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

Ancient Korea-Japan Relations: Paekche and the Origin of the Yamato Dynasty

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Chapter Eleven

The Samurai-Shogunate Period and the Meiji Restoration

Revival of Emperor-Worship Ideology



奈良縣 橿原市 大久保町 (1863 復原 前-後)

The Ruins 荒蕪 of Yamato Rulers' Tombs before the Meiji Restoration



Yūriaku 雄略 (大阪府羽曳野市)



Tenji 天智 (京都市山科區)



Kimmei 欽明 (高市郡 明日香村)
 文久帝陵圖 宮内廳書陵部所藏
 (Right Middle) The alleged ruins of Jimmu's Tomb at the Unebi Mountain before rebuilt for "restoration." Unebi-yama is a hill located between the villages of *Shirakashi* and *Masuge* in Yamato, near which, according to the *Nihongi*, Jimmu had fixed his residence *Kashiwabara no miya* in 660 BCE, and was later buried. In 1889, *Kashiwabara-jingū* temple was erected on its summit.



11.1. Capitals of the Yamato Kingdom
Fujiwara-kyō (藤原京 694-710); Heijō-kyō (平城京 Nara, 710-84); Nagaoka-kyō (長岡京 784-794); and Heian-kyō (平安京 Kyōto, 794-1868)

The Yamato court had relocated its capital within the Asuka area each time a new king came to the throne. In 645, Prince Naka no Ōe (Tenji, r.661-71), assisted by Nakatomi Kamatari (中臣鎌足 614-69), eliminated the Soga clan. Kamatari's son, Fujiwara Fubito (藤原不比等 659-720), tried to implement the Taika Reform, and also to establish the first "permanent" capital to accommodate the growing bureaucracy. Jitō (r.686-97) made the final decision to transfer the capital to Fujiwara-kyō in 694. After a mere 16 years, however, Fubito decided to relocate the capital yet again to Heijō-kyō, about 16 km north of Fujiwara-kyō.

CHAPTER ELEVEN The Samurai-Shogunate Period and the Meiji Restoration REVIVAL OF EMPEROR-WORSHIP IDEOLOGY

1. Dynasties Collapsing Everywhere

Periods of drought in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and far to the east into Asia had two high points, between 300-400 and around 800. Many places where agriculture had been carried on with elaborate irrigation networks were abandoned because of widespread drought.¹ The decline and fall of the Tang dynasty began in the middle of the eighth century. Franke and Twitchett (1994: 5-6) note: "around 840 the stability of northern Asia began to unravel. First the Tibetan kingdom suddenly collapsed ... the Uighur empire disintegrated ... The Tang empire was destroyed by ... rebellion.... In the last years of the century, central authority began to break down in Japan ... the Silla kingdom broke up into three regional warlord states... Parhae went into a terminal decline ... and in the far southwest Nanchao too fell apart ... and in AD 900 the international situation had been fluid for some sixty years, and governments were collapsing everywhere."

FALL OF SILLA AND RISE OF THE KORYEO DYNASTY

By the mid-eighth century, the culture and arts of the Unified Silla society seemed at the height of their glory. Beneath the surface, however, power struggles between the leading aristocratic clans and ruling royal families set in motion the process of the nation's decline and fall. The beginning of this

turbulent period coincided with the beginning of global drought c.800. When Korea proper was divided into several kingdoms, ceaselessly fighting each other for conquest or mere survival, the rulers of each state had to maintain not only a strong autocratic rule for instant nation-wide mobilizations, but also a rational and fair institutional arrangement to consolidate the patriotic loyalty of peasants. When the unification was achieved, however, the centralized aristocratic system soon began to degenerate into a ruthless means to exploit peasants.

The non-royal aristocracy eventually seized political power, abolished the system of annual grain grants from “office land,” and restored the old “stipend village” system for government officials, while continuing the “tax villages” enabling the aristocracy to hold agricultural land in perpetuity. The impoverished peasants who could not repay their debts were reduced to slavery.

Ambitious nobles created private military forces, arming their slaves and recruiting roaming peasants.² There occurred open contests for the throne, producing twenty kings during Silla’s last 155 years (780-935). A contender for the throne often had to ally himself with local chiefs. In the countryside, the castle lords, some of them with a capital aristocratic background but most of them being indigenous local headmen in the final days, usurped the positions of the provincial magistrates who had been dispatched from the capital.


The first large scale peasant revolt broke out in 889, and then a succession of rebellions erupted all over the country. Two leaders, one from poor peasant stock and the other an outcast royal prince, eventually consolidated the peasant rebel forces (called the armed Grass Brigands), and established the Later Paekche in 892 and Later Koguryeo in 901, respectively. This was the Later Three Kingdom period in the Korean Peninsula (892-936) roughly matching the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdom period (907-960) in mainland China.

Wang Keon (r.918-43) had emerged from a powerful local clan in the Kae-seong area that had been engaged in extensive maritime commercial activities. He had at first served as a commander of the Later Koguryeo (901-18) army, and then put forward by the generals for the kingship.³ He established the Koryeo dynasty (918-1392), winning surrender of the last ruler of

¹ See Lamb (1995: 156-69). The Mayan civilization reached a zenith around 750, but their society imploded because of severe droughts between 760-910. See Peterson and Haug (2005: 322-7).

² The nobles commanded their own private soldiery recruited from the local populace and landless wanderers, exacting taxes and corvée service from the peasant.

³ Wang Keon and his immediate successors restructured the entire society and relieved the misery of common people by establishing a more equitable land-tax system and emancipating a large number of slaves.



11.2. Koryeo mountain fortresses at (top) Sari-won city, Hwang-hae-do, and (bottom) Kae-sung

⁴ The territorial expansion of the Tang empire reached its peak by 680, but the rise of Tibetans and Eastern Turks in Inner Asia and of Parhae in Manchuria soon began to push back the Tang frontiers. The Second Turkic Empire, (682-741) emerging in 682, ruled the Mongolian steppe until it was replaced by the Uighur Turkic Empire (744-840).

There occurred a devastating Qidan invasion of Hebei in 696, and the Qidans could be destroyed in 697 only by borrowing the Turkic forces.

See Barfield (1989: 145) and Twitchett and Wechsler (1979: 284).

Graff (2002: 206) notes that: "In 678 another Tang army campaigning in the Qinghai region was similarly exposed to defeat in detail at the hands of the Tibetans, and in 680 Tibetan forces captured the important fortress of Anrong in the mountainous borderland of northwestern Sichuan."



11.3. Thirteenth century warriors in the Japanese Islands
蒙古襲來繪詞

Silla in 935, and destroying the Later Paekche in 936.

FALL OF TANG AND RISE OF THE QIDAN LIAO DYNASTY

Empress Wu, in alliance with the Silla, was able to conquer Paekche in 663 and Koguryeo in 668, but Tang could not enjoy her exploits even for a few years. Fighting against the Silla began in 671, and the Tang army was expelled from the Korean Peninsula in 676.⁴ There then emerged the Parhae in 698, and the Tang were expelled also from the Liaodong area by the mid-eighth century, retreating behind the Great Wall. The remnants of the Koguryeo people, together with the Sumo-Mohe tribes, established the Parhae (Bohai) dynasty in Manchuria. Parhae coexisted with Tang, and survived twenty years longer until 926.

