The Manchus Co-opt the Mongols to Rule over the East Asian Continent:

Eight Banners and Neo-Confucian Civil Governance[[1]](#footnote-1)

*Wontack Hong*

*Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University*

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1. Fall of the Han Chinese Ming Dynasty

**Ming founders did not revive the song institution**

The savage despotism of Zhu Yuanzhang (Ming Taizu r.1368-98) made flogging with bamboo staves in open court a regular feature of Ming terrorism.1 According to Fairbank and Goldman (1998: 128), the character of the Ming dynasty “began with the mentality of the dynastic founder … He was a peasant who had starved and begged as a boy, got his literacy from Buddhist priests, and joined an anti-Mongol religious sect. Rising as a rebel warlord, he bested his competitors in violence in the lower Yangzi region.” The emperor’s personal troops functioned as a special police force acting outside of the established legal system with its own fearsome prison for political offenders. Frontier commands were placed under the control of Zhu’s sons.2

Franke and Twitchett (1994: 42) state that the Ming rulers did not “resume the more sophisticated models of government provided by the Song,” but instead adopted “the institutional developments of the Jin and Yuan eras.” They also contend that the Ming rulers reverted “to the Tang models that all the conquerors had admired.” All the top positions of the Secretariat were abolished, and the heads of the Six Boards reported to the emperor personally. 3

The first civil service examination was held at the lowest level in 1368, leading up to the metropolitan exam in 1371. After 1384, the system of examinations and renewal exams became the central institution in upper-class life. 4 After relocating the capital from Nanjing to Beijing, Yongle (r.1402-24) devoted himself to military affairs, leaving the Confucian officials in charge of the civil bureaucracy. Ming rule was decisively shifted to civil officials after his death.

Positions in the bureaucracy and the military officer hierarchy were dominated by officials selected through the Neo-Confucian exam system which was administered at the county, provincial, and capital levels with specified regional quotas.5 The competition among the landed gentry families to “join officialdom quickly exceeded Song levels,” says Ebrey (1996: 190). Although the early Ming emperors established autocracy, Elman (2000: 618) notes, the “Ming literati ensured that the dynasty would maintain a political balance between the court and the bureaucracy and use Cheng-Zhu learning as the standard to select officials.”

Ever after the Zhu Xi’s interpretation of the Confucian classics (Four Books) was adopted as state dogma, there remained no room for original ideas in the examination system. Any deviation from the orthodox interpretation led to failure. 6 The exam system not only served to recruit loyal civil servants of a standard type but also to guarantee a thorough indoctrination in the Confucian ideology among the whole educated class; “in this way, particularly from the Ming dynasty on, an unparalleled uniformity of thought was enforced not only among the officials but throughout the whole leading class,” says Franke (1972: 13).

The Ming rulers further institutionalized the dominance of local landed-gentry elites, Lorge (2005a: 110-1) explains: “The entire population was divided into communities of 110 adjacent households as the basic unit of self-government and state control. Each year one of the heads of the ten wealthiest households held the position of community chief, who served as representative to the local magistrate and the local tax collector. … Thus, those in power at the local level were explicitly charged with deciding local issues, and anyone who was not satisfied…and moved to the next level was actively discouraged by the magistrate from doing so.”

**Ming despotism executed by the eunuchs**

Since Ming “was the only extended period of native rule over all of China proper,” Ebrey (1996: 215) states, “historians wish they could assign more accomplishments” to it, but “the Ming period is generally judged rather harshly.” 7

Zhu Yuanzhang had aimed at extreme frugality, and set the land tax at about 10 percent of the product, arranging to have every specific revenue transferred directly to each authorized expenditure. Fairbank and Goldman (1998: 132-3) note that this “fragmentation of revenue and expenditure” eliminated the use of the financial resources for internal rebellions, but also starved the central governmnet of revenue.8

Ebrey (1996: 194) states: Zhu Yuanzhang “had stipulated that eunuchs should not be allowed to learn to read or to interfere in politics. Within decades, however, palace eunuchs were … playing major roles in military affairs and…the appointment and promotion of officials. During the last century of the Ming 70,000 eunuchs were in service throughout the country, 10,000 in capital. They had their own bureaucracy, parallel to that of the civil service.” 9

Although the gentry scholars were constantly terrorized by the corrupt eunuch dictatorship, Fairbank and Goldman (1998: 128) note, “great achievements in education and philosophy, literature and art, reflected the high cultural level of the elite gentry society” that had, in the words of Ebrey (1996: 201), the “resources to pursue a rather idyllic version of the literati life… and occasional office holding.” 10

In spite of the Ming’s anti-commercialism, the villagers and townspeople were left to run many of their affairs on their own, and the growth of cities accompanied the spread of the interregional trade in salt and cereals (as well as tobacco and sugar cane in the south).11 Rich merchant families emerged, and many of them could afford to join the landed-gentry families in competition for officialdom.

By the year 1600, on the eve of the dynasty’s violent end, the empire of Ming was the most sophisticated of all the nations on earth in literature, printing, art, and urban life. At the very moment when the Ming dynasty seemed at the height of its glory, however, the state and economy began to unravel. The eunuch domination of the Court had, on the one hand, paralyzed the bureaucracy and military. On the other hand, accroding to Ebrey (1996: 214), the central governmnet’s revenue could not keep up with the population growth “because of long-standing tendencies for peasants to lose their land and rich landlords to find ways to minimize their tax payments. Short of revenue, the government [could not] respond effectively to natural disasters, such as those brought on the early seventeenth century by the ‘little ice age’… [F]amine became serious… [A]rmy deserters…[formed] gangs and [ravaged] the countryside.” 12 The Ming dynasty began to crumble from within.

By 1636, two rebel leaders had emerged. Li Zicheng (from Shaanxi, c.1605-45), a former shepherd and postal relay station worker, in the north and Zhang Xianzhong, a former soldier, in the area between the Yellow and Yangzi rivers.Those who brought order to the chaos in mainland China were the Nüzhen woodsmen of Eastern Manchuria.

