwara-kyō. Yamato court used to change the location of its capital within the Asuka area each time a new king came to the throne.

³The Mononobe and Ōtomo clans, for instance, formerly commanded the King's army, but the military and civil powers became to be separated at the level of local administration. Peasants came to be conscripted directly by the state to serve (for three years) either in their own provinces (led by provincial officials), in the capital, on the frontier or for major military campaigns (led by court nobles with temporary military commissions).

⁴The relocation of capital from Heijō-kyō to Nagaoka-kyō in 784 and to Heian-kyō (Kyōto) in 794 coincides with the beginning of global drought around 800.



13.2. Warriors

⁵ A court noble could give a local landholder immunity from taxation and thereby receive a portion of the estate's produce in return for his protective service. The Fujiwara clan owned the most extensive manorial rights. Family registers and the allocation of farming land were discontinued, and state-owned land was integrated into the private estates.

⁶ According to Tsunoda, et al. (1958: 109), "control of the so-called 'provinces,' tenuous even at the start, was in the ninth and tenth centuries almost entirely lost to great families who made a mockery of the land and tax system imported from Tang China." The characteristic feudal institutions of medieval Japan (embracing the twelfth through sixteenth centuries) had their roots in the Heian Period.

⁷ See Sansom (1963: 236). As early as 792, the Yamato court abandoned its policy of countrywide conscription of peasants and made district-level officials responsible for keeping peace in the provinces through the organization of local militia. The distressed people turned to religion for solace. The Buddhist leaders did their best to offer people consolation for the miseries of the age that peaked in the tenth century.

⁸ Friday (1992: 4)

⁹ According to Farris (1992: 150-2, 375), "Japanese peasants of the tenth

monopoly of a small number of other aristocratic clans.

"END OF THE DYNASTY" SYNDROM

During the ninth century, the aristocratic clans (in the capital and in the provinces) and large temples started to create private manors (*shōen*), and by the tenth century, the public land-holding system as well as the authority of the central government collapsed completely.⁵ As owners of the private estates, powerful aristocrats and monks of important temples had appointed major local families and peasants to function as local administrators.⁶

The spread of private estates reduced the state revenues, forcing the imperial family to rely on income from its own estates and leading to a nation-wide breakdown of law and order. Contemporary accounts give a picture of chaos and violence so widespread that the commoners had to arm in self-defense.⁷

By the early tenth century, small- and medium-sized farmers began to arm themselves for self-protection and gather around the wealthiest and most influential of their own standing.⁸ Farmers preferred a local magnate who claimed noble descent than an aristocratic absentee landlord. Those who owned or administered the great estates, on the other hand, were forced to maintain private warriors to protect their lives and property. Friday (1992: 174-5, 139) notes that "By the end of the ninth century, most of the state's military dirty work was being done by private forces directed by private warriors operating in the name of the government," and also that by 914 the occupants of *Kebiishi* (provincial police officers) posts were "all peasants of the province in which they hold office." Sansom (1963: 239) observes: "It may be taken for granted that, especially in the provinces remote from the capital, almost every farmer was a warrior."

After being mobilized for fighting, the peasant soldiers used to return to their lands.⁹ As time passed, however, there evolved military specialists by natural selection who started to form a professional full-time warrior class called *samurai*. The *samurai* were destined to become the rulers of medieval Japan. There evolved a sort of meritocracy based on martial skills instead of the Confucian examination system.

Whether of humble origin like Toyotomi Hideyoshi or of obscure origin like Tokugawa Ieyasu, every swordsman was placed on an equal footing. The only wonder is why it took such a long time for the peasant warriors to recognize their absolute power.

Aristocratic clans that were unable to acquire high positions in the central government went out to the provinces, assuming leadership over the peasant warriors. They maintained their own cavalry, and enrolled peasants as their swordsmen and archers. The Minamoto clan (*Genji*) and the Taira clan (*Heishi*), both descended from the imperial family, came to serve as the two largest rallying points of peasant warriors.¹⁰ The leaders of the imperial line could legitimize the power of peasant warriors. Until the end of the twelfth century, however, the warriors were still the servants of the court and the state. “*Samurai*” literally means “one who serves.” The leaders of peasant warriors were politically naïve and remained outside the power structure for a long time. According to Farris (1992: 176), court nobles had their own warriors to guard their mansions, and were “able to keep [provincial] warriors at heel by setting them against themselves.”

MILITARY GOVERNMENT BRINGING ORDER TO THE CHAOS

The Taira clan captured political power first (1156-60) and occupied the higher official positions of the central government in 1167, but was soon overthrown by the Minamoto clan in 1185. Minamoto Yoritomo commenced the Kamakura shogunate (1192-1333) at a seaside village in the east. There emerged a complicated feudal system with an imperial court still appointing provincial officials, owners of private estates appointing their own administrators, and the shogun appointing his own vassals as provincial protectors and stewards. Although the court nobles were still able to compete for power and influence with warriors, the establishment of military government in Kamakura effectively terminated the rule by the Yamato court. The collapse of the aristocratic Yamato court brought new leaders on the scene and a greater participation by the locals in the national life. The military government, in one form or another, endured into the

century moved too freely” to be reliant on the leaders’ economic and social functions and “warriors were free to come and go as they pleased.” While the peasant soldiers had farmed a bit of land, they basically relied on robbing and pillaging to sustain themselves.

¹⁰ Imperial offspring five or six generations removed from the ruler were cut off from the dynasty and given surnames like other nobles. The royal house had no surname. In 814, Saga (809-23) created, as dynastic shedding 分家, the surname Minamoto (*Gen 源*) for 33 of his 50 children. In addition to the original Saga Genji, there were Minamoto lineages tracing their origins to Seiwa (858-76), Uda (887-97), etc. Minamoto Yoritomo, who established the Kamakura shogunate, and Ashikaga Takauji, who established the Muromachi shogunate, both could trace their descent from Seiwa Genji. In 825, Kanmu awarded the surname Taira (*Hei 平*) to his grandson. Thereafter, all members cut off from the imperial line were surnamed either Minamoto or Taira. Kanmu’s great grandson was also made Taira, and his descendants achieved notable reputations as warriors. The Hōjō family, who controlled the shogunate after the death of Minamoto Yoritomo, also claimed descent from the Taira. The Tokugawa family tried to trace their ancestry to the Minamoto line.

¹¹ See Tsunoda, et al. (1958: 181).

¹² The Muromachi shogunate was destroyed in 1572 by a feudal lord, Oda Nobunaga, who was killed in 1582 by one of his vassals, Toyotomi Hideyoshi. The unification of the Japanese islands in 1590 was followed by the invasion of Chosun (1592-8). Building on the social system introduced by Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, the Tokugawa shogunate (1603-1868), established by a daimyo based in Edo, was able to maintain a stable social order (of the ruling samurai above the farmer, the artisan, and the merchant) on the Japanese islands for 265 years.

¹³ Buddhism was regarded as a political-religious ideology to further the secular objective of the state. After unification, however, Buddhism began to separate itself from politics, losing its political influence but gaining its religious autonomy.

¹⁴ Head-rank six were just below the true-bone royal clans, and their advancement in public office was restricted by the members of the royal lineage. Aristocrats of the head-rank six through head-rank four lineages could occupy the lower positions. Head-ranks from one to three designated the common people. The bone rank system dictated what kind of clothes, carriages, daily utensils, and houses members could have. The Council of *True-Bone* Nobles made decisions on succession to the throne and the declaration of war.

nineteenth century.¹¹

A samurai leader named Ashikaga Takauji, who could also claim the imperial line, established the Muromachi shogunate (1333-1573) and let feudal *daimyos* rule over independent provincial areas. Samurai and peasants organized autonomous local organizations, and the regional *daimyos* tried to incorporate these various autonomous entities into their own political system and to organize local warriors into armies on the basis of lord-vassal relationships.¹²

The Paekche people, who had conquered the Japanese islands and set themselves up as a layer of overlords above the rice-growing Yayoi-Kofun peasants, lost power to the samurai class of peasant origin, though some of them could survive as the heads of samurai warriors.

2. Fall of the Silla and Rise of the Koryeo Dynasty

The three kingdoms in the Korean peninsula had evolved from pluralistic regimes into centralized aristocratic states centered upon the kingship, giving former tribal or clan chieftains appropriate ranks in the hierarchic bureaucracy. Military forces were put under the authority of the king as commander-in-chief, who often led troops in person and fought in battle. The council of the high aristocracy made decisions on the most important matters of state. Fortresses were built in the regions, and the castle lords served both as governors and military commanders. Aristocratic holders of government office and military command were rewarded with large amounts of land and prisoner-slaves.

Buddhism was seen as well-suited to the unity and cohesion of the nation's people and hence was eagerly accepted by the royal houses.¹³

The Silla had never adopted the Tang-style examination system. Rather, the Silla continued as a hereditary aristocratic society. Members of the holy-bone and the true-bone classes monopolized the throne and occupied the high-ranking positions.¹⁴ Garrisons called *Jeong* or Bannermen 停/幢 (differentiated with the color of the sleeves) were established in each province, commanded by true-bone generals. There were

also Oath Bannermen 誓幢 who pledged their loyalty to their commanders.

By the mid-eighth century, the culture and arts of the Unified Silla society seemed at the height of their glory. Beneath the surface, however, power struggles between the leading aristocratic clans and ruling royal families set in motion the process of the nation's decline and fall. The beginning of this turbulent period coincided with the beginning of global drought c. 800.

When Korea proper was divided into several kingdoms, ceaselessly fighting each other for conquest or mere survival, the rulers of each state had to maintain not only a strong autocratic rule for instant nation-wide mobilizations, but also a rational and fair institutional arrangement to consolidate the patriotic loyalty of peasants. When unification was achieved, however, the centralized aristocratic system soon began to degenerate into a ruthless means to exploit peasants.