After the reign of Empress Wu (660-705), one could plainly see the decaying might of the Tang's military forces. By the early eighth century, the Tang government had lost control of land allotment; the Equal Field system (that had been introduced by Northern Wei in 485 and retained by the later Xianbei conquest dynasties) became ineffective; and control over the land and peasants by the landed-gentry families greatly increased. As the concentration of landholdings accelerated, less and less land became available for redistribution, and the formation of large private estates revived the old Qin-Han-type land system. The polarization of land ownership destroyed the very foundation of the *fubing* system. The year 737 saw a decisive shift toward a mercenary army. The Tang government abandoned the *fubing* system altogether in 749, relying on a mercenary army that came to be maintained by the subsequent Han Chinese dynasties, Song and Ming.

The successors to Empress Wu, anxious to avoid Turkish attacks, offered marriage proposals, gifts, and subsidies. Even before the An Lushan rebellion (755-63), the Uighur Turks had extorted huge amounts of silk and other gifts from the Tang. The Tang's rule became nominal after a series of rebellions beginning with An Lushan, and the Uighur Turks became the extortioner-cum-protector. By the ninth century, regional military commanders (*Jiedushi*), who were often foreigners, did not permit interference from the central government. According to Fairbank (1992: 86), "the actual interregnum in central power lasted all the way from the rebellion of 755 to 979."

Taking advantage of the anarchy on the steppe, Abaoji led a great expedition into the steppe in 924-5, conquering northern Mongolia. He also established his sovereignty over the Uighur Turks who came to be settled in the Gansu area. Abaoji conquered Parhae in 926, just before his death, unifying virtually the whole of Manchuria. In 936, a son-in-law of the Shatuo emperor had ascended the throne and established the Later Jin dynasty (936-46) by allying himself with the Qidan and ceding to them the sixteen northern provinces. After the rapid succession of the Five Dynasties in the north, the commander of the palace guard, Zhao Guang'yun (Song Taizu), under the last of the dynasties (Later Zhou) was elevated to emperor by his troops in 960.

The Qidans had maintained hostile confrontations against the Song (960-1127), but eventually concluded a peace treaty in 1004 which called for the Song to deliver 200,000 bolts of silk and 100,000 ounces of silver annually to the Qidans. The Qidans were content to occupy the Beijing-Datong area. Peace by the treaties of 1004 and 1042 was preserved for a hundred years. Liao (907-1125) came to occupy Manchuria, Mongolia, and the northeastern part of China, stretching from the borders of Korea in the east to the Altai Mountains in the west, and monopolizing China's direct communication with Central and Western Asia. China inherited from the Qidan the medieval European name, Cathay (Kitaia, Cathaia), the name that remains the standard designation for China throughout the Slavonic world, including Russia.

Every Qidan invasion of Koryeo in the 1010s ended in failure, but in 1020 the Koryeo court, keeping its cis-Yalu territory, promised to abandon its hostile stance against Qidan and to break its relations with the Song, and thenceforth their relationship was peaceful.

The early Murong Yan dynasties (designated either as the Former, Later, Western or Southern Yan, 337-410) had fallen victim to another Xianbei tribe, the Toubu (Northern Wei, 386-534), that went on to unify North China by 439. Seven hundred years later, the Qidan Liao also fell victim to another Manchurian tribe, the Nüzhen, who went on to conquer North China, seizing the whole Central Plain by 1127 from the Song. Franke (1994: 215) states that, with the Jin dynasty (1115-1234), the Mohe-



11.4. Twelfth century warriors
武士登場 伴大納言繪卷



11.5. A 12th century fan

⁵ The Mononobe and Ōtomo clans had formerly commanded the King's army, but peasants came to be conscripted

directly by the state to serve (for three years) either in their own provinces (led by provincial officials), in the capital, on the frontier, or for major military campaigns (led by court nobles with temporary military commissions). Farris (2009: 82-3) notes that: “fighters were responsible for supplying their own weapons... Nearly a quarter of adult males were called for service, and ...there was a saying that ‘if one man is drafted, the whole household will ... be destroyed.’ [When there occurred] the wars against the *emish* between 774 and 812...the court discovered how inadequate peasant conscript foot soldiers were against the *emish* cavalry [fighting as guerrillas]. [R]evolts of Taira no Masakado and Fujiwara Sumitomo took place between 935 and 941.”

⁶ The relocation of the capital from Heijō-kyō to Nagaoka-kyō in 784 and to Heian-kyō in 794 coincides with the beginning of global drought c.800. See also Sansom (1963: 140, 196-7).



11.6. Amida Coming over the Mountain
13th century Kamakura period color on silk painting. Zenrin-ji, Kyōto

Nüzhen “Tungusic people appear for the first time in world history as an identifiable entity and as a great political power. ... Centuries later the Nüzhen’s direct descendants, the Manchus, repeated the achievements of their forefathers... This time...they...subjugated the whole of China.”

2. Fall of the Yamato Dynasty and Era of the Samurai and Shogunate

DECLINE AND FALL OF THE YAMATO DYNASTY

The overthrow of the Soga clan was followed by the *Taika* Reforms in 645 in the Japanese Islands. There followed the fall of Paekche in 663 in the Korean Peninsula, the frantic efforts of the Yamato court to fortify the possible Tang invasion route on the Japanese Islands, and the reinforcement of the *Ritsuryō* system for nation-wide military mobilization. By issuing the *Taihō* law codes in 701 and *Yōrō* codes in 718, the entire populace in the Japanese Islands came under the rule of Tang-style national statute law with a centralized bureaucratic government. On the basis of state ownership of land, peasants were allotted parcels of land, paying taxes and providing corvée service.

The *Be* people that had been controlled by the *Kabane* bearing *Uji* leaders were transformed into freemen (*kōmin*) under direct state control. Ruling clans were deprived of their traditional privileges, such as holding troops to be used by the Yamato sovereign as guards or in battle, but acquired a new status as high-ranking bureaucrats or hereditary local officials.⁵ The lower strata of the old elite (such as the *Kuni-no-miyatsuko*) obtained positions as local district officials. Government officials received fief according to their rank, post, and merits.

The imported *Ritsuryō* system, however, did not fit the clan-based Japanese society. When the Tang’s expansionist threat disappeared in the aftermath of the An Lushan rebellion (755-63), the Yamato rulers lost their zeal to enforce the *Ritsuryō* system. During the Heian period (794-1185), especially after the reign of Kammu (r.781-806), the Fujiwara clan, which had been prominent in the implementation of *Taika* Reforms, established close marital ties with the imperial family, and occupied most of the high offices in the central government.⁶ Diplomatic contact with the

chaotically deteriorating Tang dynasty was discontinued after 838.

Fujiwara Yoshifusa established the Regency in 858, effectively exercising the powers of emperor until 872. He was succeeded by Fujiwara Mototsune. The effective rule by the Fujiwara Regency continued until the reign of Fujiwara Tadamichi (1123-50), though the supremacy of the Fujiwara had ended with the death of Michinaga in 1027 because other clans were beginning to feel their own strength. Middle and lower level positions in the central and provincial government became the hereditary monopoly of a small number of other aristocratic clans.