2. Manchurian Woodsmen Conquer China with Eight Banners

**nurhacHi and Huang’taiji, founders of the qing dynasty**

The Mohe-Nüzhen tribes had traditionally dwelt in fortified villages under the control of lineage headmen subject to the *beile* (Mong. *beki*; Turk. *beg*; prince, nobleman) lord of tribal federation. Nurhachi (奴爾哈赤 b.1559/r.1616-26) was born to a *beile* chieftain of the Jianzhou tribes that had been hunting and farming around the region of the Chang’bai Mountains. The lineage of Nurhachi and his sixth generation ancestor, Mönke Temür (猛哥帖木兒), used the Tong (佟) surname that could have descended from the ancient surname “*Jiagu*,” called “(Aisin) *Gioro*” in Qing times. 13

In 1433, Mönke Temür was killed in tribal fighting, and his younger brother made the decision to move, Elliott (2001: 53) says, “away from the Korean border, which recurrent attacks by Korean forces had proved inhospitable.” The Jianzhou tribes migrated, Li (2002: 13) says, “following several defeats at the hand of the Koreans,” to the Pozhu River valley c.1436. The general vicinity of Pozhu valley, the original homeland of Koguryeo, became the base for the Jianzhou tribes long before the conquest of Liaodong by Nurhachi.

According to Li (2002: 28), Nurhachi had lost his mother when he was young, and for a time he had to make, “a living by collecting ginseng and cones and selling them in the Fushun market,” and “lived in the household of the Ming general Li Chengliang (李成梁 1526-1615) in Fushun.” According to the *Mingshi*, Li Chengliang was of Korean descent and father of Rusong who led the Ming army that was dispatched in 1593 to help Chosun repel the Japanese invasion forces. When Nurhachi’s father and grandfather were both killed in the midst of a tribal battle in 1582, Nurhachi succeeded to the leadership of the Jianzhou Left Branch at the age of twenty-four.

Nurhachi founded his first walled city, Fe Ala, in 1587; led his first of eight tribute missions of Nüzhen chiefs to Beijing in 1590; offered the Ming his assistance to fight against the Japanese invasion forces in the Korean Peninsula in 1592; was conferred the title of Dragon-Tiger General by the Ming court in 1595; established his first capital at Hetu Ala in the early 1600s; subjugated most of the other Nüzhen tribes by 1613; declared himself the Khan of Latter Jin in 1616; destroyed the Ming forces at Sarhū in 1619; conquered the entire Liaodong area by 1621; and moved his capital to Shenyang (renamed Mukden, *florescence*) in 1625.14

On lunar New Year’s Day in 1596, Nurhachi told Shin Chung-il, an envoy from the Chosun court, that “from this day forward, our two countries will be as one, our two families will be one, forever united and amicable, for generations, without end.” Nurhachi sent a letter to the Chosun court, reading: “the honorable Korean country and our Nüzhen nation, we two countries, will advance toward customary good relations, and our two peoples will not…raise troops against each other.” 15

In sixteenth-century Manchuria, Chinese-style intensive agriculture was conducted only in the southernmost region below Shenyang. The Ming rulers had maintained strong garrisons in the Liao River basin under their own generals. Ming military recruitment for service in Liaodong was surging among the Nüzhens and Koreans.16 Crossley (1999: 47-8) reiterates Owen Lattimore’s view that the Liaodong-Jilin region “prior to the Ming-Qing transition was a ‘reservoir’ in which the fluid elements of Chinese, Mongol, Korean, and native cultures swirled in response to political and economic currents,” and that “the Nüzhens cum Manchus must have been cultural ‘chameleons’ [like transfrontier or creole], blending alternatively with the Mongols, the Chinese, or the Koreans as advantage dictated.”

Nurhachi’s only literate son (eighth, and born of a secondary consort), Huang’taiji (皇太極 b.1592/r.1627-43), was elected the khan of Nüzhen tribes in 1626. Huang’taiji devoted the first ten years of his reign to consolidating his father’s gain. In 1635, he imposed a new pan-Manchurian identity with a single name of “Manchu” upon all his subjects, a disparate collection of tribes incorporated in the banner system, claiming that, in the words of Crossley (1997: 79), “the Aisin Gioro lineage [has] roots deep in eastern Manchuria, sharing ancestry with the fishing and gathering peoples of the upper Amur (whom he was busily conquering and impressing into the Eight Banners), with the Mongols, and with Korea.” Huang’taiji declared himself the Emperor of Great Qing on May 14, 1636, making Nurhachi the founder-emperor of the Qing dynasty.17

**the manchus subdue chosun before conquering china**

Seon-jo (r.1567-1608) was succeeded by his second son Kwang-hae (b.1575/r.1608-23), whose skillful foreign policy kept Chosun from being drawn into the conflict between the Nüzhen and the Ming. Although a sense of gratitude ran deep in the minds of Koreans who were indebted to Ming for their survival, Kwang-hae had personally gone through the ravages of the Japanese invasion (1592-8) at the age of 17-23, and understood the reality of regional power balance. In the midst of his endeavor to enhance the state of military preparedness (by repairing defensive strongpoints, renovating weaponry, and instituting training programs), however, Kwang-hae was removed from the throne by the faction in support of his nephew In-jo (b.1595/ r.1623-49) who, too young to remember savage international warfare, foolishly switched to a pro-Ming and anti-Nüzhen policy. Consequently, Lee (1984: 215) notes, “the Manchus now came to feel it necessary to eliminate the threat to their rear posed by Korea before proceeding with their campaign against Ming.” 18

Huang’taiji invaded Chosun in 1627 with a 30,000-man army, but withdrew in exchange for a pledge from the Chosun court to do honor to Latter Jin as an older brother. Declaring himself emperor of the Qing in 1636, he demanded a suzerain-subject relationship. When In-jo refused to meet his demand, Huang’taiji himself led an army of 100,000 men and invaded Chosun in December 1636. King In-jo surrendered on January 30, 1637, and vowed to sever his ties with the Ming, to pay homage to the Qing court, and to dispatch troops to assist the Manchu campaign against the Ming, delivering his two sons as hostages. 19

The Qing invasion was of short duration, but the northwest region through which the Manchus had passed was ravaged. Prior to 1020, the Yemaek cousins in the Korean Peninsula had maintained an effective military machine to fight against the massive invasions and defend their nationhood, but they learned that, by adopting the “*Sa-dae* (Respect the Greater)” strategy, territorial integrity could be maintained without warfare. The powerful military machine was abandoned, but simply by “yielding to the stronger,” be it the Qidans, the Nüzhens, the Mongols or the Han Chinese, the Korean dynasty could maintain its independent nationhood free from the destructions of warfare. When the Koreans prematurely relinquished their neutral stance or stood up against the obvious Stronger, however, they suffered wholesale destruction until they, voluntarily or involuntarily, changed their stance. A Manchurian force, in particular, could not allow to stand the threat to their rear posed by the Koreans before proceeding with their campaign against mainland China. The Koreans had to be either neutralized or subdued.