“END OF THE DYNASTY” SYNDROME

The non-royal aristocracy eventually seized political power, abolished the system of annual grain grants from “office land,” and restored the old “stipend village” system for government officials, while continuing the “tax villages” enabling the aristocracy to hold agricultural land in perpetuity. The impoverished peasants who could not repay their debts were reduced to slavery.


Ambitious nobles created private military forces, arming their slaves and recruiting the roaming peasants. There occurred open contests for the throne, producing twenty kings during Silla's last 155 years (780-935). A contender for the throne often had to ally himself with local chiefs. In the countryside, the castle lords, some of them with a capital aristocratic background but most of them being indigenous local headmen in the final days, usurped the positions of the provincial magistrates who had been dispatched from the capital.¹⁵

The first large scale peasant revolt broke out in 889, and then a succession of rebellions erupted all over the country. Two leaders, one from poor peasant stock and the other an outcast royal prince, eventually consolidated the

¹⁵ The nobles commanded their own private soldiery recruited from the local populace and landless wanderers, and exacted taxes and corvée labor service from the peasant.



13.3. Koryeo Dae-heung San-sung
A mountain fortress constructed by the Koryeo people to be used as a stronghold to defend its capital city, Kae-sung, when the Qidan army invaded.



13.4. Koryeo Jeong-bang San-sung
A mountain fortress located at Kwang-sung-ri, Sari-won City, Hwang-hae-do

¹⁶ 高麗史節要 丙申十九年 [936]
秋九月..王率三軍至天安合兵進次一
善神劔而兵逆之隔一利川而陣 王與
瑩觀兵而... 領黑水達姑鐵勒諸蕃勁
騎九千五百

Wang Keon and his immediate successors restructured the entire society and relieved the misery of common people by establishing a more equitable land-tax system and emancipating a large number of slaves.

¹⁷ Wang Keon bestowed the royal surname on powerful castle lords, and formed matrimonial alliances with local clan leaders, taking six queens and 23 wives. He had concluded a marriage arrangement with the last Silla king, each marrying one of the other's daughters.

¹⁸ Koryeo culture was matrilineal, holding by law that the social class of a child followed that of the mother. The state examination and marriage ties permitted mobility, though limited, in the Koryeo society. Peasants could not hold government office. Buddhism was an established culture of the late Silla and became the state religion of the Koryeo dynasty with two major schools – Doctrinal and Meditation – providing different paths to enlightenment. The Buddhist establishment became closely intertwined with secular affairs, and became rich through vast landholdings. The Meditation school of Buddhism had spread in the closing days of the Silla, and also predominated in late Koryeo

peasant rebel forces (called the armed Grass Brigands), and established the Later Paekche in 892 and Later Koguryeo in 901, respectively. The Later Three Kingdom period in the Korean peninsula (892-936) roughly matches the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdom period (907-960) in mainland China.

WANG KEON BRINGING ORDER TO THE CHAOS

Wang Keon (877-943) had emerged from a powerful local clan in the Kae-seong area that had been engaged in extensive maritime commercial activities. He had at first served as a commander of the Later Koguryeo (901-18) army, and then put forward by the generals for the kingship. He established the Koryeo dynasty (918-1392), winning surrender of the last ruler of Silla in 935 and destroying the Later Paekche in 936. It is recorded that, among the 86,500 soldiers mobilized by Wang Keon at his final battle against the Later Paekche in September 936, 9,500 consisted of valiant Black-Water Ruzhen and Uighur Turkic cavalry soldiers.¹⁶

The Koryeo created hereditary military households from among the young and vigorous peasants, granting land to soldiers and assigning two supporting households to cultivate the land of each military household. What was called Stipend Land was allocated to officials, in lieu of salary, and what was called Merit Land was granted in perpetuity and cultivated by tenant farmers. There were also public lands tilled by peasants paying one-fourth of the harvest to the state.

Wang Keon broke the bone-rank order, and drew on hereditary aristocrats from many different clans.¹⁷ Thousands of native provincial strongmen were named vassals of merit. A large number of local aristocratic clans, including the aristocrats of Silla's *head-rank* six lineages and the powerful clans of the Kae-seong area, participated in the central bureaucracy. Koryeo adopted the Confucian examination system in 958 to select civil officials of varied backgrounds, and institutionalized an elaborate Chinese-style government apparatus. Aristocratic lineages, however, still determined political power. They monopolized the highest offices in the government, married their daughters to the monarchs, controlled extensive wealth, and dominated the educational

institutions. It was essentially a hereditary society, though the officials recruited through the civil service examination became an active check on the entrenched power of the aristocratic establishment in the latter half of the dynasty.¹⁸

Wang Keon regarded himself as the successor of the Koguryeo dynasty, and welcomed the ruling class and the last crown prince of the Parhae dynasty that was destroyed by the Qidan Liao (916-1125) in 926. More than fifty thousand Parhae aristocrats took refuge in Koryeo, and the crown prince was officially included in the Koryeo royal clan. The influx of Parhae refugees, including officials, artisans, and peasants, continued throughout the tenth century. Most Ruzhen tribes had been under Parhae rule, but when Parhae was destroyed by the Qidan, they looked upon Koryeo as the suzerain power.¹⁹

3. Fall of the Tang and Birth of a Proto-Manchurian Dynasty

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE TANG DYNASTY

By the early eighth century, the Tang government lost control of land allotment, the equal-field system became ineffective, and control over the land and peasants by the great estate owners increased. The polarization of land ownership destroyed the foundation of a self-supporting conscript army. In 749, the Tang government abandoned the conscription of the peasantry, preferring a mercenary army that was maintained throughout the period of the Five Dynasties (907-60) and the Song (960-1279).

Gao Xian-zhi was a Tang general of Koguryeo origin who commanded the An-xi area. In 746, he led 10,000 cavalry across the Pamirs, and drove out the Tibetans. Gao achieved spectacular success in the campaigns of Gilgit and Farghana, but his army was routed in 751 by the Arabs on the Talas River. Tang lost all of Central Asia by Gao's defeat.

Under the Xuan-zong (713-55), Tang displayed grandeur and prosperity, and yet the Uighur khagans were extracting huge amounts of silk and other gifts from Tang.²⁰ The Sogdian merchants of the Turkestan oases acted as buyers of extorted silk and other goods for trade in the west. An Lu-

society because of its simple message, calling for meditation and relying on sudden enlightenment. The impoverished peasant found it a source of consolation. In the closing years of Koryeo, new interest grew in Neo-Confucianism.

¹⁹ See Henthorn (1971: 96).

高麗史節要 乙酉八年 十二月 [925] 契丹滅渤海 渤海本粟末靺鞨也 唐武后時 高句麗人大祚榮走保遼東 睿宗封爲渤海郡王 因自稱渤海國 併有扶餘肅慎等十餘國...而與契丹世讎 契丹主大舉攻渤海圍忽汗城滅之 改爲東丹國 其世子大光顯 及將軍申德 禮部卿大和均 均老司政大元均 工部卿大福譽 左右衛將軍大審理 小將冒豆干 檢校開國男朴漁 工部卿吳興等 率其餘衆 前後來奔者數萬戶 王待之甚厚 賜光顯姓名王繼 附之宗籍 使奉其祀 僚佐皆賜爵

Some Mohe-Ruzhen tribes of Parhae moved into the Ham-heung plain in the Korean northeast and also into the Yalu River area. According to Lee (1984: 126), "It was Koryeo that supplied their needs of grain, cloth, iron agricultural implements, and iron weapons, for which they exchanged horses and furs. There were many Ruzhen who remained in their original places of abode and yet put their trust in Koryeo, while still others migrated into the Koryeo domain. To these Koryeo gave land and dwellings, thus furnishing them with the means to maintain their livelihood."

²⁰ In the late seventh century, the eastern Turks, destroyed in 630-46 by Tang Tai-zong, restored their traditional khanate. The western Turks, also, revolted against the khans appointed by the Tang court, regaining their independence. There followed civil war, and one of the vassal tribes took over the eastern Turkic khanate, establishing the empire of Uighur Turks (744-840) in the same upper Orkhon region. It was the substitution of one Turkic khanate for another.

²¹ See Twitchett (1979: 426-7, 433-5, 443, 449, 455-7, 461, 471). In 755, An Lu-shan, as the military governor of Fan-yang (modern Beijing), invaded Qidan territory and inflicted heavy losses on the Qidan tribes. But later in the same year, An Lu-shan himself rebelled and invaded Hebei with a force including large contingents of Qidan.

²² 新唐書 卷二百一十七上 列傳 第一百四十二上 回鶻上 肅宗即位 使者來請助討祿山...代宗即位...請助天子討賊...德宗立...先帝...土地人衆歸我 玉帛子女子回紇

²³ See Franke and Twitchett (1994: 44-8) and Barfield (1989: 121, 161, 164-9).

北史 卷九十四 列傳 第八十二 奚 本曰庫莫奚 其先東部胡宇文之別種也 初爲慕容晃所破...契丹國...與庫莫奚異種同類 並爲慕容晃所破...太和三年 [479] 高句麗竊與蠕蠕謀欲取地豆干以分之 契丹舊怨其侵軼...天保四年 [553]...寄於高麗...隋開皇

shan, a half Sogdian and half Turk general who had commanded the northwestern frontier army, rebelled in 755, captured Luo-yang, and proclaimed himself emperor of Greater Yan in 756. Xuan-zong summarily executed Gao Xian-zhi and another general for their failure to defeat the rebels.²¹

Su-zong (r. 756-62), who usurped power from his father, appealed to the Uighur Turks (that replaced the eastern Turks in Mongolia and founded an empire in 744) to help him in recovering the capital, stating that: “the land and people belong to me; the jade and the silver, the boys and the girls will be given to the Uighurs.”²² The Uighur Turks became indispensable allies of the Tang, putting down the rebellion of An Lu-shan and Shi Si-ming in 757.