During the ninth century, the aristocratic clans (in the capital and in the provinces) and large temples started to create private manors (*shōen*), and by the tenth century, the public land-holding system as well as the authority of the central government collapsed completely.⁷ The Fujiwara clan owned the most extensive manorial rights. As owners of the private estates, powerful aristocrats and the monks of important temples had appointed major local families and peasants to function as local administrators.⁸

The spread of private estates reduced the state revenues, forcing the imperial family to rely on income from its own estates and leading to a nation-wide breakdown of law and order. As early as 792, the Yamato court had abandoned its policy of countrywide conscription of peasants and made district-level officials responsible for keeping peace in the provinces. Contemporary accounts give a picture of chaos and violence so widespread that the commoners had to arm in self-defense. The distressed people turned to religion for solace.⁹

By the early tenth century, small- and medium-sized farmers began to arm themselves for self-protection and gather around the wealthiest and most influential of their own standing.¹⁰ Farmers preferred a local magnate who claimed noble descent to an aristocratic absentee landlord. Those who owned or administered the great estates, on the other hand, were forced to maintain private warriors to protect their lives and property. Friday (1992: 174-5, 139) notes that “By the end of the ninth century, most of the state’s military dirty work was being done by private forces directed by private warriors operating in the name of the government,” and also that by 914 the occupants of *Kebiishi*

⁷ A court noble could give a local landholder immunity from taxation and thereby receive a portion of the estate’s produce in return for his protective service. Family registers and the allocation of farm land were discontinued, and state-owned land was integrated into the private estates.

⁸ According to Tsunoda, et al. (1958: 109), “control of the so-called ‘provinces,’ tenuous even at the start, was in the ninth and tenth centuries almost entirely lost to great families who made a mockery of the land and tax system imported from Tang.” The characteristic feudal institutions of medieval Japan (12th-16th centuries) had their roots in the Heian Period.

⁹ See Sansom (1963: 236). The Buddhist leaders did their best to offer people consolation for the miseries of the age that peaked in the tenth century. The promise of salvation in the Pure Land of Amida (offered to the humble and unlettered who would express their trust in Amida by intoning his sacred title “*Namu Amida Butsu*”) was made by Kūya, Hōnen, and Ippen (1239-89). These priests wandered the country with ragged bands of followers and spurred devotion to Amida by distributing talismans (*fuda*) bearing his name and by organizing ecstatic dances chanting *nembutsu* as the simplified means of salvation.

¹⁰ Friday (1992: 4)

¹¹ According to Farris (1992: 150-2, 375), “Japanese peasants of the tenth century moved too freely” to be reliant on the leaders’ economic and social functions and “warriors were free to come and go as they pleased.” While the peasant soldiers had farmed a bit of land, they basically relied on robbing and pillaging to sustain themselves.

¹² Imperial offspring five or six generations removed from the ruler were cut off from the dynasty and given surnames like other nobles. The royal house had no surname. In 814, Saga (r.809-23) created, as dynastic shedding (分家), the surname Minamoto (*Gen* 源) for 33 of his 50 children. In addition to the original Saga Genji, there were Minamoto lineages tracing their origins to Seiwa (r.858-76), Uda (r.887-97), etc. Minamoto Yoritomo, who established the Kamakura shogunate, and Ashikaga Takauji, who established the Muromachi shogunate, both traced their descent from Seiwa Genji. In 825, Kammu awarded the surname Taira (*Hei* 平) to his grandson. Thereafter, all members cut off from the imperial line were surnamed either Minamoto or Taira. Kammu’s great grandson was also made Taira, and his descendants achieved reputations as warriors. The Hōjō family, who controlled the Kamakura shogunate after the death of Minamoto Yoritomo in 1219, also claimed descent from the Taira. The Tokugawa family tried to trace their ancestry to the Minamoto line.

(provincial police officers) posts were “all peasants of the province in which they hold office.” Sansom (1963: 239) observes that “It may be taken for granted that, especially in the provinces remote from the capital, almost every farmer was a warrior.”

It had been the practice that, after being mobilized for fighting, peasant soldiers returned to their lands.¹¹ As time passed, however, there evolved military specialists by natural selection who started to form, from at least the early tenth century (say, late 930s), a professional full-time warrior class called *samurai*, structured on the lord-vassal ties among fighting men. In the Han Chinese Song dynasty (960-1127-1279), the recommendation requirements for the examination were abolished and the Confucian examination system became the dominant channel for official appointment, power, and wealth, not only for the gentry but also for the peasant, at least in theory. The Yamato rulers had never adopted the Confucian examination system. In the Japanese Islands, however, there evolved a sort of meritocracy based on martial skills. Whether of humble origin like Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537-98) or of obscure origin like Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542-1616), every swordsman was placed on an equal footing. From about mid-Heian times forward, *samurai* were in charge of provincial governments and served as functionaries in the *shōen*. Replacing the hereditary aristocracy, the *samurai* became the real ruling class of the Japanese Islands from the late 12th century until the Meiji Restoration of 1868. The only wonder is why it took such a long time for the peasant warriors to recognize their absolute power.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT BRINGING ORDER TO THE CHAOS

Aristocratic clans, including the surplus members of the imperial family, that were unable to acquire high positions in the central government went out to the provinces, assuming leadership over the peasant warriors. They maintained their own cavalry, and enrolled peasants as their swordsmen and archers. The Minamoto clan (*Genji*) and the Taira clan (*Heishi*), both descended from the imperial family, came to serve as the two largest rallying points of peasant warriors.¹² The leadership of the imperial line legitimized the raw power of peasant warriors. Until the end of the twelfth century, however, the peasant warriors were still the servants of the court and the state. “*Samurai*” literally means “one who serves.” The local leaders of peasant warriors

were politically naïve and remained outside the power structure for a long time. According to Farris (1992: 176), court nobles had their own warriors to guard their mansions, and were “able to keep [provincial] warriors at heel by setting them against themselves.”

The Taira clan captured political power first (1156-60) and occupied the higher official positions of the central government in 1167, but was overthrown by the Minamoto clan after the Genpei War of 1180-5. Minamoto Yoritomo (1147-99) commenced the Kamakura shogunate (1192-1333) at a seaside village in the east. There emerged a complicated feudal system with an imperial court still appointing provincial officials, owners of private estates appointing their own administrators, and the *shogun* appointing his own vassals as provincial military governors (*shugo*). Although the court nobles were still able to compete for power and influence with warriors, the establishment of military government in Kamakura effectively terminated the rule by the Yamato court. The collapse of the aristocratic Yamato court brought new leaders on the scene and a greater participation by the locals in the national life. The military government, in one form or another, endured into the nineteenth century.¹³


The Mongol invasions in 1274 and 1281 had weakened the Kamakura *bakufu*, and the outlaw bands (*akutō*) proliferated. A samurai leader named Ashikaga Takauji (1305-58), who could also claim the imperial line, established the Muromachi shogunate (1333-1573) with its headquarters located in Kyōto after 1378, and let feudal military officials, *shugo daimyōs*, rule over independent provincial areas. The samurai and peasants organized autonomous local organizations, and the regional *daimyōs* tried to incorporate these various autonomous entities into their own political system and to organize local warriors into armies on the basis of lord-vassal relationships.¹⁴

By the end of the fifteenth century, local military lords emerged from the ranks of local warrior-landowners (*kokujin* 國人). With a decline in shogunal leadership, local deputy military governors (*shugo-dai* 代) and local warrior-landowners began “the overturning of those on top (*gekokujo* 下剋上), displacing the military governors (*shugo daimyōs* 守護大名) appointed by the Muromachi shogunate”; established control over provinces that had been ruled by the great *shugo* houses; and waged constant war

¹³ See Tsunoda, et al. (1958: 181).