**eight banners: highly militarized social organization**

Nurhachi created four banners in 1601, each of a different color (either yellow, white, blue, or red). In 1616, the year Nurhachi declared himself the Kahn of the Latter Jin, each of the four banners was split into two (one being the plain banner and the other being bordered), completing the formation of the Eight Banners. The Khan commanded the upper three banners, and his sons and nephews, the imperial clansmen, were appointed as the banner lords (*beile*) of the five lower banners.20 The Manchu Eight Banners (*Manzhou Baqi*) were such a highly militarized form of social organization as to merit the claim by Elliott (2001: 348): “Every Manchu man, woman, and child, with the sole exception of the emperor, belonged to the Eight Banners.”21

Banner units were organized along traditional tribal lines, and constituted a hereditary socio-military system for all able-bodied freemen (between fifteen and sixty years of age, and at least 165 cm tall) to provide active combat duty on rotation; to register and protect their families and slaves; and to supervise work on their land, paying tax-in-kind and labor service. The family members of company (*niru*) bannermen were placed under the jurisdiction of the same hereditary company captain (*niru-i-ejen*, mostly the chieftains who brought their tribesmen over to Nurhachi’s side), headed at the top by the banner commander (*gūsai ejen*, the distinguished military leader), above whom was the imperial *beile*. The lands assigned to bannermen were kept scattered, intermingling with land belonging to other banners and hence, Fairbank and Goldman (1998: 146) note, “the banners did not become territorial units.” Each banner soldier or officer received three to thirty (mostly Chinese) slaves and bondservants with lands for cultivation (that became tax-exempt after 1644), and “enjoyed booty in warfare, and stipends of rice and cash in peacetime (ibid: 146).” 22

The banner elites were recruited from the village leaders, tribal chieftains and surrendered Ming officers, and were trained to perform both military and civil tasks, in the words of Crossley (1999: 287), “to further the ends of conquest and occupation.” The banner elites, Fairbank and Goldman (1998: 147) state, “formed a talent pool from which individuals could be chosen to function as civil bureaucrats.” Crossley (1997: 127) states that the pre-conquest ideal “of the bannermen as comprehensive state functionaries” [soldiers, clerks, or officials] continued to shape the Qing “educational policies after the conquest.”

Rawski (1998: 63-4) states that “in 1634 the military offices created by Nurhachi were translated into Manchu titles of nobility.” The banner elite “who were not of imperial descent and *Aisin Gioro* who did not belong to the *zongshi* (宗室),” could earn hereditary nobility from the emperor, and their descendants could receive higher titles through their own achievements. Rawski (ibid: 59, 63) notes that, although the banner nobles also filled positions in the civil services, they were particularly dominant in the highest decision-making inner-court posts (*amban*/councilors).

The banner soldiers were, says Michael (1964: xxiii), “prohibited from leaving their units to become farmers or to follow any other profession. They were to remain a privileged, salaried group isolated from the general Chinese life.” The free bannermen, notes Im (1981: 52), “preferred to turn over farming to the slaves and Chinese tenants. … They rapidly became accustomed to their elite status as conquerors.”

The Banner system assumed the function of tribal organization that controlled all of the Nüzhen tribes militarily, politically, economically, and socially. According to Elliott (2006: 31), one of the strengths of the banner system was that “it provided the framework for maintaining all of society on a permanent wartime footing.”

**governmental authority to the civil bureaucracy**

Under Nurhachi, Li (2002: 60) notes, “the main governmental functions were channeled through the eight banners’ leadership.” With a drastic increase in the non-banner Chinese population, however, the Manchus needed a centralized administrative system under the supreme ruler’s direct control. By 1627, Huang’taiji began to establish a Ming-style bureaucracy in Sheng’jing (盛京 Shenyang/Mukden) and, says Elman (2000: 164), “initiated examinations for Machus, Mongols, and Chinese banners in their native languages … as early as 1634.” In 1629, Huang’taiji created the Secretariat staffed by Manchu, Mongol and Chinese scholars, called Literary Office (*Wenguan*), that was reorganized in 1636 into the Three Palace Academies (*Three Inner Courts* as the emperor’s personal staff). The Six Ministries were set up in 1631 with four presidents—two Manchus, one Mongol, and one Chinese. The Censorate was established in 1636, and the Ministry of Colonial Affairs (理藩院) in 1638 that administered the Mongols. Educated Han Chinese who surrendered were offered a chance to serve in the rapidly expanding bureaucracy. Governmental functions were transferred from the banners to the newly created central bureaucracy. 23 “By the time the Manchus entered North China,” Fairbank and Goldman (1998: 147) state, “they were fully prepared…to rule in the Chinese way. 24

3. Manchus Co-opt the Mongols and the Liaodong Han Chinese

**Manchus co-opt the mongols as a junior partner**

To clear the way for a successful campaign against mainland China, a Nüzhen force from eastern Manchuria had either to subjugate or to co-opt not only the Yemaek Tungus in Korea proper but also the Mongols (now including the Mongolianized Qidans) in the west. The Manchus were able to co-opt the Mongols for “the Great Enterprise” who remained as a faithful ally until the very end of the Qing dynasty.