Rebellion, however, raged across mainland China until 763, and the central power of the Tang dynasty never fully revived thereafter. The Tang owed its continued existence to the Uighur military support. Barfield (1989: 151) notes that: “When the Uighur empire was destroyed by a more savage Kirghiz Turks [from the upper Yenisei region] in 840, the Tang lost its protection and fell in all but name to the next revolt in China.” The fates of Tang and Uighur Turks waxed and waned together. The demise of the Uighur Empire coincided with the global drought c. 800 CE.

The Uighurs, expelled from the Mongolian steppe by the Kirghiz, fled south to the oasis area in the Tarim basin that had been inhabited by the Aryan peoples, and eventually established Turkestan kingdoms, leading a sedentary life and inventing their own alphabetic script (by improving the Sogdian alphabetic script), later adapted to a semi-alphabetical and phonetic “small script” for Qidan c. 925 and later for Mongolian c. 1204.

THE QIDAN ORIGINATED FROM THE YU-WEN XIANBEI

The Qidan originated from the Yu-wen Xianbei that were crushed by the Mu-rong Xianbei in 345. The Qidan later became the tributaries of the Tuoba Xianbei. In 479, a large section of the Qidan, threatened by the expansion of the Jou-jans (that founded an empire in the Mongolian steppe in 308 that lasted until 552), moved southeastward into the middle valley of the Liao River. The Qidan became dependent on

Koguryeo in 553. During the Tang campaign against Koguryeo in 645, however, the Qidans fought on the side of the Tang. The Tang court bestowed on the chieftain of the Qidan confederation the imperial surname Li in 648, and tried to control the Qidan tribes indirectly.

The Qidan tribes came to occupy the Liao-xi area near modern Jehol and, in 696, came down through Shan-hai-guan, raiding the plain of Beijing in 697. Empress Wu sought help from the khagan of eastern Turks (that destroyed the Jou-jan Mongols and founded an empire in 552) who were able to so thoroughly destroy the Qidan as to eliminate their threat to the Tang for more than two centuries until the Uighur Turks (that had replaced the eastern Turks in 745 to become the new Turkish Protector for the Tang) were destroyed by the wild Kirghiz Turks.²³ The Kirghiz could understand neither the empire-building nor the benefits from playing the role of Protector for the Han Chinese dynasties. The Kirghiz Turks soon went back to the Yenisei steppes, creating a power vacuum on the Mongolian steppes.

In 907, the chieftains of the eight Qidan tribes gathered together and elected the leader of the Yelu (formerly *I-la*) tribe called A-bao-ji (872-926; r. 916-26), the khaghan of the Qidan confederation. A-bao-ji laid the foundation for the Liao dynasty by uniting Qidan tribes, gaining hegemony over the Liao-xi steppe, and establishing control over a number of cities in the Liao River basin.

The original core of the Qidan native territory was located on Liao-xi steppe, especially in the basin of the Sharamurun (Xar Moron). This is the region where the Qidan established their Supreme and Central Capitals, and the hydronym Liao became the basis of their dynastic name.²⁴ Being located between the deserts and steppes in the west and the plains and forests in the east, the Qidan Xianbei culture had traits in common with both the Turko-Mongol and Tungusic peoples. Franke and Twitchett (1994: 46) note that: “the Qidan may have spoken either a proto-Mongolian language influenced by Tungusic vocabulary or a Tungusic language influenced by Mongolian vocabulary, in either case using many Turkic loan words.”²⁵

The relationship between the Xianbei and the Yemaek

四年 [584]...契丹...背高麗

舊唐書 卷一百九十九下 列傳 北狄 契丹 居...鮮卑之故地...分爲八部... 諸部皆須議合 不得獨舉 本臣突厥... 不利則遁保青山及鮮卑山...太宗伐高麗 至營州...授其蕃將窟哥爲左武衛將軍 貞觀二十二年...賜姓李氏... 則天怒其反亂...攻陷冀州...俄而奚及突厥之衆掩擊其後...以...東走

新唐書 列傳 北狄 契丹...攻崇州... 武后怒...突厥默啜襲破其部

The Kirghiz never attempted to incorporate the Uighur elite to found an empire, learning the art of maintaining the tributary connection. The Uighur elite fled south and became rulers of two sedentary oasis city states in Turkestan, and transformed themselves from the nomadic protector-extortioner into the international middlemen, trading horses and jade for silk.

²⁴ See Janhunen (1996: 145).

The Qidan had been only semi-nomadic, relying to some extent on agricultural crops, especially millet. See Fairbank and Goldman (1992: 113). According to Franke and Twitchett (1994: 57), the Qidan had begun to practice more advanced agriculture, to foster the production of iron and salt, and to encourage weaving under the chieftainship of A-bao-ji's father Sa-la-ti.

²⁵ See Grousset (1970: 133-134). A-bao-ji provided the Qidan people with their own writing system. In 920, the

“large script” was invented by adapting the Chinese script to the highly inflected Qidan language. In 925, the “small script” was invented by adapting the Uighur alphabet. In 1922, two inscriptions in Qidan writing dating to the early twelfth century were discovered in Mongolia.

²⁶ 遼史 地理志一 遼國其先曰契丹本鮮卑之地...上京道 上京臨潢府本漢遼東郡西安平之地...名曰皇都

遼史 卷四十九 志第十八 禮志一 遼本朝鮮故壤 箕子八條之教 流風遺俗 蓋有存者

²⁷ Parhae was a rich country, with five capitals, fifteen superior prefectures, and sixty-two prefectures. The Eastern Capital at Liao-yang came to control the former Parhae territories, while the Southern Capital at modern Beijing controlled the former Han Chinese territories.

遼史 卷一 本紀第一 太祖 太祖 ... 姓耶律氏...字阿保機...契丹...里人...天顯元年 [926]...拔夫餘城...詔諭渤海郡縣...以平渤海

²⁸ Koryeo pulled together the fragmented members of the Koguryeo-Parhae dynasties as well as their traditional territory south of the Yalu. Those Yemaek Tungus who remained in Manchuria became to be thoroughly absorbed into the Ruzhen-Manchu Tungus.

Tungus was close enough for the History of Liao to assert that the Qidan Liao, the descendants the Xianbei, had originated from the old Chosun land, having the identical customs and tradition of “the Ki-ja (Ji-ji)’s Eight Clauses of Instruction” as the Chosun.²⁶

THE QIDAN XIANBEI UNIFY MANCHURIA BEFORE OCCUPYING NORTH CHINA

Taking advantage of the anarchy on the steppe, A-bao-ji attacked Mongolia in 912, and led a great expedition into the steppe in 924-5, conquering northern Mongolia around the Orkhon River. He also established his sovereignty over the Uighurs Turks who had settled in the Gansu area.

A-bao-ji conquered Parhae (Bohai) in 926, just before his death at the age of fifty-four, unifying virtually the whole of Manchuria. After conquering Parhae, instead of annexing its territory, A-bao-ji made it a vassal kingdom by changing its name to the kingdom of Dong-tan (abolished in 930), and appointed as its king his eldest son.²⁷ Franke and Twitchett (1994: 66) note: “Why A-bao-ji acted so cautiously toward Parhae is not entirely clear. ... he may simply have wished to avoid antagonizing its numerous and potentially hostile population ...” The Parhae retained a great degree of autonomy under their own leaders and paid tribute as vassals rather than taxes as subjects until in the early eleventh century when they were fully incorporated into the Liao system of government (see *ibid.*, p. 79).

Ledyard (1983: 346) contends that “the defeat of Parhae in 926 was the final blow to Korean pretensions to the territory north of the Yalu ... and ... its defeat takes Korea out of Manchuria for the rest of history up to the present time.”²⁸

The ephemeral Former Yan (349-70) was able to occupy only the Liao-xi and Liao-dong, without conquering the Koguryeo, before launching attacks on North China. The Northern Wei (386-534) was unable to occupy even the Liao-dong before conquering North China in 439. The Qidans, however, had conquered the Parhae and unified almost all of Manchuria before occupying North China. Ledyard (1983: 323) notes: “unlike the earlier case, in which the various [Xianbei] Yan states and Koguryeo had ended up in a standoff, the

Qidans now quickly disposed of their eastern Manchurian rival, Parhae. Thus, for the first time in history, all of Manchuria, east and west, was controlled by a single state.”

Tai-zong (r. 926-47), a younger son of A-bao-ji, mounted an expedition against the Tangut tribes in 933, acquired sixteen formerly Chinese prefectures in 937, occupied Kai-feng for three months and adopted a new dynastic name, Liao, for the Qidan state in 947, and died shortly thereafter on his way back to the north from Kai-feng.

THE FOUNDER OF KIN IMPLEMENTS THE DUAL SYSTEM: THE LEGACY OF MURONG-XIANBEI AND TUOBA-XIANBEI

The Qidan Liao established their western capital at Da-tong and their southern capital at the border garrison city now called Beijing. The Liao came to occupy Manchuria, Mongolia, and the northeastern part of China, stretching from the borders of Korea in the east to the Altai Mountains in the west, and monopolizing China’s direct communication with Central and Western Asia. China inherited from Qidan the medieval European name Cathay (Kitaia, Cathaia), the name that still remains the standard designation for China throughout the Slavonic world, including Russia.