Jansen (1995: x) explains that “Most *shugo* resided in their original base or in Kamakura, so that opportunities for troublemakers in the provinces were plentiful.”

¹⁴ Emperor Godaigo (r.1318-39) had rallied discontented warriors to bring the Kamakura *bakufu* to its final crisis. After their defeat against Takauji in 1335, an alternate line of emperors had been placed in Kyōto, while Godaigo's followers maintained a rival court at Yoshino. The struggle between the Northern and Southern courts (1336-92) was resolved later by a settlement calling for alternation between the two lines. The Muromachi shogunate was destroyed in 1572 by a feudal lord, Oda Nobunaga, who was killed in 1582 by one of his vassals, Toyotomi Hideyoshi. The unification of Japanese Islands in 1590 was followed by the invasion of Chosun in 1592-8. Building on the social system introduced by Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, the Tokugawa shogunate, established in 1603 by a daimyo based in Edo, was able to maintain a stable social order (of the ruling samurai above the farmer, artisan, and merchant) for 265 years.



「神武天皇山陵使奉献図」

11.7. Public Rites at Tomb of Jimmu



11.8. Meiji Transformation of Outfits (top) Young samurai from Satsuma, Chōshū, and Tosa who overthrew the Tokugawa shogunate; and (bottom) the conscript army trained and organized on Western models as a modern national army.

¹⁵“Literacy for the samurai, a requirement mandated by their status as the bureaucratic elite, meant first of all learning to read the Chinese classics, including the Confucian analects, with their message of loyalty to one’s superior as the key to social order.” Edwards (2003: 15)

¹⁶ Edwards (2005: 40)

to enlarge their domains. Jansen (1995: 142) explains that “Unlike the *shugo* daimyō whose legitimacy was derived from the *bakufu*, the *sengoku* daimyo drew their primary authority from their ability to exercise power and to maintain local control over the other *kokujin* and peasant communities.”

The so-called Warring States period (*Sengoku* period, 1467-1568) lasted from the beginning of the Ōnin War (1467-77) until 1568 when Oda Nobunaga (1534-82) emerged as a national unifier, to be followed by Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537-98) and then by the Tokugawa shogunate (1603-1868). By the late sixteenth century, most samurai, the evolutionary winners, were obliged to leave their native farmland and to take up residence in castle towns and cities in the permanent service of their lords.¹⁵ Peasants, the evolutionary losers, could not leave their lands, and were deprived of the right to possess weapons.

The Paekche rulers, who had conquered the Japanese Islands and set themselves up as a layer of overlords above the rice-growing Yayoi-Kofun peasants, lost their power to the samurai class of peasant origin, though some of them could survive as the titular heads of samurai warriors.

3. Revival of the Emperor-Worship Ideology in Japan

BIRTH OF THE SEMIRELIGIOUS EMPEROR WORSHIP

Ever since the appearance of *Kojiki* and *Nihongi*, their ideology was instilled in the minds of the Yamato ruling class, and eventually evolved into semireligious emperor worship on the Japanese Islands. The appellation for Yamato rulers accordingly had been elevated from Great King (*Ō-kimi*) to Emperor (*Tennō*).

After compiling the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi*, “the ruling line bolstered its position of pre-eminence within the aristocratic elites through claims to divine descent. These were codified into an official genealogy... The genealogy was also documented by designating a tomb for each member of the ancestral line [including] the first emperor Jimmu... Provision for the upkeep of these tombs was made by the state, and public rites were regularly conducted at certain of them during the Nara (710-94) and Heian (794-1185) periods. This system disintegrated during the turbulent centuries comprising Japan’s medieval era (1185-1573), and

locations of most of the tomb formerly attributed to the earlier figures in the imperial genealogy were forgotten.”¹⁶

MEIJI RESTORATION OF THE EMPEROR AND IMPERIAL TOMBS

The Tokugawa shoguns had eliminated nearly all intercourse with the outside world in order to avoid the disruptive influence observed during the brief period of activity allowed to the Portuguese and Spanish missionaries in the late 16th century. The Manchu Qing was defeated by Britain in the First Opium War of 1842. The shogun’s samurai armies, just like the Manchu-Mongol Eight Banners, were not up to any contest against the Western military machine. In 1853-4, the U. S. Commodore Perry and his fleet arrived off the coast of the Japanese Islands and forced the Tokugawa shogunate (1603-1867) to open up the nation.

In mainland China, the Manchu Qing submitted to an unequal treaty system with the Western powers in 1858-60. In the Japanese islands, the shogunate signed unequal treaties with the Western powers, allowing them exemption from Japanese law, and to export goods to Japan at favorable prices.¹⁷ The weakness of the shogun’s government encouraged the ancient enemies of the shogun, the samurai clans who had lost earlier power contests, such as the Satsuma and Chōshū clans, to conspire for the termination of shogunate military regime. The conspirators chose the strategy of resurrecting the emperor from obscurity to serve as the figurehead of a modern government built around the coalition of leading anti-shogun clans.

Almost by default, the concept of the emperor became crucial as a rallying point, producing the slogan of *Sonnō Jōi* (Revere the Emperor and Expel the Barbarians). The last shogun, Tokugawa Yoshinobu, resigned in November 1867 and in January 1868, the Restoration was proclaimed in the name of sixteen-year old boy emperor Mutsuhito (1852-1912, to be called Meiji), declaring that the whole country had now submitted to rule by the emperor.

Since the Japanese people had long ago ceased to be aware of the existence of the emperor, they had to launch vigorous promotion campaigns to put the emperor on conspicuous display. In November 1868, the court was relocated to Tokyo, far away from the old conspiratorial aristocracy in

¹⁷ Perry threatened to open fire if the letter from President Fillmore asking for broader relations was not received. “In March 1854, the Treaty of Kanagawa was concluded, opening two ports to American ships and allowing the United States to post a consul near Tokyo.” Edwards (2003: 17) “In 1858...the American Consul General Townsend Harris pressed the *bakufu* into signing a commercial treaty in which Japan was accorded inferior status (ibid: 18).”



11.9. Mutsuhito 睦仁 (1852-1912) succeeded to the throne 践祚 in 1867 and was enthroned 即位 in 1868.



11.10. First Envoy to Paris in 1862-3

¹⁸ Yamagata Aritomo (1838-1922) was born into an impoverished low-ranking samurai family in the Hagi town of Chōshū. He rose to prominence through his leadership in the militia, went to Europe in 1869 to study military systems, and became architect of the modern Japanese army, enacting the three-year universal conscription in 1873 (destroying the class distinction between the samurai and commoners); defeating the Satsuma Rebellion led by Saigō Takamori in 1877; and reorganizing the army along Prussian lines with the general staff with command functions (independent of army minister and free from civil control) in 1878. He resigned as army minister in 1878 to become the chief of the General Staff that had direct access to the emperor. Without any loss of influence among the military, Yamagata headed the Legislative Board in 1882-3, and served as home minister for over seven years, instituting an all-pervasive police system, and setting up a Staff College headed by a Prussian Major Wilhelm Meckel. He served as prime minister from December 1889 to May 1891, and also from November 1898 to October 1900 (now as a field marshal), shoring up the executive power of the bureaucracy in the face of Itō Hirobumi's growing interest in party government. During the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), he served as chief of the General Staff. After the death of Itō, Yamagata became the most influential member among the elder statesmen known as the Genrō,

Kyoto. The emperor took up residence in the great castle of the Tokugawa shoguns.