In the west of the Greater Xing’an Range at that time were the Chahar Mongols ruled by Ligdan Khan (r.1603-34), a descendant of Dayan Khan (1460-1521?), whose ambition was to form an empire by subjugating other Eastern Mongol tribes in Inner Mongolia. 25 According to Lattimore (1934: 29), the Mongol ruling princes were “all descendants of different sons or brothers of Chinggis Khan; or, in the case of the Kharchin princes in Jehol, of his daughter.” Due to the incessant fighting among the heirs of Chinngis Khan, the Mongols had been very much fragmented. The Manchus offered an alliance to the other Eastern Mongols, defeated Ligdan Khan, and obtained the support of the Mongols in Inner Mongolia for the cause of the Manchu empire-building. Elliott (2001: 63) notes that “in 1636, an imperial seal of the Yuan emperor was presented to Huang’taiji by the widow of Ligdan khan,” and Rawski (1998: 198) states that the acquisition “of the ‘seal transmitting the state’ (傳國璽) … was hailed as concrete proof that he had received the mandate of Heaven.”26 Lattimore (1934: 29) says that the “recognition of the Manchu Emperors as overlords of the Mongols [*bogdo kaghan*; *Great Khan of Khans*] was largely the result of negotiations to end the fighting among different descendants of the heirs of Chinggis.”

Lattimore (1934: 16) states that the alliance between the Manchus and the Eastern Mongols “built up a frontier power in Inner Mongolia which protected the Manchu conquests in China,” and hence “was one of the essential preliminaries to the… conquest.” Between 1621 and 1635, Nurhachi and Huang’taiji established a parallel structure of eight Mongol banners (*Menggu Baqi*). Each Mongol banner company was headed by a hereditary tribal chief. The Qing dynasty depended heavily on Mongol troops to defend its Inner Asian frontier. The unification of all Eastern Mongols by the Manchus began with Inner Mongolia, extending their control into Outer Mongolia much later (in 1691).

Perdue (2005: 124) states that the intermarriage with Mongolian noble families further cemented the alliance between the two peoples: “From 1612 to 1615 Nurhachi and his sons together married six Mongolian women. Huang’taiji expanded the marriage alliance policy, marrying twelve of his daughters to Mongolian chieftains.” 27 Di Cosmo and Bao (2003: xii) state that the “marriages and oaths of alliance allowed the Manchu leadership to re-weave the threads of the Manchu-Mongol relationship into a solid fabric of alliance and subordination that …secured the incorporation of the south Mongol tribes in the Eight Banner system.”Lattimore (1934: 29) contends that the Mongols “had never looked on the Manchu Emperors as alien conquerors,” and “felt that they were equals of the Manchus as founders of the Manchu Empire.”

The descendants of Chinggis Khan received positions of rank in the Qing administration, commanding their own tribal people. The Qing rulers effectively divided and immobilized the Mongols by organizing them under separate leagues with assigned pasturage.28 By restricting military and administrative activities of hereditary princes within their own regions, the Manchus prevented the formation of national unity among the Mongols and the emergence of too creative tribal leadership. 29

According to Li (2002: 64-5), “the Manchu leaders showed little interest in becoming Buddhist themselves,” but they, at Huang’taiji’s initiative, “took advantage of the Mongols’ adherence to Buddhism” by styling themselves “as protectors of Tibetan Buddhism, which helped consolidate their rule over the Mongols and foreshadowed their claim to Tibet.”Elverskog (2006: 3, 6) states that the Manchu emperors “used Buddhism to rule the Mongols” and “were able to ensure the undying loyalty of the Mongols”who became “stalwart defenders of the Qing state precisely because it had become identified as a multiethnic Buddhist empire.” 30

Crossley (2006: 70-1) states: “Acknowledged noblemen of the Mongol Eight Banners and of the Khalkha khanates lived much like as Manchus of the Aisin Gioro or the titled [noble] families. …Commoners of the Mongol Eight Banners, distributed among the capital and provincial garrisons with other bannermen, were perhaps the most privileged group of the garrisons.”

**Huang’taiji enlists the liaodong han chinese**

Also mobilizing the Han Chinese around the Liao River basin (called *Nikan*), Huang’taiji established two full Chinese banners (*Hanjun Baqi*) in 1637, increasing the number to four in 1639, and then to eight in 1642, just in time for the conquest of China that began two years later. Almost 40 percent of the conquest force in 1644 consisted of the *Liaodong* Han Chinese bannermen (漢軍旗人). The *Liaodong* Chinese banner companies were mostly headed by the surrendered Ming officers who had brought with them the soldiers and military households under their command, and became hereditary captains.31

After Han Wudi had conquered Old Chosun in 108 BCE, a large number of Chinese came to settle in the Liao basin area. The descendants of these settlers came to constitute the core of the Han Chinese Eight Banners.32 Lattimore (1934: 66-7) contends that the frontier Han Chinese “takes on a new character …genuinely rooted in the region…identify[ing] himself, in a quasi-tribal manner, with the new frontier power that is beginning to press inward on China. … [T]hese were the Chinese bannermen who served with the Manchus in the conquest of China.” Through distinghuished military service, some Han Chinese commanders were able to found hereditary noble lines.33

The Ming forces armed with cannon were a formidable opponent to Manchu incursions but, Torbert (1977: 16) notes, the Ming generals Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming surrendered in 1633 with a number of cannons and “set to work producing more of them.” The Chinese bannermen were well experienced with casting and using cannons, and their “Portuguese” artillery force was called *Ujen Cooha* (重火器兵). According to Im (1981: 8), “the Manchu and Mongol bannermen’s main weapons were the bow and arrow used on horseback, while the auxiliarly Chinese armies used muskets and artillery pieces, which were praticularly useful in offensive operations against fortresses and walled cities.” The *Liaodong* Han Chinese cavalrymen used firearms in addition to bows and arrows, and the Chinese artillerymen continued to be in charge of all heavy Portuguese-style cannons in siege warfare. 34

Out of the approximately one million total male banner population in 1648, about 16 percent were Manchus and 8 percent Mongols, while 13 percent were *Liaodong* Chinese bannermen, and the remaining 63 percent the bondservants.35

**150,000 bannermen conquer the ming empire**

On September 21, 1643, Huang’taiji suddenly died. Following a complicated process of compromise and consensus, his younger brother Dorgon (1612-50, 多爾袞, Nurhachi’s 14th son from third wife, the *beile* of Plain White Banner) became the regent for Huang’taiji’s five-year-old ninth son, Fu-lin (Shunzhi 福臨/順治 b.1638/r.1644-61). In seven years, Dorgon accomplished the conquest of mainland China, laid solid foundations for a new empire, and made every Chinese adopt the Manchu hair style.