A-bao-ji had implemented the dualistic form of administration, with a Northern Administration responsible for the Qidan and tribal peoples and a Southern Administration, organized on the Tang model, responsible for the Han Chinese population. The Qidan continued the dual system until the end of the Liao dynasty (916-1125), recruiting Han Chinese civil administrators through examination, establishing an examination hall in the Southern Capital in 977, maintaining its own *Han-lin* academy, and yet enlisting the tribal troops to constitute the backbone of the army.²⁹

The Qidan tribes were mobilized to serve in the military units called *ordo* (from which derives “horde”).³⁰ It was indeed a dual state: the southern area of three million Chinese in sixteen prefectures around Beijing was governed through the Chinese style bureaucracy staffed almost entirely by Han Chinese officials (though important decisions were a preserve for the Qidan officers at the court), while the northern area of less than one million Qidan people was governed by the

²⁹ A-bao-ji had appointed northern and southern prime ministers. The division was not a strictly geographical one. Tai-zong ordered that the officials of the Northern Administration and the empress dowager (the arch-representative of the old tribal ways) wear Qidan costume and that the officials of the Southern Administration and the emperor himself dress in Chinese style.

The Qidans were debarred from taking the Chinese examinations, and were employed under the traditional system of hereditary succession to office. The scions of high Chinese officials also enjoyed the hereditary privilege of entry to office as under the Tang. See Frank and Twitchett (1994: 77, 92).

³⁰ The Altaic term for the household or camp of a ruler is *ordo* in Mongolian and *ordu* in Turkic. The Liao royal family members including the emperor had their own *ordo*, which included servants, retainers, and dignitaries. The emperor and princes of the Kin had personal regiments like the Liao *ordo*, which included not only the Ruzhen military units but also a great number of slaves. Both the Liao and Kin maintained the structural dualism of bodyguard-household and formal bureaucratic administration. See Frank and Twitchett (1994: 22-3, 63).

³¹ Fairbank and Goldman (1992: 113) Tao Jing-shen (in Rossabi, 1983: 78) notes that: “Fu Pi ... pointed out that the Qidans ... had not only adopted

Chinese institutions but also had a formidable military machine, which the Chinese did not have.”

³² Rossabi (1983: 5-6) notes: “Ten Kingdoms, whose monarchs were generally Chinese, ruled South China, and Five Dynasties, whose potentates were usually of foreign origin, governed North China. ... The rulers in South China generally did not lay claim to the title of ‘emperor.’ ... Only the Northern states competed for control of the whole Chinese empire.”



13.5. Early Song Painting of Water Transport on Silk

³³ See Barfield (1989: 174). The treaty of 1042 confirmed the brotherly relationship, and increased the annual payments to 200,000 units of silver and 300,000 units of silk.

traditional tribal law.³¹

Through the dual system, the invaders from the Mongolian steppes or Manchuria attempted to resist sinification. While preserving their own tribal tradition, they let the Chinese people maintain their own way of life, allowing the cultural heritage of Chinese civilization to survive. Different rules were applied to their Han subjects but it did not mean that the Han Chinese were misgoverned. According to Franke and Twitchett (1994: 39), “the Han Chinese ... never once rose up against the Qidan, and at the very end, when the southern Han Chinese section of the Liao came under threat simultaneously from the Song and the Ruzhens, the population fiercely resisted the Song and then gave up the Southern Capital to the Ruzhen without even token resistance.”

THE HAN CHINESE SONG, THE SELF-CLAIMED HEIR TO THE TANG

The Tang dynasty had been fragmented by rebellions before it was extinguished in 907. The situation of the Five Dynasties in North China (907-60) and the Ten Kingdoms in Central and South China (902-79) following the collapse of Tang was structurally similar to that of the Five Barbarians and Sixteen States (304-439) after the fall of the Han Chinese dynasties, especially to the situation after the southward flight of the Western Jin court in 317 until the unification of North China by the Tuoba Xianbei in 439.³² A succession of warlords, usually of non-Chinese origin, claimed the Imperial throne in the north while the south was divided among the Han Chinese satraps.

After the rapid succession of the Five Dynasties in the north, the commander of the palace guard, Zhao Guang-yin (趙匡胤 Song Tai-zu), under the last of the dynasties (Later Zhou) was elevated to emperor by his troops in 960. Tai-zu (r. 960-76) was a highly skilled archer and horseman in his youth, and his forebears had been military leaders under one or another Imperial claimant.

The Qidans had maintained hostile confrontations against the Song, eventually concluding a peace treaty in 1004 which called for the Song to deliver 200,000 bolts of silk and 100,000 ounces of silver annually to the Qidans. The Qidan

were content to occupy Beijing and Da-tong. The peace by the treaties of 1004 and 1042 was preserved for a hundred years. The Song court was made to accept inferior status and continue to pay “tribute” in the name of a contribution to the Liao’s military expenses.³³

Jagchid and Symons (1989: 132) note: “stable relations...were maintained only because the Song were willing to annually present vast amounts of Chinese wealth to” the Qidans, and also to the Tangut Xia. The Tangut in northern Shaan-xi and Gan-su, the descendants of ancient Tibeto-Burman peoples, had acquired autonomy under the late Tang, established an independent state in 982, and then formed their own empire Xia (1038-1227) extracting large subsidies from the Song in exchange for peace until it was conquered by Chinggis khan in 1227. Since the most prominent Tangut clan had the surname Tuoba, some scholars speculate that the Xia emperors were descent from the Tuoba rulers of Xianbei Wei dynasties.³⁴

The population of the Song Empire amounted to about 80 million, while only about five million people lived in the area from Tibet through the Mongol steppes and Manchuria. After 963, the administration of the Song prefectures began to be transferred from the unruly military to civil officials recruited through the examination system (see Fairbank and Goldman, 1992, p. 88). The century and a half of the Song dynasty (960-1126), with its capital at Kai-feng, became one the most creative periods in Chinese civilization.

THE YE-MAEK KORYEO “RESPECTS THE STRONGER” AND MAKES PEACE WITH THE QIDAN-XIANBEI LIAO

The irredentist spirit of the founder of the Koryeo dynasty was evident in the very name, Koryeo, a shortened form of Koguryeo. In fact, many Chinese dynastic chronicles, as well as the Kojiki and Nihongi, always refer to Koguryeo as Koryeo.

Wang Keun, the founder of Koryeo, had left behind for his successors the Ten Injunctions, of which Article 5 commanded the later kings to reside more than 100 days a year in the Western Capital (the modern Pyung-yang). Article 4 commanded the later kings to avoid the ignobility of copying the Han Chinese tradition, and never to imitate the barbarous

遼史 卷十九 本紀第十九 興宗二十一年 [1041] 閏月癸未...宋歲增銀絹十萬兩匹 文書稱貢

Tao Jing-shen (Rossabi, 1983: 69) notes that: “A fictitious kinship relationship was established between the emperors of the two states. ... On receiving the news of the death of an emperor ... funeral ceremonies were held at both courts ...” The two states often addressed each other as the “northern dynasty” and “the southern dynasty.”

³⁴ Franke and Twitchett (1994: 154) note that: “the Tangut emperor ruled over a multiethnic, economically diversified population numbering perhaps three million. His subjects included Chinese, Tibetans, Uighurs, Qidans, and various other Ch’iang and Turkic groups in addition to the Tangut core.” See also (ibid: 156-7). According to Janhunen (1996: 139), the name Tangut seems to have originated among some early Mongol-related populations, but the Tangut must still be regarded as ethnically unclassified.



13.6. Koryeo Leather Boots

³⁵ 高麗史節要 癸卯二十六年 (943)
 王...召...親授訓要...其三曰 凡元子不
 肖者與其次子 次于皆不肖者 與其
 兄弟之中群下推戴者繼承大統 其四
 曰 惟我東方 舊慕唐風文物禮樂 悉
 導其制 殊方異土 人性各異 不必苟
 同 契丹是禽獸之國 風俗不同 言語
 亦異 衣冠制度 慎勿效焉 其五曰...
 西京水德調順為我國地脈之根本 宜
 當四仲巡 駐留過百日 以致安寧

Wang Keon had strong reservations about the Chinese tradition of requiring the eldest son, even if an idiot or a rogue, to take the throne. In good Altaic fashion, Article 3 clearly commanded the choice of the most capable heir by saying that when the eldest son is unworthy, then a younger son be chosen; and when all the younger sons are unworthy, then one of the brothers may ascend the throne.

高麗史節要 壬寅二十五年 冬十月
 契丹遣使來歸橐駝五十四 王以契丹
 嘗與渤海連和忽生疑貳不顧舊盟 一
 朝殄滅此為無道之甚不足遠結為隣
 絕其交聘流其使三十人于海島繫橐
 駝萬夫橋下皆餓死
 高麗史節要 庚申十一年 (960) ...以
 開京為皇都西京為西都

³⁶ Rogers (1983: 155) notes: "Xiao ... complained that Koryeo, despite its proximity to Liao, 'crossed the sea to serve Song.'... Seo Hui ... vehemently asserted Koryeo's claim to Koguryeo's territory on both sides of the Yalu. He justified Koryeo's relations with Song and noted that hostile Ruzhen tribes in the Yalu region prevented similar

Qidan tradition. In October 942, the Qidan envoys brought a gift of fifty camels, but Wang Keon, angry at the destruction of Parhae in 926 by the Qidan, banished the thirty Qidan envoys to an island and let the camels starve to death. Kwangjong (949-75) styled himself emperor, calling Kae-seong the "Imperial Capital" in 960.³⁵

Ledyard (1983: 323) notes: "As the self-proclaimed successor to Koguryeo ... Koryeo considered the northern territories in Manchuria its rightful legacy. The Qidans, as conquerors of Bohai [Parhae]... obviously had other ideas. Koryeo was ultimately successful in laying claim to and holding the old Bohai lands south of the lower Yalu, which were the bone of contention in a series of Koryeo-Liao wars lasting from 993 to 1018."