After throwing out the shogunate (*bakufu*), the leaders of the Meiji coup had decided to gather together under the authority of the imperial court, and commenced the westernization-cum-industrialization in the name of Meiji Restoration (1868-1912), emulating Western colonialism and imperialism. Mutsuhito became the figurehead of state, but not the head of government. The oligarchs who had conspired in the Meiji coup kept executive control for themselves.

ITŌ HIROBUMI

Itō Hirobumi was born in 1841 to a poor peasant family of Chōshū (the present-day Yamaguchi Prefecture) at the western end of the Japanese mainland, but was later adopted by a modest (childless) samurai.¹⁸ He was educated at a Chōshū academy, and the leaders of Chōshū decided in 1863 to send him to England to study Western naval science. He was smuggled by a Scottish trader to England where he could learn Western law and modern weapons, returning to Japan in 1864. When the British envoy to Japan had an audience with the emperor in 1868, Itō served as the emperor's interpreter. Itō enjoyed a personal affinity with the boy emperor, eleven years his junior. Itō joined the Iwakura mission in 1871 for its tour of Europe and the United States. He accepted government assignments to the U. S. in 1870 and the Mission to Europe from 1871-73 to study taxation, budgetary systems, and treaty matters. He joined the group formed to study the subject of the German constitutions from 1882-83, and was able to have long conversations with Bismarck. Rising to the post of prime minister four times, he played a crucial role in the rapid westernization of Japan. He served as the first prime minister from 1885-88, helped draft the Meiji constitution in 1889, and brought about the establishment of the national Diet in 1890.

The emperor would have his decisions made for him by the leaders of core clique who became the emperor's senior private advisers. The military could exercise power without any restraint as a separate, self-contained regime above the toothless Diet and the Constitution. The ruling oligarchs let the Emperor Meiji issue Imperial Rescripts to show that they ruled by imperial decree and constitution. The politicians could not hire or fire

bureaucrats, but were allowed to promote their favorites. The Meiji constitution made the State Council (renamed Privy Council, the council of the emperor's senior advisers) and the military above the law. The military was answerable only to the emperor himself (who, after all, could not be challenged because the emperor was divine), bypassing the government bureaucracy and legislature, and inviting unfortunate consequences for the Japanese and their neighbors.

Itō became prime minister for the second time in 1892-6, and for the fourth time in 1900-1. When he became prime minister for the third time in 1898, he dissolved the Diet but could not win an absolute majority. Itō resigned, only to appear in China on September 11, 1898 to give the Qing emperor Guangxu (r.1874-1908) advice on the process and methods of Reform. Itō was shot by a Korean, Ahn Joong-keun, in 1909 at the Harbin railroad station, and his death was used in Japan to rouse popular support for the annexation of Korea.

BANSEI IKKEI

The phrase *bansei ikkei* (the line of emperors unbroken for ages eternal) was used early on by the emperor-centered Meiji government to proclaim the unique nature and the inherent superiority of the Japanese monarchy to the Western world. The first article of the 1889 Constitution declares that “The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.” Demonstrating the unbroken continuity of the imperial line “thus became a priority that affected policies toward the ancient imperial tombs, and, by extension, materials of the Kofun period as a whole.”¹⁹

The shoguns had governed in the name of the emperor, but thought that the visibility of imperial tombs would enhance the position of the emperor as the true sovereign and hence threaten the basis of their rule. In face of the foreign threat to its political life, however, the *bakufu* found hope “in the idea of merging the shogunate with the imperial house itself” by marriage. The *bakufu* also launched a program of repairing the tombs of imperial ancestors in order to benefit from its new marital linkage to the imperial house.²⁰

From ancient times, the imperial tombs have played the crucial role of visible monuments to the claim for the divine

dictating the selection of prime ministers. Yamagata also controlled the underworld gangsters, including the Yamaguchi Gumi that could supply not only bullies and assassins to harass politicians and union leaders at home, but also a large contingent of thugs to handle various dirty work abroad (say, “softening up” Korea and Manchuria in advance of an invasion by the Imperial Army).

¹⁹ Edwards (2005: 41)

²⁰ The 14th shogun, Tokugawa Iemochi (r.1858-66), married the daughter of the Emperor Kōmei (r.1847-66) in February 1862. See Edwards (2003: 19).

²¹ Edwards (2003: 11-2) “[I]n Japan's ancient period...treatment of various sites as royal tombs helped solidify the imperial house's supremacy over other aristocratic families (ibid).”

²² Edwards (2003: 21) notes that “For most of the Edo period, opinion had divided among three sites in the southern Nara basin, all near the northeastern base of Mt. Unebi, where Jimmu is said in the ancient chronicles to have been buried. ... [T]he actual choice among them was made on neither textual nor archeological grounds, but as a matter of expediency. Specifically, the site chosen in February 1863 was the one involving the fewest obstacles, in terms of having to relocate nearby residents, or to ‘repairing’ it as a tomb worthy of the founding ancestor.”

²³ See Edwards (2005: 40-1). The three mythic generations, Jimmu's father, grandfather, and Ninigi, are said to have dwelled in Kyūshū after the descent from heaven. "In 1874, three locations in southern Kyūshū were designated the 'tombs' of the Sun Goddess's grandson who made the descent, and of his son and grandson (Jimmu's father)." Edwards (2003: 23)

²⁴ Egami (江上波夫 1964) views his theory, which others have named "the Theory of the Horseriding People 騎馬民族説" as a "modern edition of Kida's theory, which appeared as "the Theory of the common Origin of the Japanese and Korean People 日鮮同祖論," immediately after Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910. Kida Sadakich (喜田貞吉 1871-1939) was forced to resign from his post (國定國史教科書 編纂擔當) in 1911 for statements held to be disrespectful to the imperial institution.



11.11. Itō Hirobumi (1841-1909)

origins and unbroken continuity of the ruling line. Since the ideology of the divine and ancient origin of the imperial line was used as the rallying point by the Meiji rulers, the program of identification and repairs was undertaken in earnest by the post-*bakufu* government. With the Meiji Restoration, "special treatment of imperial tombs again accompanied assertions of divine origin and unparalleled continuity for the ruling house, in hopes this time of bolstering Japan's status in the eyes of foreign nations."²¹

Jimmu's tomb had already been designated and repaired in 1863 in the southern Nara basin.²² The designation of a tomb for every figure named in the official list of successors to the throne was completed by 1889, just in time for the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution. To emphasize the continuity from divine origins to the imperial line, three tombs (two mountain tops and a cave) were designated in 1874 in Kyūshū for the three generations linking Jimmu with his great-grandfather Ninigi, the grandson of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu.²³

There emerged what came to be considered the correct answer to the question of the founders of the Yamato Kingdom and the roots of the imperial family. It was the imperial clan who were the forefathers of the current imperial family that established the Yamato Kingdom and, for the first time in Japanese history, could unify the Japanese Islands. "A single unbroken line for myriad generations (*Bansei Ikkai*)" is the orthodox account of the imperial family and its origin. Most importantly, the imperial clan represents a truly "native" ruling force that had emerged as the result of natural socio-political evolution on the Japanese archipelago. The Yamato Kingdom was a wholly indigenous dynasty. Above all, the Japanese are a "unique" people gradually evolved from the ancient Ice Age inhabitants of the Japanese Islands, unrelated with any others on earth.