The rebel Li Zicheng had occupied Xi’an in October 1643, proclaimed himself Emperor of Shun (順) in January 1644, and seized the Ming capital on March 18. In April 1644, Li himself led an attack on Wu Sangui who had just repositioned his garrison troops from Ningyuan (寧遠) to Shan’haiguan. The “150,000 invincible bannermen” of Manchu, Mongol and *Liaodong* Han Chinese together with the 40,000-man Ming soldiers of Wu Sangui, who threw in his lot with the Manchus, marched down the coast, and entered Beijing on May 2, 1644. 36 The boy emperor, Shunzhi, began reigning in the new capital.

Ajige (阿濟格 1605-51) destroyed the remnants of Li Zicheng. Li was killed by villagers in September 1645. Dodo (多鐸 1614-49) was transferred from Xi’an to conduct a southern expedition on April 1, 1645, and was able to enter Nanjing without opposition on June 8.37 Ajige and Dodo were Dorgon’s uterine brothers. In July 1645, Dorgon ordered all Chinese, Wakeman (1985: 647) writes, “to shave their foreheads and plait their hair in a tribal queue like the Manchus. …[T]he command to cut one’s hair or lose one’s head not only brought rulers and subjects together into a single physical resemblance; it also provided them with a perfect loyalty test.” The haircutting command caused widespread resistance to the conquerors but, by December 17, 1645, “Dodo was able to tell Dorgon [that] Jiangnan and Zhejiang [were] completely pacified.” Hence Kutcher (1997: 723) could say that “the most marked feature of that conquest, the sign of obedience, was the shaved forehead…”

Wu Sangui (1612-78) was a native of the Ming Pale in Liaodong. Wu Sangui’s father, Wu Xiang (錦州總兵官), was the son-in-law of General Zu Dashou. Both the Zu and Wu families had served the Ming for generations as professional soldiers. The last Ming emperor hanged himself as the rebels broke into the Fobidden City on March 19, 1644, and Wu’s father and the entire Wu household were slaughtered. Wu decided to march with the Manchus on Beijing to destroy the usurpers, if not to save the Ming dynasty. The Manchus continued Wu in power and honor, but kept him away from North China, assigning him and several other turncoat Chinese generals the protracted task of hunting down the remnants of Ming royal families and their supporters. 38

The vigor and intelligence, or rather the ingenuity, of the Qing rulers enabled the conquest of all of mainland China, using remarkably few human resources and without resorting to the massacres and terrorizing destructiveness of the Mongols.

**manchus rule han chinese with confucian bureaucracy**

Immediately after the conquest, Wakeman (1985: 447) states, the “rapid transfer of allegiance by the operational administrative staff of the [Ming] imperial bureaucracy vastly facilitated the Qing occupation.” The Qing rulers appointed many of the *Liaodong* Han Chinese bannermen to the middle and higher reaches of the bureaucracy. According to Kessler (1969), in 1667, the *Liaodong* Chinese bannermen held 28 of 29 *du/fu* posts (督撫 governor-general/governor: 正二品總**督**/從二品巡**撫**), “the chief agents of imperial authority outside the capital.” 39 The Han Chinese officials then began to be selected from the gentry families through the examination system. The very first Palace Examination was held in 1646, merely two years after the conquest.40 High-ranking positions were largely monopolized by the Manchus (and Mongols), but the low-ranking provincial positions in mainland China were almost exclusively filled by Han Chinese gentry scholars. 41

The Manchu imperial family and bannermen were educated in special dynastic schools that taught the Manchu language, horseriding, archery, and a minimum knowledge of the Five Classics and the Mandarin dialect required to rule the Han Chinese. 42 After 1651, the Manchu and Mongol bannermen could take a simple *jinshi* examination in their own language, called the Translation Examination for bannermen, at the garrison. Those who attained the literary degree were listed on the waiting list of the Board of Civil Office; had an audience with the emperor; and then appointed to the seventh-to-ninth rank clerk positions. Im (1981: 93-4) states: “After six years service as clerk, an individual could, if he wished, return to a military post at the garrison. … If he wished to remain a civil servant, he could become a candidate for assistant district magistrate… Theoretically, [these] clerks had to keep on practicing archery and horseback riding.” The banner captains “had easier access to positions as civil administrators in the…government. As bureaucrats they enjoyed power and wealth, although their positions in the civil government were not inherited (ibid: 49-50).”43

After 1687, the bannermen could participate in the same examinations taken by the Han Chinese, but they had to prove their ability in archery and horsemanship first. Most Manchus still did not compete with the Chinese in provincial and metropolitan examinations.In 1697, the imperial families were encouraged to take the civil examinations with other Manchus. The Manchu bannermen, however, had little reason to master Confucian learning. During the reign of Qianlong (r.1736-96), a total of sixty persons were appointed as the Compiler to Hanlin Academy to serve the emperor directly as personal secretary. All of the twenty-five Han Chinese had the *jinshi* degree, but only four out of the thirty-five bannermen-appointees (旗人) had the *jinshi* degree.44

**enhanced role of the examination system**

The landed gentry were the backbone of Manchu rule in mainland China. Although the Qing government, Rowe (2009: 29) notes, “carved out imperial, banner, and official estates in the environs of Beijing … it did this primarily in areas that had been decimated by the Li Zicheng rebellion. Elsewhere, it announced its intent to respect existing ownership rights.” By passing the Confucian civil service examinations, members of the Chinese landed gentry became functionaries of the Qing dynasty and moved up the ladder through the system, acquiring due privileges.

Franke (1972: 8) states: the examination system “had assumed its final shape” in the Ming dynasty, “which was taken over without any major change” by the Qing dynasty. 45 There was a change, however. A total of 22,980 persons had passed the *jinshi* exams during the 273-year (1371-1644) rule of the Ming dynasty, but 25,441 persons passed during the 258-year (1646-1904) rule of the Qing dynasty, implying an increase in the average annual number from 84 to 99.