In 993, the Liao had sent an invasion force, claimed to number 800,000, across the Yalu under Xiao Sun-ning, viceroy of the Liao Eastern Capital. Xiao had identified Koryeo with Silla and Liao with Koguryeo, and demanded the cession to Liao of the former Koguryeo territories both south and north of the Yalu. Through the diplomatic maneuvers of Seo Hui, however, Koryeo could persuade the Qidan army to withdraw voluntarily. The Qidan could not deny Seo Hui's assertion that Koryeo was the successor to Koguryeo and thus could lay claim to the Manchurian territories formerly under Koguryeo dominion, including the Liao's Eastern Capital. In fact, the Qidans were engaged in a battle against the Northern Song at that time, and hence were unable to bring their full strength to bear on Koryeo. The Qidan Liao, and later the Ruzhen Kin, avoided engagements on both mainland China and the Korean peninsula fronts at the same time.³⁶

After concluding the peace treaty with the Song in 1004, the Liao launched full-scale campaigns against Koryeo, beginning in 1010 and lasting for about ten years, but they gained no real success. The Liao army of 400,000 men invaded Koryeo in 1010, and captured the capital. Koryeo mobilized 300,000 soldiers. Fearing that their supply lines might be cut, the Qidan suddenly withdrew without gaining any particular advantage.³⁷ The Qidan invaded again, this time with 100,000 men, in 1018, but virtually the entire army was annihilated at Kui-ju by the 208,300-men-strong Koryeo army led by general

Kang Kam-chan. Every Qidan invasion of Koryeo ended in failure, but in 1020 the Koryeo court, keeping its cis-Yalu territory, promised to abandon its hostile stance against Qidan and to break its relations with the Song, and thenceforth their relationship was peaceful.

After experiencing the repeated ravages of warfare, the Koryeo rulers learned the wisdom of “Respect-the-Greater” or “Yield-to-Stronger” strategy. When the Ruzhen Kin appeared as the new “Stronger,” never mind whether they were barbarous nomads or primitive woodsmen, the Koryeo readily accepted the suzerain-subject formality without mounting a single battle.

The Yalu River has ever since been the definitive northern frontier for the peninsular state dominated by the pure-blooded Ye-maek Tungus. Their cousins in Manchuria, who had already gone through the process of forming the Marco-Tungus under Koguryeo (after c. 400) and Parhae (689-926), began the process of becoming an integral part of the greater (Xianbei-Tungus) Manchurian people under the Liao, Kin, Yuan and Qing that came to occupy the whole of Manchuria.

The Northern Song court (960-1127), which was thoroughly humiliated by the Liao, admired the vigor of the new Koryeo kingdom and promoted commercial and cultural exchanges. The Song and the Koryeo, however, maintained rather irregular relations with each other, partly because of Qidan and Ruzhen interventions, and partly because of the reservations harbored by the Song against the Koryeo. According to Ledyard (1983: 347), “a substantial body of Song opinion, led by Su Tung-p’o, still considered Koryeo tainted with a ‘Manchurian’ character that in their view utterly impaired its usefulness as an ally. But another Song group, for which Fu Pi can serve as the spokesman, seems to have grasped the reality that Koryeo was a valid and credible enemy of the Manchurian forces – in other words, that it was now a peninsular power defending a Chinese style of civilization against northern enemies. But Su’s views largely prevailed.”

4. The Eastern Manchurian Woodsmen Founding a

relations with the Liao. If Koryeo were permitted to establish forts in strategic locations to control the Ruzhens it would seek to cultivate relations with Liao.”

Through diplomatic maneuvers, Koryeo obtained Qidan consent to incorporate the area up to the Yalu into its territory and to build forts to regulate the Ruzhens. See also Lee (1984: 125) and Franke and Twitchett (1994: 103).

高麗史節要 癸巳十二年 [993] 冬十月 蕭遜寧...書云八十萬兵...語熙曰 汝國興新羅地 高句麗之地我所有也 而汝侵蝕之 又與我連壤而越海 事宋大國 是以來討 今割地以獻 而修朝聘 可無事矣 熙曰 非也 我國則高句麗之舊也 故號高麗 都平壤 若論地界 上國之東京 皆在我境 何得謂之 侵蝕乎 且鴨綠江內外亦我境內 今女真盜據 其間頑黠變詐 道途梗澁 甚於涉海 朝聘之不通 女真之故也 若今逐女真 還我舊地 築城堡 通道路 則敢不修聘 ...熙復奏曰 臣與遜寧 若盪平女真 收復舊地 然後朝觀可通 今...收江內請俟得江外 修聘未晚

³⁷ Franke and Twitchett (1994: 219) note that, when the Qidans waged a campaign against Koryeo in 1910, “the Ruzhens took the Korean side. The Qidans suffered a heavy defeat and retreated. But for the Ruzhens, this victory of their Korean ally had the result that their emissaries for quite some time thereafter reached Song China only as members of Korean embassies.”

³⁸ According to Tao (1976: 6), the Ruzhen may have been subject to the Mohe for a long time, and hence were also called Mohe or Hei-shui Mohe. When the Ruzhen became the most influential tribe in 1100, the Mohe suddenly disappeared in history, probably because the Ruzhen had subjugated all the Mohe tribes, and all the Mohe called themselves Ruzhen.

³⁹ The wild Ruzhen tribes had been scattered in the mountains and elected for themselves brave persons as chieftains. They had maintained semiegalitarian customs, and all had the same millet gruel and roast meat for food. Aguda did not expect his officials to kowtow before him. The Liao court had appointed Wu-gu-nai (1021-71), a sixth-generation descendent of the founder of the Wan-yan clan and the grandfather of Aguda, as military governor of the wild Ruzhens. The Wan-yan clan had their original home in the valley of a southern tributary of the Song-hua River, east of Harbin, which became the site of the Kin Supreme Capital. See Franke and Twitchett (1994: 220-1, 266).

⁴⁰ Tao (1976: 15) notes that: "A Ruzhen chieftain sent 700 horses, together with other native products, to Koryeo in 948, marking the beginning of relations between the two peoples. The Ruzhen furnished Koryeo with information about the Qidan, revealing, in 993, a Qidan plan of invading Koryeo. Although the Ruzhen paid tribute to Koryeo and

Full-fledged Manchurian Dynasty

The Liao army put down a major Parhae rebellion in 1029-30, and launched a number of punitive attacks on the wild Ruzhen tribes. By 1034-44, the northeastern frontier kept reporting alliances among the Parhae, wild Ruzhen tribes, and Koreans, necessitating the Qidan Liao punitive expeditions. The frequent revolts and wars along its northeastern flank drained the Liao dynasty (see Barfield, 1989, pp. 176-8).

Franke and Twitchett (1994: 217-8) note that: "all Chinese sources agree that the Ruzhens were a part of the Mohe (Korean *Malgal*) tribes who used to live along what is now the border between Korea and Manchuria ... [and] in Tang times they had become subjects of the Parhae kingdom." The Parhae kingdom (689-926) was established by the people of Puyeo-Koguryeo together with the Mohe people. The History of Liao, however, differentiates the Parhae (that include the Mohe) from the Ruzhen tribes (that originate from the Mohe).³⁸ The Qidans had incorporated some Ruzhen tribes into the Liao state, who were called "tame" Ruzhen. The use of "Ruzhens" in Liao history, therefore, seems to carry the connotation of untamed, wild Ruzhens, beyond the control of the Qidan.

Aguda (*Tai- \dot{z} u* 太祖 阿骨打 r. 1115-23), the founder of the Kin (Golden, formerly written as Jin or Chin in English) dynasty (1115-1234), was a leader of the Wan-yan clan that belonged to the wild Ruzhens. He was able to expand his dominance over the other wild Ruzhens during the eleventh century.³⁹ According to Franke and Twitchett (1994: 224), Aguda was not only an able general but also a brilliant diplomat and strategist.

Tao (1976: 16-7) contends that "it is safe to assume that Han-bu (*Shi- \dot{z} u* 始祖 函普 of the Kin dynasty) moved from Koryeo to Manchuria in the early to middle tenth century and settled in the Mudan River region. After four 'generations' Sui-ke (*Xian- \dot{z} u* 獻祖 綏可) moved to the banks of the Hai-gu River, near the present A-shi River. ... became powerful, and the Liao government appointed Shi-lu (*Zhao- \dot{z} u* 昭祖 石魯) as a Liao official. ... all the neighboring clans and Wan-yan lineages obeyed Wu-ku-nai (*Jing- \dot{z} u* 景祖 烏古迺 1021-74) making the Ruzhen the most powerful tribe in the middle

Song-hua region, and the Wan-yan men firmly established in its central leadership. ... Ying-ge (*Mu-zong* 穆宗 盈歌 1053-1103) ... stopped the sending of horses as tribute to ... Liao and Koryeo [after 1100].”⁴⁰

Unlike the steppe nomads, the Ruzhens relied upon farming as much as upon hunting and fishing. The Ruzhens had a mixed (say, semi-nomadic or semi-sedentary) economy that combined patchy farming with stock-raising, hunting, and fishing. The Ruzhen knew how to weave, plant hemp, and cultivate silkworms. They dressed in white linen in summer, and wore furs in winter. Just like the Ye-maek Tungus, they used *Kang*, a bed built of bricks or clay, that was heated with a fire underneath. They were forest tribes and yet had a fine cavalry. Their tribal organization, and their archery and horsemanship perfected by hunting, had produced a military tradition similar to their nomadic neighbors. The tribal families were grouped together under their hereditary commanders. When a man died, a brother could take his wife, preferring inheritance by brother from brothers. The Ruzhens worked hard in the fields to earn a meager living but, once in war, they devoted themselves to fighting, as if it were a family affair, in order to capture booty.⁴¹

The early Yan dynasties (designated either as the Former, Later, Western or Southern Yan, 349-410) had fallen victim to another Xianbei tribe, the Toubu Wei (386-534), that went on to unify North China. Seven hundred years later, the Qidan Liao also fell victim to another Manchurian tribe, the Ruzhens, who went on to conquer North China, seizing the whole Central Plain from Song.⁴²

Franke and Twitchett (1994: 215) state that, with the Kin dynasty, the Mohe-Ruzhen “Tungusic people appear for the first time in world history as an identifiable entity and as a great political power. ... Centuries later the Ruzhens’ direct descendants, the Manchus, repeated the achievements of their forefathers ... This time ... they ... subjugated the whole of China.”