EMPEROR WORSHIP STRIKES BACK

Japan's defeat in the Second World War brought an end to the official claim for the divine status of the imperial line. When the emperor, under the Allied occupation, had to renounce publicly, in January of 1946, his claims to divinity, the Japanese people, including Egami Namio, suddenly found themselves groping for a new understanding of their past history that would be consistent with democratic ideals. They also groped for new

ways to define who and what they were.²⁴ Freed from prewar restraints, questions about the nation's origin were opened to academic investigation. But it did not take long before the emperor-centered ideology struck back. Numerous Japanese historians began to present and still continue to present many and richly imagined variations on the theme of the “correct” answer.

Edwards (2003: 11) notes that “Nearly 900 locations in Japan are currently treated as imperial tombs...containing the remains of an imperial family member. Roughly 250 of these are archeological sites predating the start of written history.” Since the correct answer has to be protected, there is apparently absolutely no “possibility of examining these sites ... for purposes of scientific investigation (ibid: 26).”

Barnes' work of 1988 was confined geographically to the Nara Basin, and focused on the Late Yayoi and Early-Middle Tomb period *settlement* data in order to trace the social and economic processes that led to the emergence of the Yamato State (ibid: 195). Barnes' work of 2007 deals with the *burial* data from Middle Yayoi through early Tomb period across the whole of the western archipelago in order to trace the processes of “social stratification” that enabled the emergence of the Yamato state. According to Barnes (2007: 9, 103), the [a priori] **assumptions** that (1) Himiko's country Yama-tai [Yama-ichi] was one and the same as the later documented Yama-to; (2) Himiko [Pimihu] mentioned in the *Dongyi-zhuan* can be identified as a personage connected to the Sujin line of sovereigns as portrayed in the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi*; and (3) Himiko's tomb can be equated with one of the monumental keyhole tombs in the southeastern Nara Basin “reflect the currently held judgment of most Japanese archeologists. ... If these assumptions are ever found wanting, then the interpretations developed herein will have to be thoroughly rethought (ibid: 195).”

As of 2005, Edwards (2005: 46-7) calls our attention to the fact that the Imperial Household Agency (“retaining much of its former [prewar] autonomy within the government”) denies access to “the sites designated as imperial tombs” which “include the largest and most important tombs of the Kofun period” that is “vital to the study of Japan's ancient history,” and also to the fact that “contemporary Japanese archeology” is not “free of political constraints in its investigation of the past.” Consequently,



11.12. Officially designated as the tomb of Emperor Sujin and rebuilt for “Restoration.” Ten-ri City, Nara
 文久山陵圖 崇神天皇 山邊道
 勾岡上陵 奈良縣 天理市 柳本町

²⁵ Barnes (2007a: 103)

²⁶ Brown's assertions are based on the six large (200-300 meters long) burial mounds discovered in the Shiki area at the base of Mt. Miwa that have the keyhole shape, horizontal stone chambers, and coffins surrounded by numerous mirrors, weapons, tools, and ornaments. Japanese archeologists insist that these tombs were built between 250 and 350. They further argue that “the last part of the third

century was a time of explosive agricultural growth” enabling the Yamato kings “to marshal the human and physical resources needed for constructing huge mounds [and] undertaking ambitious military campaigns.” They contend that “a sharp increase in rice productivity” had resulted from “development in the use of iron for making agricultural tools, techniques for leveling off and irrigating fields...and the expansion of upland farming.” Brown (1993: 114-6) never questions the validity of their dogmatic dating method, and never ponders over the implication of the fact that the Japanese Islands had completely depended on iron supplied from the Korean Peninsula until iron sand was discovered in the sixth century.

²⁷ The irony may be the fact that Egami (1964: 48) has already contended that there is chronological continuity between the Late Yayoi culture (100-300) and the Early Tomb culture (300-375), and that the change which took place can be understood as a result of increasing “social stratification.” The Japanese archeological community has been --apparently to make Himiko to play Jingū (recorded in the *Nihongi* to have lived between 170-269 CE) in the emergence of Yamato Kingdom--merging the Late Yayoi into the Early Kofun, in effect, as prescribed by Egami, who simply wanted to amplify the cultural continuity between the Late Yayoi and the Early Kofun periods.

“many Japanese archeologists’ presentations and interpretations of data are influenced by their *a priori* assumptions of the uniqueness and homogeneity of Japanese culture.”

The Japanese archeological community has been ardently pushing back the beginning of the Early Tomb period by discovering “**new dating evidence**” in order to close the “temporal hiatus between mention of Himiko’s tomb and the beginning of mounded-tomb construction in Nara.”²⁵ Apparently reflecting the dominant sentiment of the Japanese archeological community, Barnes (2007a: 9) states that the beginning of Early Kofun period “has already been pushed back from its post-war standard of 300 CE to 250 CE to coincide with Himiko’s ostensible death date.” Witness the work of Brown (1993: 109), who believes that “recent archeological investigations of ancient mounds located in southeastern section of the Nara plain suggest that Yamato came into existence long before the final years of the fourth century, but they provide no convincing evidence that his kingdom was created by foreign invaders,” and then declares that “the Yamato kingdom appeared on the Nara plain of central Japan between about A.D. 250 and 300 (ibid: 108).” Brown (1993: 108) asserts that “the huge burial mounds” were built “in Yamato after the middle of the third century.”²⁶

According to Barnes (2007a: 44-5), the Middle Yayoi period has been pushed back from its post-war standard of 100 BCE-100 CE to 200 BCE-0 CE, and the Late Yayoi period from 100-300 CE to 0-200 CE, while the period between 200-250 CE is called oddly enough the “Terminal Yayoi period,” apparently as a tentative treatment waiting for another set of “discoveries.”

According to Barnes (2007a: 9), the Early Tomb period “is likely to be soon pushed back again in recognition of keyhole-shaped mound building in the early 3rd century.” The Early Kofun period would then include the entire reign of Jingū (201-69 CE) as recorded in the *Nihongi*. With a few more efforts by the Japanese archeological community, virtually the entire traditional (post-war standard) Late Yayoi period (100-300 CE), covering the entire lifetime of Jingū (170-269 CE) as recorded in the *Nihongi*, may well be included in the Early Kofun period in the near future. Then the Early Tomb period would cover 100-400 CE, while the Middle and Late Tomb periods would cover 400-700.²⁷

TRACES OF SOME SLAG AS THE PROOF OF IRON-SMELTING FURNACES

Farris (1998: 71-3) states that: “In the fifth century, perhaps beginning between A.D. 425 and 450, the quantity of iron from sites of all types in Japan grew dramatically. ... What is more, the source for almost all this iron must have been continental, and most likely Korea... Recently scientists have discovered Enjo site north of Kyoto where craftsmen smelted into tools and ingots Japanese iron sand collected from river bottoms. In addition to holes containing rusted pieces of iron and slag, there were remains of furnaces for refining the sand, foundries for forging tools, and kilns for manufacturing charcoal. At present Enjo is considered the oldest iron-smelting site in Japan ... The implication is clear: nearly all the iron to make the first Japanese weapons and tools came from Korea...at least until iron sand was discovered in Japan in the sixth century.”