There were three main grades of examinations for the Han Chinese. The lowest grade examination (*kekao* 科考) was held in the prefectural capital (府都) after the preliminary qualifying examinations (*tongshi* 童試) for *tongsheng* (童生 *apprentice candidates*) administered in the county seat that were open to all but the mean people (賤民). The successful candidates were given the rank of *shengyuan* (*novice scholars* 生員), popularly called cultivated talent (*xiucai* 秀才). The second grade examination (*xiangshi* 鄕試) for *juren* (*selected men* 擧人) was held in the provincial capital (省都) every three years, and the third (*huishi* 會試) for *jinshi* (*presented scholars* 進士) in the capital every three years with re-examination in the imperial palace (*dianshi* 殿試) under the supervision of the emperor. Quotas were set at all three levels of examination.

The members of the degree-holders class (*shenshi* 紳士) were exempt from the corvèe labor service and the tax replacing it; enjoyed the legal privilege of commutation for minor offenses (being exempt from the demeaning humiliation of being lashed); enjoyed enormous, broadly recognized prestige evidenced outwardly by special scholar’s gowns and hat-buttons; and were free from the oppression of the underclerks (which is to say, received courteously by officials).46 To retain their status, however, all *shengyuan* had to submit to regular (biennial) recertification exams (*suikao* 歲考 *lit.* “*yearly tests*” for licensing) at the prefectural capital. They were never free of the stress and threat of examinations.47 To rule the empire, Qin Shihuang’di forbade scholars to read classics, but the Manchu rulers induced the Han Chinese gentry scholars to get trapped in the Confucian honeypot, so to speak, drowning themselves in the Confucian Classics.

According to Elman (2000: 241-2), even if “a degree-holder never held office, [the] labor tax benefits and legal privilege [were] sufficient social reward to merit investment of family resources for the required training.” Thousands of exam candidates “congregated biennially at counties, townships, and prefectures, and triennially in provincial and national capitals, and these goings-on took on local significance as social, economic, cultural, and political events ... with the likelihood that only one in a hundred would pass ... who ranged … from under twenty to over sixty years of age (ibid: xxxi-ii).”

The position and power of landed gentry depended on the certification of educational qualifications by state examination degrees.From the perspective of the Han Chinese in mainland China, Elman (2002: 361) writes, the Qing government “was a meritocracy in which social prestige and political appointment depended…on written examinations.” Qing emperors legitimated their rule of Han Chinese by “deftly appropriating the civil values of classical learning;” maintaining the Neo-Confucian bureaucracy composed of Chinese officials; and presenting themselves as sage-monarchs working with Confucian scholar-officials. “Filiality [孝] was developed to new heights as an essential prerequisite for rulership,” states Rawski (1996: 834).48 The Manchu rulers’ acceptance of “the gentry’s role as public functionaries was a major factor that worked for the stability” of the Qing Empire, says Michael (1964: xxiii).

The candidates preparing for the examinations had to master classical written Chinese, Elman (2000: 374-5) says, “whose linguistic terseness, thousands of unusual written graphs, and archaic grammatical forms required memorization and constant attention from childhood to adulthood.”As a result, the literati elite all over mainland China, regardless of their own vernacular dialects, could communicate in written form using a brush (*bi-hua* 筆畵).

During the Qing time, according to Michael (1964: xxv-xxvii), “there were only some 40,000 civil and military officials—most of whom were in the capital.” There were some 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 degree-holding (lesser) gentry who “never became officials but carried on in their home districts and provinces a great variety of functions. … The services…ranged from arbitration, welfare activities, and the management…of the vital public works to the education of the future gentry generation and the maintenance of the Confucian system itself. … No local officials [the upper gentry] could manage his district without the practical cooperation of the [lesser] local gentry” who were the most literate, wealthy, and respected individuals in their local communities.49 The institutionalized cooperation of the landed gentry enabled the Qing, in the words of Rowe (2009: 32-3), “to keep the civil administration small” and “well under a million troops (including both the bannermen and the Green Standard Army) to pacify and defend a population of four to five hundred million.”

There were more than ten times the number of degree-holding literati who were relentlessly trying but continuously failing to pass the examinations. The most well-known case may be that of Yuan Shikai (袁世凱 1859-1916) who had tried repeatedly but, being a man of action, failed to pass even the lowest examination. His rise to the highest official position was owing to the patronage of Li Hongzhang (1823-1901) and the unflinching support of Empress Dowager Cixi (1835-1908), symbolizing the final days of the Qing dynasty. Passed or failed, Yuan Shikai may be classified as a scholar-official, qualitatively different from Sun Wen, Jiang Jieshi or Mao Zedong.

**manchus consolidate the new empire**

The Manchu partnership with the Mongols lasted until the very end of the Qing dynasty. Many of the *Liaodong* Han Chinese bannermen spoke both Manchu and Chinese, and hence most of them were co-opted as honorary Manchus. The partnership with Wu Sangui (d.1678) and two other Chinese collaborators who took over large satrapies in South and Southwest China (雲南吳三桂/廣東尙可喜/福州耿精忠), however, could not last long. In 1673, the three feudatories rebelled (三藩亂), but crushed by the 160,000-200,000-man banner forces augmented by the surrendered Ming soldiers (called *Lüying* 綠營軍, the Green Standard Army). “Emperor” Wu Shifan (吳世璠), Sangui’s grandson, committed suicide in 1681. Taiwan was incorporated into the empire as a prefecture of Fujian in 1683, rooting out the Ming loyalists who harassed the southern shores from the island. “Until the opening of Xinjiang” in the mid-eighteenth century, however, “that portion of the banner population directly involved in the conquest had been as mobile as the front itself,” says Crossley (1990: 13).