MAINTAINING THE DUAL ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

Franke (ibid: 220) notes that “the contacts with the Liao state and the resulting acquaintance with the ways of a

received official titles, they raided and looted Koryeo borders, and even guided the Qidan to attack Koryeo in 1013.”

⁴¹ See Tao (1976: 8-10, 22). Every male adult member of the tribe participated in large-scale hunting by encirclement (*ta-wei*), became expert archers and skilled horseman, and was automatically a soldier in war, well prepared for military maneuvers.

⁴² The original core of the Qidan native territory was located in the basin of Shara-Muren, by this time occupied by some Mongol tribes who had come to the region, absorbing the native Qidan tribes, when the Yuan rulers fled to the Mongolian steppe in 1368. The Qidan may have become extinct as a separate population by the end of the Yuan period. See Janhunen (1996: 145).

⁴³ *Mou-ko* could have implied “living together” in a village or “moving together” to herd animals, to hunt or to make war as extended lineage groups, rather than blood relationships in spite of the fact that they had observed the rule of exogamy. Crossley (1997: 26-29) notes that the *mukūn* (*Mou-ko*) was the basic unit in the imperial armies of the Kin, enlisting whole extended lineage groups as units and giving each headman the rank of captain over the unit. As the Ruzhens formed the state, the *mukūn* units “became institutionalized parts of the army, and individuals adopted their *mukūn* names

as surnames,” transforming the *mukin* into a lineage concept of ancestral affiliation. Rewards, promotions, and land grants went to the *mukin* as a group.

⁴⁴ See Franke and Twitchett (1994: 38, 40). The Ruzhens at first organized those Qidan, Parhae and Chinese people who had surrendered into the same system. Hereditary office in the system was a considerable inducement for the surrendered leaders, with their subordinates, to join the system. The formation of new Chinese units stopped in 1124, and the hereditary office for Parhae and Chinese unit commanders was abolished in 1145 but was retained for the Qidan units. Out of a population of 45 million registered in the 1187 census, members of these hereditary Ruzhen military families (consisting of 202 *Meng-an* and 1,878 *Mou-ko*), excluding those of the imperial clan, amounted to about 6 million persons (living in about 0.6 million households). About 1.2 million persons among them were slaves. Until the end, the *Meng-an* system remained the basic organization of the Ruzhen military machine. See Franke (ibid: 274-6) and also Hsiao (1978: 9). Fairbank and Goldman (1992: 115) note that the Ruzhens of the Kin dynasty totaled about 6 million [including slaves], the Qidans remaining from the Liao dynasty about 4 million, and the Han Chinese subjects about 35 million.

⁴⁵ Crossley (1997: 21) notes that: “The

more organized and structured type of government led to a growing awareness that the traditional tribal organization would be insufficient if the Ruzhens wanted to match the Qidans.” The Ruzhen Kin had indeed inherited the dual administrative structure of the Qidan Liao dynasty. The former Liao officials were incorporated into the new Kin administration. The Qidan prefects and counties remained almost intact. Tao (1976: 25) states that: “It was quite natural for the new rulers to adopt the Qidan method of employing Chinese institutions to administer the Chinese populace, while preserving their own tribal structure for the Ruzhen.”

Franke (ibid: 265, 273) states that “the basic feature of their government and administrative system was the complex interplay between native Ruzhen traditions, features inherited from the Liao state and the Chinese (Song) influence,” and that the socio-military organization of the Ruzhen Kin was “a precursor of the Manchu banner (*niru*) system.” The entire Ruzhen population was organized into the socio-military *Meng-an* system with assigned land for farming. A *Mou-ko* was the basic unit, consisting of up to 300 households, and a *Meng-an* was composed of seven to ten *Mou-ko*. All able-bodied males in a household served as soldiers, and male slaves also served as auxiliary soldiers.⁴⁵ Every lineage occupied a village or walled town, with a headman called *po-chin*. In case of war, a chieftain would mobilize clansmen from the headmen (*po-chin*) over whom they had control. In war, a headman became a *Meng-an*, head of a thousand men, or *Mou-ko*, head of a hundred men. The *Meng-an* and *Mou-ko* system was retained by the Mongols in the form of *Qian-hu* and *Bai-hu* in Yuan times (see Tao, 1976, p. 115).

The Ruzhens absorbed the conquered tribes, including the Qidan tribes, as new *Meng-an* and *Mou-ko* units under the command of their own native tribal leaders.⁴⁴ For the subject Chinese population, however, the Kin established a Chinese-style bureaucratic government staffed by the Han Chinese literate elite.⁴⁵

The Kin started to recruit Han Chinese officials in 1123 through the examination system, which concentrated on the Chinese classics. The examinations played a greater role under the Kin than under the Liao and Yuan. Tao (1976: 117)

notes that: “They suppressed the scholar-officials who ventured into opposition, and made others obedient instruments of the highly centralized imperial court.” The highest positions with executive power were mostly held by the Ruzhens. Usually the Wan-yan clansmen held all the prominent positions in the government, but there were tribal meetings in which all the chieftains could participate in making decisions on important matters. The tradition of hereditary selection protected the privilege of those who already held office and contributed to the self-perpetuation of the officials as a class. Franke (ibid: 272) notes that “the practice of transferring meritorious military leaders to the civil bureaucracy also favored the Ruzhen elements of the population, as the military organization remained very much a Ruzhen preserve during most of the dynasty.”

Between 1117 and 1123, the Song rulers negotiated the recovery of their lost territories with the Kin by offering a military alliance against the Liao. The Ruzhens, however, did not need the assistance of Song troops to conquer the Liao. After all, the Song army failed to capture Liao’s Southern Capital, and the Kin armies instead occupied all of North China by 1126, including the Song capital of Kai-feng.

In Chinese history, the year 1126 marks the second time the Han Chinese were driven out of the Central Plain by a Manchurian conquest dynasty. In 1138, a new Song capital was established at Hang-zhou south of the Yangzi River. In 1141 the Song court formally ceded the whole area north of the Huai River and agreed to vassalage and payment of tributes to the Kin.⁴⁵ The Song dynasty prior to the loss of North China is called the Northern Song (960-1126), and after its loss, the Southern Song (1127-1279).

The founders of the Sui and Tang dynasties, who were born of the ruling aristocratic clans of the Xianbei conquest dynasties, could demonstrate expansionism and assertiveness. The Song, the self-claimed heir to the Tang dynasty, had picked up the pieces of the shattered Tang state, but was completely pushed out of the Central Plain by the Ruzhen Kin, as did the (Eastern) Jin court with its flight southward in 317. The Southern Song lost control over many regions in the south including Ta-li and Vietnam long before it

Ruzhens borrowed some elements of their empire from the Qidans. One was distillation of society into national divisions, so that people living in the northern part of China were governed in Chinese...tradition, while Ruzhens lived in distinct territories, and were governed according to their own traditions. The emperors, in the fashion of the Qidans before them, transcended the regional divisions by legitimating themselves in all traditions, including Confucianism, Buddhism, and shamanistic ritual.

⁴⁵ The treaty of 1141 stipulated that the Song were subjects (*zhen*) of the Kin. Jagchid and Symons (1989: 134-5) note that: “two hundred and fifty thousand *taels* of silver and two hundred fifty thousand rolls of silk were to be presented annually.” The Song emperor called the Ruzhen ruler as “Uncle Emperor.” See also Franke and Twitchett (1994: 224).

金史 卷六 本紀第六 世宗上 五年 宋...以國書來...稱姪宋皇帝稱名再拜 奉書于叔大金皇帝

⁴⁶ According to Hsiao (1978: 6-7), “the mercenary army that had begun to replace the conscript army since around the turn of the eighth century became full-fledged under the Song.” The ranks of the mercenary army, numbering over one million soldiers and costing more than 80 percent of government revenues throughout most of the two Song dynasties, were mainly filled with starving vagabonds, idlers,

and criminals.

⁴⁷ According to Hsiao (1978: 29), “the Ruzhen soldiers of the Kin were reluctant to cultivate land; first they leased the land allocated to them by the government to Chinese tenants, and eventually they sold it *in toto*.”

⁴⁸ See Grousset (1970: 186) and Franke and Twitchett (1994: 150-3). When the last Liao emperor was captured by the Ruzhen in 1125, Ye-lü Ta-shi, the Commander in Chief in Liao’s final days, established his headquarters at the former Qidan military and administrative center of the Orkhon River region, but in 1130 he led his horde westward in search of new territories. He subjugated the Uighurs at Hami and Turfan, established a foothold in Transoxiana, and then gradually conquered the whole area between the Pamirs and the Aral Sea. The expedition in 1134 to restore the Liao dynasty, however, ended in failure. The Mongolic Black Qidan shared a common boundary with the Muslim Turkic empire of Khwarazm (1097-1220) in the west that ruled Transoxiana and Iran. Several Qidan clans are believed to have made a further westward migration to the Ural and Volga regions, joining the ruling class of Kipchak Turks, the masters of the Russian steppe, by the middle of the eleventh century. The least civilized Seljuk Turks from the north of Lake Balkhash had adopted Islam in place of the Turko-Mongol shamanism,

was annihilated by the Mongols.⁴⁶

The Ruzhen court had moved its capital from Ha’erbin to Bei-jing in 1153, and then to Kai-feng in 1161. Within a half century, the Ruzhens transformed their rustic tribal society into a dynastic empire that was by no means inferior to the traditional Han Chinese dynasty. Ledyard (1983: 324) notes: “However ‘barbarous’ were Liao and Kin from a Chinese point of view, their diplomatic and political institutions were of a basically Chinese mold. They founded dynasties, established their own calendars, exchanged ambassadors, and followed ceremonial and protocol procedures of acknowledged Chinese origin.”