Since iron sand was discovered in the sixth century, the iron-smelting in the Japanese Islands dates from no earlier than 500 CE. Prior to the sixth century, bloomery iron (that contains both blooms and ingots) had been imported from Paekche and the Kaya states that was refined through hammering (to expel the slag impurities), and fashioned into weapons and implements in the Japanese Islands.²⁸

Until very recently, traces of the bloomery furnace were essential in establishing proof of iron production. The ever-ardent Japanese archeologists, however, have decided that the presence of slag is “sufficient for confirmation of local [iron] production,” declaring that “iron dross does not appear except in the smelting process.” Since numerous iron workshop sites with “some slag” were identified, they now contend that the “local production [of wrought iron in the Japanese Islands] started in Middle Yayoi [200 BCE-0].”²⁹

According to Kidder (2007: 89), the Japanese archeologists could find some thirty iron-working places (including eight that are dated Middle Yayoi) by 1994 with one or more of the following pieces of evidence: “pits that were clearly not fireplaces, often elongated shallow holes; some slag; stone tools or fragments thereof [allegedly] used in the smelting process; and pieces of iron chisels.” They could further find “almost forty [iron] workshop sites located along the banks of rivers feeding into Osaka Bay [dated] fourth through the early


²⁸ Edwards (2006: 47) states that: “Ingots of raw iron are found in fifth-century tombs. ... Chemical analysis of raw iron ingots suggests the possibility that they were not produced in Japan.”

²⁹ Kidder (2007: 89)

³⁰ J. Edward Kidder, Jr., is emeritus professor at International Christian University, Tokyo. On the front flap of his 2007 book (titled *Himiko and Japan's Elusive Chieftom of Yamatai: Archaeology, History, and Mythology*) is the following statement:

“In this, the most comprehensive treatment in English to date, a senior scholar of early Japan turns to three sources--historical, archaeological, and mythological-- to provide a multifaceted study of ancient Japanese society. Analyzing a tremendous amount of recent archaeological material and synthesizing it with a thorough examination of the textual sources, Professor Kidder locates Yamatai in the Yamato heartland, in the southeastern part of the Nara basin. [...scholarly discussion and archaeological evidence have been inconclusive...] He describes the formation in the Yayoi period of pan-regional alliances that created the reserves of manpower required to build massive mounded tombs. It is this decisive period, at the end of the Yayoi and the beginning of the Kofun that he identifies as Himiko's era. He maintains, moreover, that Himiko played a part in the emergence of Yamato as an identifiable political

entity. In exploring the cultural and political conditions of this period and identifying the location of Yamatai as Himiko's area of activity, Kidder considers the **role of magic** in early Japanese society to better understand why an individual with her qualifications reached such a prominent position. **He enhances Himiko's story with insights drawn from mythology, turning to a rich body of mythology...**"



11.13. Fujinoki tomb, Nara
奈良縣 生駒郡 斑鳩町 藤ノ木



11.14. Paekche tomb with horizontal entrance. Bang-yi-dong Tomb No. 1
芳蕘洞 横穴式石室墳 Seoul

decades of the sixth century," and they are now contending that the region was the center of an iron industry that "should have brought in" the raw material "by boat," and "met the demands for farm and industrial tools and weapons."

According to Kidder (2007: 88), "Adding iron tips to wooden spades and hoes was a Japanese device, and invention of necessity to compensate for the relative shortage of iron. The straight-edged sickle and the striking hoe are Japanese. It has long been thought that the Wa imported iron bars, ingots, or plates from Korea for their use until their own smelting processes were of a sufficient proficiency to provide for their own needs. ... Then, when did the Japanese start to make their own iron? ... It is now generally believed that local production started in Middle Yayoi. ... [B]y the Kofun period iron tools had replaced stone tools, and it is **inconceivable** that every lowly farmer in the country was tapped into the network of foreign exchange. Artifacts or their lack, it is **evident** that local production had by the early Kofun period reached the point where supply could meet the demand." ³⁰

The Japanese archeologists have decided to believe that the iron-working places with small forging hearths that left some traces of "forging slag" were the iron smelting sites even when they cannot find any traces of bloomery furnaces. By introducing such an "ingenious" method of identification, they are now contending that the Japanese Islands began to produce bloomery iron in Middle Yayoi [200 BCE-0], and were self-sufficient in iron by the Early Kofun period [250-400 CE].

Edwards contends that the study of history and archeology in the Japanese Islands has been strongly influenced by the *a priori* assumptions of the uniqueness and homogeneity of Japanese culture. Though it is not suggested that the Western experts as a whole have consciously supported emperor-centered nationalism, their study does not seem to have escaped the ideological sentiments prevailing in their host country either.

Appendix 11.1. The Japanese Archeological Community

JAPAN'S WORST ARCHAEOLOGY SCANDAL

One may recall the incident of the Mainichi newspaper

breaking the news on Sunday morning, November 5, 2000, that “an archaeologist, Fujimura Shin’ichi, had been caught on video planting stone artifacts at the Kami-Takamori site in northern Miyagi Prefecture in northeastern Japan.”³¹

Fujimura’s findings appeared to push back the earliest human habitation of Japan to 600,000 years ago, overturning the belief that Japan’s earliest inhabitants migrated approximately 30,000 years ago. The Kami-takamori site in particular had captured worldwide attention; evidence unearthed by Fujimura seemed to show not only that early humans inhabited the area 600,000 years ago, but that these early humans were more intelligent than their contemporaries elsewhere in the world. In the words of one archaeologist, Fujimura had been in the process of “rewriting the story of human evolution.” Books on Japanese history and archaeology came to include descriptions of the Early/Middle Paleolithic Period based on Fujimura’s discoveries.

The presence of a Paleolithic culture (that was more than 10,000 years old) in Japan was not proven until 1949, when Aizawa Tadahiro, also an amateur archaeologist, made the first discovery of Paleolithic artifacts at the Iwajuku site north of Tokyo. With his discovery, Aizawa became one of the most celebrated archaeologists in Japan, and he established “the importance of amateurs” within the field. Fujimura wanted to emulate Aizawa, and a golden opportunity presented itself. Aizawa’s work proved only that Japan was populated in the Upper Paleolithic Period (up to 30,000 years ago), while the presence of humans in the Early/Middle Paleolithic Period (older than 30,000 years ago) in Japan was still being debated. Fujimura’s “findings” were therefore widely publicized, and his more important “discoveries” were incorporated into school textbooks.