The Manchus established banner garrisons, numbering from a couple of hundred to several thousand soldiers, and financed by the provincial governments. 50 According to Im (1981: 13), about 8 percent of the total number of banner soldiers were stationed in the Beijing area, 35 percent in Manchuria and 45 percent (est. 42,253 men around 1760) in 18 strategic provincial cities, to police mainland China and maintain surveillance of the Chinese civil administrators.51 The Manchu Cities (Garrisons) had parade grounds, school buildings, and the residences for provincial authorities, where bannermen were allotted a place to live with their households behind a wall that separated them from local Han Chinese. The so-called *Tartar* *Quarters* became part of the landscape and, as Waley-Cohen (2001: 18) says, “a daily reminder of the Qing’s original status as occupying conquerors.” 52

The Manchus were not bound by the Chinese tradition that required the eldest son, whether an idiot or a rogue, to take the throne: “Instead, in good Altaic fashion, they were free to choose the most capable heir,” says Elliott (2001: 356). Kangxi, the third son of Shunzhi, made it a law (太子密建法) that the emperor’s choice of heir be written in his own handwriting (勅諭); be stored in a box (密建函) behind a hanging board on the ceiling above the throne; and be revealed only in the presence of ministers after his death.

Over a period of 134 years, three capable and hard-working emperors, Kangxi (b.1654/r.1661-1722), Yongzheng (b.1678/r.1723-35) and Qianlong (b.1711/r.1736-96), consolidated the new empire, in the words of Rowe (2009: 33), organizing “the state apparatus into a rather tight and impressively efficient bureaucratic machine.” Guy (2010: 4) states that “the governors of Qing…performed with competence,” although “less than half the Qing provincial governors were *jinshi*-degree holders … [and] even under the Qianlong emperor…only 26 percent (60 of 232) of the governors held the degree (ibid: 15).”

Kangxi, who ruled for sixty years, pacified the Three Feudatory Rebellions (1673-81), personally led the campaigns to drive the Galdan (r.1671-97) forces out of Outer Mongolia (in 1690-7), enjoying the excitement of war, and occupied Lhasa in 1720. In order to maintain “discipline and training,” Kangxi instituted, Kessler notes (1976: 205), “thrice-yearly hunting trips beyond the Wall” mobilizing “as many as seventy thousand” bannermen on these occasions. Qianlong, who decided to rule exactly for sixty years by abdicating one day short of the length of his grandfather Kangxi’s reign, completed the conquest of the western Mongols in Zungaria (the area east of Tarbaghatai and west of the Altai Mountains) in 1757-9 and the Muslim Turks and Uighurs in Turkestan (the area south of Tianshan and north of the Kunlun Mountains) by the mid-1770s, and began to rule Tibet after 1791. All of these lands were inherited by the PRC. 53

In order to reduce the collective influence of imperial princes and banner nobles on the emperor’s decision-making, the function of traditional inner-court Council of Deliberative Princes and Ministers (*Yizheng’wang dachen huiyi* 議政王大臣會議) was gradually transferred to the Grand Council (*Junji’chu* 軍機處) of the emperor’s select personal confidants who supervised and directed the formal outer-court bureaucracy, run according to statutory laws and administrative codes. 54 After 1693, the secret “palace memorial (*zouzhe* 奏摺)” system that bypassed the the outer-court was developed as a major source of intelligence gathering for the emperor and inner-court ministers, reaching a wide range of select elite officials in the provinces. 55 Important documents were written only in Manchu. The Manchu rulers, Fairbank and Goldman (1998: 149) say, “followed the Qidan, Nüzhen, and Mongol examples in creating a Manchu documentation that was generally unavailable to Chinese officials.”

The provinces had Manchu governor-generals who often resided in the walled garrison compounds, and Chinese governors who also resided often in the Manchu cities with their families “like hostages.”56 The capable Chinese, recruited through the examination system, did the work while the loyal Manchus checked up on them.

According to Crossley (1999: 128), Emperor Qianlong commanded in 1740 that “selected Mongols, Koreans, *Tai Nikan* (the Chinesepopulation of eastern Liaodong and Jilin), and all ‘Fushun *Nikan*’ be enrolled in the Manchu banners.”After a protracted process of weeding out the Chinese bannermen, all banner people came to be recognized as Manchus (or Mongols). The only Han Chinese troops whose existence was recognized were the Green Standard Army that had participated in the campaigns under Qianlong. Though they numbered three times larger than the Eight Banners, they were fragmented into smaller units scattered all over the countryside, and used mainly as the local constabulary on the post routes and against bandits under the command of various local officials, without any training as a striking force.57

In 1792, Qianlong styled himself “Old Man of the Ten Complete Victories,” including victories in three wars of conquest in Xinjiang (the Zungar, Yili, and Muslim campaigns of 1755-59); two wars fought on the Sichuan-Tibetan borderlands (the Jinchuan wars of 1747-9 and 1771-6); wars in Burma (1766-70), Taiwan (1787-8) and Vietnam (1988-9); and two wars against the Gurkhas in Nepal (1990-2), as if to commemorate the “Pax Manjurica.”58

The victories in warfare were extensively commemorated in art and literature, in monuments and public buildings, in ritual celebrations, in rewards, and in celebrating marches. According to Waley-Cohen (2006: 22), such a “militarization of culture” in the Qianlong era could not but affect even the Han Chinese people, as manifested by the active “militarization of local society” in mainland China “during the nineteenth century.”Perhaps the martial legacy of the Manchu Qing had been conducive also to the advent of such legendary modern Han Chinese military leaders as Li Hongzhang (1823-1901), Yuan Shikai (1859-1916), Jiang Jieshi (1887-1975), and Mao Zedong (1893-1976).

4. The Manchus Try to Maintain the Conquerors’ Identity

**to maintain racial purity, martialism and frugality**

Huang’taiji, the de facto founder of the Qing dynasty, had expressed his grave worries over the future: “What I fear is this: that the children and grandchildren of later generations will abandon the Old Way, neglect shooting and riding, and enter into the Chinese Way.”Qianlong ordered this statement be engraved onto stelae and displayed whenever bannermen underwent military training.59

The Qing emperors idealized the Manchu identity with the martial (*wu*) values such as archery, equestrianism, military conquest, imperial expansion, and the frugal way of life accompanied with such a culture. Waley-Cohen (2006: 1) states: “They contrasted these values specifically with the scholarly, literary emphasis of Chinese culture in general and the extravagant culture of consumption that had come to characterize the late Ming period.” The Qing emperors believed that “it was precisely the dilution of such ideals through acculturation to Chinese ways (*wen*) that had brought about the demise of their ancestors, the Nüzhen Jin (ibid: 3).” They tried to hold the hereditary bannermen together as a cohesive and effectively ruling group by promoting their martialism and frugality. The “martial values” and “military culture” had been “deeply embedded in elite culture (ibid: 14),” and success in military service enhanced the “access to political power (ibid: 19).”