The Kin settled large detachments of *Meng-an* and *Mou-ko* troops in extensive military colonies throughout the conquered land of North China to perform garrison duties, appropriating Chinese farmlands and greatly increasing the number of slaves. The Ruzhen Kin maintained border garrisons equipped with a cavalry equal to the nomads’ own.⁴⁷ The hereditary Ruzhen military families were allocated slaves and farmland confiscated from the Han Chinese farmers, and they were kept separate from the Chinese population. Many Ruzhens had still remained in Manchuria during the Kin period, and continued to live in the old traditional manner.

A group of Qidan nobility who escaped the Kin conquest of the Liao moved westwards, and established the Western Liao dynasty (Black Qidan, 1131-1213). It was located in Muslim Turkestan south of the Lake Balkhash, extending from Hami to the Aral Sea and including Kashigar, Talas, and Tashkent. The arrival of these rather Mongolic Qidan tribes to subjugate Turkic nomads presaged, by a hundred years, the arrival of the pure blooded Chenggis Khanite Mongols themselves.⁴⁸

THE RUZHENS ALSO TRIED TO MAINTAIN THEIR ETHNIC IDENTITY

Franke and Twitchett (1994: 24) note that: “The early Qidans selected their leaders at a council of tribal chieftains and frequently held such a council when planning a campaign. ... The Ruzhens, too, had the custom before campaign of convoking a military assembly ... Similar war councils at which

policies and tactics were discussed also existed among the Tanguts. ... By far the most illuminating ... examples of joint decision making were the Mongols' diets or tribal convocations, the *keburiltai*. At these meetings a new ruler would be elected or proclaimed ..." Tao (1976: 18) contends that: "Culturally they had received Qidan, Chinese, and Koryeo influences, which combined with an energy that both Liao and Song lacked."

When the Ruzhen conquered the Liao, they inherited the manageable population of Han Chinese, but when they took over the entire north China from Song, they found almost 40 million Han Chinese under their rule. Like the Qidan, the Ruzhens also tried to maintain their ethnic identity, prohibiting marriage with Han Chinese, using its own script and setting up Ruzhen language schools at Keifeng.⁴⁹

The Kin emperor Shi-zong (r. 1161-89), a grandson of Aguda, instituted a program to train Ruzhen elites in warfare and hunting. Aristocrats were compelled to leave Kaifeng and set up camp in Inner Mongolia or Manchuria to toughen them up by experiencing a harsher life and to develop their skills in riding and shooting.⁵⁰ In 1174, Shi-zong forbade the imperial guards to speak Chinese, and in 1188 prohibited the Ruzhen from wearing Chinese clothes. Crossley (1997: 23) notes that the Shi-zong's "experiment, which was not a success, was considered both a model and a warning by the Manchu emperors who later ruled China."

THE KORYEO AND KIN BOTH CLAIMING THE SUCCESSOR TO KOGURYEO

The founders of both the Koryeo and Kin dynasties, in quest for their origins, claimed the successor to ancient Koguryeo: the former by naming his new state Koreyo, a shortened form of Koguryeo, though its rule barely extended to the Yalu River, and the latter, having occupied vast Manchurian domains but, facing Wang Keon's prior claim, by asserting that the founder originally came from Koguryeo (i.e., from the old Koguryeo land). Parhae had referred to itself as Koguryeo (written Koryeo in *Kojiki* and *Nihongi*) in official communications with the Yamato kingdom, and the state-founding ideology of the ruling Wan-yan clan was to perceive

occupied Khurasan in 1040, captured Baghdad in 1055, and expanded their empire from Persia to Asia Minor under the guise of the Holy War of Islam, capturing the Byzantine emperor in Armenia in 1071. The khan became sultan. The Persian and Arab caliphates were replaced by the newly converted Turkish sultanate. These Iranized Turks, founding an empire with a Turkic military structure and Persian administrative system, tried valiantly but could not defend the Persian civilization against the fresh uncivilized Turko-Mongols such as Chenggis khan (r. 1206-27) and Tamerlane (1336-1405). The Seljuks that Turkicized Anatolia were eventually replaced in 1390 by the Ottoman Turks, who went on to conquer Byzantium in 1453, and reassembled under their rule the territory of the old eastern Roman empire and more. The altitude, climate and vegetation of the Anatolian plateau showed natural affinity with the Kirghiz steppe. The ancient Byzantine lands became thoroughly Turkified, culturally if not genetically. According to Cavalli-Sforza (2000: 152), the invading Turks were few in number relative to the subject populations. The Greek was replaced by an Altaic language, but the genetic effects of Turkic invasion were rather modest. Their armies had few soldiers, and not all of them came with their families.

⁴⁹ See Franke and Twitchett (1994: 40), Crossley (1997: 21), and Fairbank and Goldman (1992: 115). Aguda ordered

Xi-yin in 1119 to create a new Ruzhen script that adapted Qidan pattern in using Chinese characters. The small characters were created in 1138.

⁵⁰ Shi-zong discouraged fraternizing between the Ruzhen garrison families and Chinese peasants by making them to live in groups among the vast sedentary Chinese populace. The Ruzhens, however, gave up hunting and fishing, made their living on revenues collected from the Chinese peasants, and eventually lost their fighting spirit.

⁵¹ See Rogers (1983: 159).

⁵² 金史 卷一 本紀第一 世紀
金之始祖諱函普 初從高麗來...兄...
留高麗不肯從...始祖居完顏 部僕幹
水之涯...招諭渤海人曰 女直渤海本
同一家 蓋其初皆勿 吉之七部也

高麗史節要 乙未十年 [1115] 生女
真完顏阿骨打 稱皇帝 更名旻國號
金 其俗如匈奴 諸部落無城郭 分居
山野 無文字 以言語結繩為約束 土
饒豬羊牛馬 馬多駿 其人驚勇 為兒
能引弓射鳥鼠 及壯無不空弦 走馬
習戰為勁兵 諸部各相雄長 莫能統
一 其地 西直契丹 南直我境 故嘗
事契丹及我朝 每來朝以麋金貂皮良
馬為贄 我朝亦厚遣銀幣 歲常如此
或曰 昔我平州 僧今俊 [Han-bu?]
遁入女真 居阿之古村 是為金之先
或曰平州僧今幸之子克守 [Han-bu?]
初入女真 居阿之古村 娶女真女 生
子曰 古乙太師 [Wu-lu?] 古乙生活羅
太師 [Shi-lu or Wu-gu-na?] 活羅多子

the wild Ruzhens as the remnant people of Parhae with Koguryeo ancestry.⁵¹

Aguda was quoted as having said that “the Ruzhen and the Parhae were originally the one and the same family.” At the very beginning, the History of Kin further states that the founder of the Kin (implying the ancestor of the Wan-yan clan, *Han-bu*) had originally come from Koryeo.⁵² The Chronicle of Great Kin states that the founder of the Kin dynasty (implying the ancestor of the Wan-yan clan), though recorded to have come from Koguryeo in the History of Kin, had originally come from Silla with the clan name of Wan-yan. Since the Silla royal surname of Kim (Golden) has been transmitted from generation to generation over many dozens of generations, the Chronicle continues, the royal surname of Silla without doubt became its dynastic name.⁵³

According to Franke (1994: 219-20), Aguda (r. 1115-23) and his brother Wu-ya-shu (r. 1103-13) were grandsons of Wu-gu-nai (1021-74), a “sixth-generation” descendant of the founder of the Wan-yan clan, dating *Han-bu* c. 900. The “Koryeo” in the record of the History of Kin could therefore refer either to the Wang Keon’s Koryeo (918-1392), or the old Koguryeo (37 BCE-668 CE) land, or the Later Koguryeo (901-18). The Koryeo court apparently understood it to mean Wang Keon’s Koryeo, while the Emperor Qian-long of Qing read it Koguryeo (or the old Koguryeo land) and understood it as a misprint for Silla (57 BCE-935). If we take the Franke’s idea (that is based on the History of Kin) on the timing of *Han-bu*’s existence, the “Koryeo” may well have implied the “old Koguryeo land.” Tao (1976: 16), however, contends that “Han-bu came from Korea, which was Koryeo (918-1392), not Koguryeo (37 BCE-668), for there were only ‘four generations’ between Han-bu and Wu-gu-nai.” The History of Koryeo states that the founder of the Kin dynasty was a native of the Pyung-san area of Hwang-hae province in Koryeo, and the records seem to be more consistent with the Tao’s idea of “four” generations instead of “six” generations.

KORYEO SURVIVING WITH “RESPECT THE STRONGER” STRATEGY

In 1117, Aguda demanded that the Koryeo court

establish an Elder-Brother-Younger-Brother relationship. The demand was ignored. The Kin rulers had openly declared that their progenitor was a Koryeo person, and that they revered Koryeo as the land of their parents. After conquering the Qidan Liao (916-1125) and Northern Song (960-1126), however, Tai-zong (1123-35) of the Kin demanded that the Koryeo court enter into a suzerain-subject relationship. The Koryeo rulers had avoided being drawn into the conflicts among the Liao, Song and Kin, but by that time of Tai-zong's demand, they clearly recognized that they had no alternative but to assent to Kin's demand as the price of Koryeo's territorial integrity.

Observing Koryeo's ready submission in 1126 "in the absence of any conspicuous military threat or jade-silver allurements," Tai-zong of the Kin greatly appreciated the wisdom of Koryeo's Respect-the-Greater strategy.⁵⁴ The relations between Koryeo (918-1392) and Kin (1115-1234) were thenceforth peaceful -- perhaps too peaceful. The absence of an external threat against Koryeo encouraged an internal plot to supplant the king, monarchs falling into pleasure-seeking, and an excessive civil supremacy disdainful of the now useless military officers. The humiliated generals at last made a coup d'état in 1170 and seized absolute power until 1258, with unexpected ramifications on Koryeo's resistance against the Mongols, a brand-new "Stronger."