The foreign media, Asian as well as Western, have tended to see Fujimura’s forgery, his planting of evidence, as a manifestation of Japanese nationalism. A typical portrayal holds that Japanese archaeology is dedicated to proving the primacy of the Japanese race, or disproving its linkages to other East Asian peoples. For example, the *New York Times* article points out that “The Fujimura scandal has cast a harsh light on a scientific establishment that often lends itself to the national effort of enhancing Japan’s sense of uniqueness. State and local governments, for example, have spent huge amounts of money to

³¹ This section contains the excerpts from “Politics and Personality: Japan’s Worst Archaeology Scandal,” by Shoh Yamada, in *Harvard Asia Quarterly*, Volume VI, No. 3. Summer 2002. After graduating from high school, Fujimura Shin’ichi (b.1950) went to work at a local electronic gadget factory. A diligent worker and caring father of two, he seemed to be the perfectly honest and humble northern Japanese countryman. He began surveying for archaeological artifacts in northern Miyagi Prefecture where he lived. In 1992, with his discovery of the Zazaragi site – the first unanimously confirmed Japanese Early/Middle Paleolithic site – Fujimura became the first winner of the Aizawa Award, which had been established in memory of Aizawa and was intended to recognize an amateur archaeologist who had made an outstanding contribution to the study of the Paleolithic. Fujimura later won the award again in conjunction with his colleagues (although all of these discoveries now appear to have been forged). Through this series of discoveries he mirrored Aizawa’s story, and people around him felt that a model of amateur-professional archaeological cooperation had emerged. Because of his apparent aptitude for discovery, Fujimura was nicknamed “God’s Hand.”

³² Howard French, “Meet a stone age man so original, he’s a hoax”, *The New York Times*, December 7, 2000.

³³ This section draws on excerpts from “Japanese Scandals - This Time It’s Archaeology” by Charles T. Keally on the *Ancient East Asia Website*, Nov. 17, 2000. (www.ancienteastasia.org/special/japanarchscandal.htm)

³⁴ Keally writes: “At the 8th Meeting of the ‘Northeastern Japan Palaeolithic Discussion Group,’ held [in] 1994, I made the following notes...for the Kami-Takamori site –‘Most artifacts well made, bifacial. Look almost like Jomon.’ ...90% or more of the Early Palaeolithic sites and artifacts have been found by one person [Fujimura] ... [W]hen he shows up, suddenly lots of artifacts are found ... that have never been found elsewhere in the world with such early dates... [T]he artifacts are always found on the flat surface ...600,000 years ago or 100,000 years ago, the artifacts are the same form and materials; they show no evolution... [I]f there are 10 tools, there should be 100 flakes from their production, yet no flakes are ever found. ... [I]t makes one wonder about the intelligence of the people who readily accepted these finds, without expressing a word of reservation. Some of those people are leading archaeologists here (ibid).”

³⁵ “The scandals involving high ranking people in Japan’s iron triangle of politicians, bureaucrats and business leaders stem from the closed system there, too, and from the forced compliance with the group, the hierarchical structure, and the

underwrite the search for early man, while ignoring questions about Japanese identity. Ancient imperial tombs remain officially closed to researchers, many here say, because they might contain evidence linking the imperial lineage to neighboring Korea.”³²

CHARLES T. KEALLY MAKES COMMENTS ON “JAPANESE SCANDALS”

Keally states: “The media say that this scandal casts doubt on all of the archaeological sites Fujimura has worked on, and on the Early and Middle Palaeolithic in Japan, on Japanese academia in general, and on Japan as a whole. I agree. Fujimura is the one taking all of the blame for planting artifacts on the site, but I feel all of Japanese society, especially academia, and most particularly archaeology, is ultimately responsible.”³³ This is, all of Japanese society may be accused of complicity in the Fujimura’s forgeries; providing him, immersing him in, a frame of mind that is more interested in Japan’s sense of uniqueness than in truth.

According to Keally, the Japanese archaeologists who look for and excavate Early and Middle Palaeolithic sites appear to be inexcusably careless in their work: “They have a strong tendency to ignore criticism or to laugh at the critic. I have seen them brush off the opinions of experts...on matters related to the geology of their sites and the validity of the dates. ... I see no indication that they have geologists studying the ancient topography to determine the site context. I see little to indicate adequate study of the sources of the lithic materials.”³⁴ No one seems to check the possibility that the pits might have a natural rather than a human explanation. Keally says that “I see no sign of good studies of site taphonomy -- the study of the processes of how the site changed from the original deposition to its present condition.”

Keally laments: “Japanese academia is famous for its closed system. Students cannot pass teachers. Lower ranking teachers and students must agree with the ideas of the higher ranking teachers and the leader, or be expelled from the group.”³⁵ Many academics spend their whole career in the same university system, from student to teacher to retiree. This is why Japan has so few Nobel Prizes in science, why most of those scientists have done all or most of their research outside of Japan, and why they are unknown in Japan until they are recognized by the world.”³⁶ “It is this system,” Keally contends, that bears a heavy

“responsibility for both Fujimura’s acts and for the fact that no one caught it earlier.”³⁷

According to Keally, about half of Japan’s archaeologists have only BA degrees. And even the ones who go on to higher degrees are educated only in archaeology; rather than receiving an interdisciplinary education in the other sciences bearing strongly on archaeology -- geology, absolute dating methods, palynology, biology, cultural anthropology, and many others: “This narrow, incestuous education is also to blame for archaeologists not seeing the problems in the Early and Middle Palaeolithic sites.”

According to Keally, if Fujimura’s actions mean he had some sort of mental glitch, then a whole lot of other archaeologists do, too: “The real problem is why it took so long to see the problem in his ‘god hand’ and all of the other problems in the Early and Middle Palaeolithic sites he has worked on. Why did so many leading archaeologists accept, as wholly valid, materials that have so many questionable aspects?” Whatever the explanation for Fujimura’s behavior may be, “it is merely a proximate explanation. The ultimate cause lies way beyond this individual. Fujimura deserves criticism for his actions. But he also deserves our sympathy, for he is ultimately a product of a system” that is producing many scandals, as well as stress and suicides. Keally continues: “every day, it seems, the media report that what we see...is just ‘the tip of the iceberg.’”

Keally concludes: “I feel there is a good chance that all of the Early and Middle Palaeolithic sites that Fujimura has worked on are fabrications. The few sites of this early age that I know of that Fujimura has not worked on have their own problems of validity. We seem to be back to zero on this question of humans in Japan before 35,000 years ago. Which means, we either have to find and/or validate some concrete evidence of humans in Japan in the Middle or Early Palaeolithic, or we have to develop a very good hypothesis explaining why they were not here. I am not at all certain Japanese archaeology is up to either task.”

Is the Japanese archaeological community or the Japanese historians community really up to the task? What Charles T. Keally says may have to be taken as a serious warning to the modern Western exegesis that blindly endorses the claustrophobic narrowness of the Japanese academic tradition.³⁸

secretiveness. This is just another face of the ultimate cause...underlying this recent scandal in archaeology (ibid).”

³⁶ “Japan is discussing education reform a lot these days. One of the ideas being expressed is to put education back into college education. This is a clear acknowledgment of what everyone already knows -- that college is not likely to produce an educated graduate (ibid).”

³⁷ “The archaeologists who question the validity of the Early and Middle Palaeolithic finds -- the human origin of the lithics or the accuracy of the dates or Fujimura’s ‘god hand’ -- also are doing very poor work. They rarely put their doubts into print, but instead pass them around as rumors (ibid).”

³⁸ The community of Western experts in Japan studies also seems to show an inclination toward narrowness by praising the Conformists for their “using insights from a variety of disciplinary perspectives and evidence from various source bases to refute the idea of a conquest,” and for their “positing a more **nuanced** set of exchanges between peoples on the peninsula and the islands,” while condemning the Dissenters for alleged “personal intolerance and nationalistic overtones,” and then refusing to participate in the academic debate. I was labeled a “revisionist historian” in the *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 67, No. 1, June 2007, p. 219.