Ledyard (1983: 324) notes: "Koryeo managed to hold on to what it had and still add the cis-Yalu area. And while Song lost all of northern China to the Ruzhens, Koryeo managed to settle its affairs diplomatically and thus warded off a Ruzhen invasion." Amazingly enough, the Koryeo dynasty (918-1392) survived and outlived the Qidan Liao (916-1125), the Ruzhen Kin (1125-1234) and the Mongol Yuan (1206-1368), while the Song dynasty (960-1127-1279) was pushed further and further south, only to be completely wiped out.

Ledyard (1983: 346) notes: "Koryeo people themselves debated the historical nature of their dynasty: some considered it to have inherited the tradition and legitimacy of Koguryeo, others believed that it was the true successor of Silla. Koryeo's founders doubtless took the former view, as is suggested most directly by their choice of the name of their

[*Ho-li-po, Po-la-shu, and Ying-ko*]
長曰**勅里鉢** [*Ho-li-po*], ...勅里鉢長子
烏雅束 [*Wu-ya-shu*] 嗣位 烏雅束卒
弟**阿骨打**立 [*Aguda*]

⁵³ 欽定滿洲源流考

卷七 部族 完顏 五代 金史世紀
金之先出靺鞨氏古肅慎地也...**金之始祖**
初從**高麗**來 按通考及**大金國志**
云 本自**新羅**來 姓完顏氏 考新羅與
高麗舊地相錯 遼金史中往往 二國
互稱不為分別 以史傳按之 **新羅王**
金姓 相傳數十世 則金之自新羅來
無疑建國之名 亦應取此 金史地理
誌 乃云以國有金水源為名 史家附
會之詞未足憑耳 居完顏部

卷七 部族 完顏 遼 祥符三年 契丹
征高麗道由女真 女真復與高麗合兵
拒之 契丹大敗而還 自天聖後屬契
丹世襲節度使兄弟相傳 其帥**本新羅**
人 號完顏氏 女真服其練事以首領
推之自哈富...哈富生...生...次太祖次
太宗...國號大金

卷七 部族 元...**金始祖** 本從**新羅**來
號完顏氏 所部稱完顏部 新羅王金
姓則金之遠派出

The Geography Section of the History of Kin, however, states that the dynastic name Kin (implying Golden in Chinese and *Alchun* in Tungusic) might have been based on the Ruzhen name of the river A-shi, a southern tributary of the Lower Song-hua. On this minor local river, the Ruzhen established their Supreme Capital. See Janhunen (1996: 155). The Qing emperors clearly believed that the founders of the Kin dynasty were their direct ancestors. 欽定滿洲源流考 卷首諭旨 上諭頃閱金史世紀云 金始祖居完顏部 其

地有白山黑水...本朝肇興...與大金正
同 史又稱金之先出靺鞨部古肅慎地
...我朝得姓曰愛新覺羅氏 國語為金
曰愛新 可為金源同派之證

⁵⁴ 高麗史節要 丁酉十二年 [1117]
金主阿骨打...書曰 兄大女真金國皇
帝致書又弟高麗國王 自我祖考 介
在一方 謂契丹為大國 高麗為父母
之邦 小心事之 契丹無道 陵轍我
疆場奴隸我人民 屢加無名之師 我
不得已拒之 蒙天之祐 獲殄滅之 惟
王許我知親 結為兄弟 以成世世無
窮之好 仍遣良馬一匹 書至 大臣
極言 和親不可 御史中丞金富轍 上
疏以為 金人新破大遼 遣使於我
請為兄弟之國 以成永世和親之計
我朝不許 臣竊觀 漢之於匈奴 唐之
於突厥 或與之稱臣 或下嫁公主 凡
可以和親者無不為之 今大宋與契丹
迭為伯叔兄弟 世世和通 以天子之
尊 無敵於天下 而於蠻胡之國 屈
而事之者 乃所謂聖人 權以濟道 保
全國家之良策也 昔成宗之世[981-97]
取遼失策 以遼遼人之入寇 誠可為
鑑戒 臣願盛朝 思長圖遠策 以保
國家 使無後悔
己亥十四年 [1119] 遣中書主事...聘
于金 國書有况彼源發乎吾土之語
金主拒不受
丙午四年 [1126] 遣...如金稱臣上表
...金回詔曰 以小事大 乃社稷之圖...
加非兵革之威 誘不玉帛之惠 自然
來者 不曰良哉 且君父之心 予已堅
篤 而臣子之義 汝毋易忘

⁵⁵ Ledyard (1983: 152) notes that the military leaders of the new state badly needed the expertise in administrative affairs which the aristocracy of the

state. But socially and politically, Koguryeo's fortunes were subverted by the host of Silla officials that swarmed north to Kae-gyong, and after the confrontation between the two polar views in the first half of the twelfth century, there was no question but that the Silla tradition had won." In face of the vigorous Qidan-Ruzhen Manchurian powers, the Silla tradition did not provide any motivation for expansion even as far as the Yalu River, much less beyond it.

In Koryeo, the faction adhering to the legacy of Koguryeo, represented by the irredentist ideology (or the ideology of Western Capital) of the monk Myo-cheong, lost their battle in 1136 against the Silla-successionist Confucian faction represented by Kim Busik of royal Silla descent who were satisfied with the peninsular status.⁵⁵ The ideology of the Silla successionist, i.e., divesting itself even of a theoretical claim to Koguryeo's Manchurian domains, accorded well with the rulers of the Liao, Kin and Song, reducing tension at the northern frontier and consequently the necessity for military preparedness of Koryeo, to the advantage of its civilian bureaucrats. The triumph of the Confucianist faction inaugurated dominance by the civil officialdom until the military coup in 1170.

In compiling Samguk-sagi (completed in 1145), Kim Busik accepted the Respect-the-Stronger ideology, postulated Koryeo as the heir of Silla with a peninsular setting, and added the 258-year history of "Unified" Silla (677-935), but ignoring the history of its contemporary, Parhae (689-926).

PARHAE AND SILLA AS THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN DYNASTIES

The writings by Il-Yeon, Yi Kyubo, Yi Seung-hiu, and Yu Deuk-gong track the efforts of the spiritual heirs of Koguryeo to redress Kim Busik's distortions and lay a historical foundation for a *de jure* claim to Koguryeo's Manchurian domains, including the Liao-dong area.⁵⁶ Yu Deuk-gong deplored the failure of the Koryeo court to compile "the History of Northern Dynasty and the History of Southern Dynasty," that is to say, the history of Parhae and Silla, respectively.

Yu Deuk-gong wrote the preface to his Parhae

History as follows.⁵⁷

The Koryeo did not compile the History of Parhae, and so the growth of Koryeo's national power was limited. In former times, the Ko clan resided in the north, calling their nation Koguryeo; the Puyeo clan resided in the southwest, calling their nation Paekche; and the Pak-Seok-Kim clans resided in southeast, calling their nation Silla. These were the Three States whose histories merited recording, and the Koryeo rightly obliged with their compilation. With the fall of the Puyeo clan and the Ko clan, the Kim clan occupied the south, and the Tae clan occupied the north, calling their nation Parhae. Silla and Parhae should, respectively, be called the southern and northern states with southern and northern dynastic histories, and yet the Koryeo compiled only the history of (unified) Silla. This was wrong. After all, who were the Tae clan? They were precisely the Koguryeo people. Whose territory did the Tae clan occupy? It was precisely the Koguryeo territory, and they could expand it further to the east, west and north. With the fall of the Kim clan and the Tae clan, the Wang clan unified the nation and called their nation Koryeo. They could occupy the whole of the Kim clan's territory in the south, but they could not occupy the whole of the Tae clan's territory in the north. A portion of the northern territory was lost to the Ruzhen, and a portion of it to the Qidan. ... Even though the Parhae was destroyed by the Liao, ... when its capital was captured, the Crown Prince and 100,000 Parhae people escaped to Koryeo. ... Zhang Keonzang (806-66) was a Tang person, and yet he had compiled the History of the Parhae State. Why was it, then, that the Koryeo people were unable to compile the history of Parhae?

defunct Silla state could offer, and the Silla ethos quickly gained the ascendancy in Kae-seong.

⁵⁶ See *Samguk-Yusa* written by the Monk Il-Yeon in c. 1281-3, "Ode to King Tong-myung" in *Dong-guk Yi-sang-guk-jip* written by Yi Kyu-bo in 1193, *Zhe-wang Ungi* (Rhymed Record of Theocrats and Kings) by Yi Seoung-hiu (1224-1300), and *Parhae-Ko* completed in 1784 by Yu Deuk-gong (1748-1807). Yi Kyu-bo (1168-1241) amplified the national ethos rooted in the heritage of Koguryeo with his ode to its legendary founder Tong-myung on the basis of Old History of Three Kingdom that antedated Kim Busik's work.

⁵⁷ 柳得恭 渤海考
高麗不修渤海史 知高麗之不振也
昔者高氏居于北 曰高句麗 夫餘氏
居于西南 曰百濟 朴昔金氏居于東
南 曰新羅 是為三國 宜其有三國史
而高麗修之 是矣 及夫餘氏亡高氏
亡 金氏有其南 大氏有其北 曰渤海
是為南北國 宜其有南北國史 而高
麗不修之 非矣 夫大氏者何人也 乃
高句麗之人也 其所有之地何地也
乃高 句麗之地也 而斥其東斥其西
斥 其北而大之耳 及夫金氏亡大氏
亡 王氏統而有之 曰高麗 其南 有
金氏之地則全 而其北有大氏之地則
不全 或入於女真 或入於契丹... 渤
海為遼所滅...其忽汗城之也 世子
以下奔高麗者 十餘萬人 無其官則
必其書矣...張建章唐人也 尚著渤海
國記 以高麗之人 而獨不可修渤海
之史乎