The Manchu emperors spent summers in Inner Mongolia (at Chengde in Jehol/Rehe), maintaining physical fitness by riding, hunting (at Mulan, the huge hunting park north of Rehe), and shooting. Emperor Qianlong prescribed rigorous study of the Manchu language and of military skills for banner education. He formalized the Old Manchu Way: immersion in the military arts of riding and shooting, the speaking and writing of Manchu, shamanism, frugality, and reverence for the lineages. He stated that “whether you have studied classical literature [the *Four Books* and *Five Classics*] is a matter of no concern to me.” 60

According to Elliott (2001: 355), the “performance of songs at the Qianlong court celebrating the twelfth-century victories of the Nüzhen Jin dynasty over the Song” was an “indication of the sense the Manchus had of following in the footsteps of the Mongols, the Nüzhens, and the Qidans.”

The Kangxi Emperor, in the words of Oxnam (1973: 286), “knew the rudiments of the Chinese language, …was willing to play the role of good Confucian emperor, … [and] found it easier to dismount from the horse of conquest.” Although the Manchu “emperor presented himself to Han Chinese as the heir to the Chinese dynastic tradition, a Confucian monarch,” and to the Mongols and Tibetans as “Khan of Khans” cum Protector of Buddhism as the “Buddha Reincarnate,” every Manchu ruler had “identified shamanism with [the sacred] Manchu tradition” and “promoted the Aisin Gioro family rites” by disseminating through “the banner organization” the court “shamnistic code” which “strongly emphasized ancestor worship.” 61 The Manchus, Spence (1990: 41) notes, kept “to their own private religious practices, which were conducted by shamanic priests and priestesses in temple compounds to which the Chinese were denied access.”

The Manchus tried to maintain their racial purity by banning marriage between the banner members and the Han Chinese. The general ban on intermarriage remained in effect for 250 years until lifted a year after the Boxer Rebellion (i.e., only ten years before the collapse of the dynasty in 1911). Although marriages were permitted between the families of Manchu and *Liaodong* Han Chinese bannermen, Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 11-2) state, this constituted no break in the general policy because the “Chinese bannermen were considered Manchu and, particularly when they lived in the north, behaved as such, acquiring not only the speech, but exactly the manners and even gestures of the old-fashioned Manchus of Manchuria.” 62

The Qing rulers thought that the Han Chinese practice of binding the feet of their women was extremely barbarous, and hence they proscribed foot-binding for Manchu women. Walking through life with “big feet,” Manchu women were not bound by the same rigid social conventions which prevailed among the Han Chinese. 63

No combination of efforts, however, could save the Manchus from the fate of ethnic self-destruction. By the end of the Qianlong period (r.1736-96), the great majority of bannermen in the provincial Manchu garrison cities, too small to maintain a self-contained life and public banner schools, could not speak the Manchu language, though memorials were routinely sent in Manchu until the end of the Qing dynasty. 64

Although the Manchu and Han Chinese bannermen were mostly promoted to governorship in the early days, Guy (ibid: 67) states that “By the nineteenth century, the vast majority of those promoted [from junior territorial office to governorships] were Chinese civilians [with *jinshi*-degree]. … In the Tongzhi reign [r.1861-74], the figure was 80 percent.”

**the ideology of manchu rulers on their ethnic origin**

According to Elliott (2000: 608), “the very first lines of the *Manchu Veritable Records* (dating from before 1644)—an account of the mythical origins of the Manchus and the exploits of the Qing founder, Nurhachi—is a reference to…the Changbai Mountains [長白山/白頭山 *the ritualized Manchu ancestral birthplace*] …from [which] flow three rivers, the Yalu, the Sungari, and the Aihu.” Elliott quotes *Shengzu Shilu*: “Northewest of the Yalu River is all the territory of China [Qing]; to its southeast is the territory of Korea [Chosun] … Southwest of the Tumen is the territory of Korea, while to its northeast is the territory of [Qing] … but the area between the Yalu and the Tumen is still unknown (ibid: 623);” and further quotes Gong Chai: “Manchuria [Manzhou]…is the dynasty’s auspicious place of origin (ibid: 632).” 65

In an imperial edict (dated September 20, 1777) commissioning the “Researches on Manchu Origins” (*Manzhou Yuanliu’kao*, completed six years later in 1783), Emperor Qianlong (r.1736-96) presented his own disquisition on the history of Manchuria. In the preface to the *Researches on the Manchu Origins*, Qianlong states that the ancestors of the Jin imperial clan had lived among the Mohe confederation within the territory of the ancient Sushens, where were found the Long White Mountains (*Chang’bai-shan*) and the Black Water (*Hei-shui*). This was the very scene of the rise of the Nüzhens. The Qing rulers believed that the founders of the Jin dynasty were their direct ancestors, and they initially called their nation Latter Jin until 1636. Qianlong suggested that “*Man-zhou* (滿洲)” may be traced to “*Man-zhu* (滿珠)” which may in turn be traced to “*Zhu-shen* (珠申),” a fairly recent reflex of the remote name of “*Su-shen* (肅愼).” 66

The Qing rulers traced the Manchu origins not only to the Sushen-Mohe-Nüzhen Tungus, but also to the Three Han, Silla and Paekche of the Yemaek Tungus, as well as to the Parhae, the Macro-Tungus. As a common denominator, the reputation of all the Tungusic people for their excellent archery marksmanship (on horseback) and fighting capabilities was very much amplified. The *Manzhou Yuanliu’kao*, however, conspicuously excludes the Qidan and the Koguryeo because the Xianbei, on the one hand, had obviously nothing to do with the Manchu origins while the presence of (the Yemaek Tungus) Koguryeo, on the other hand, might inflict serious damage on their effort to nurture a hegemonic image of the Sushen-Mohe Tungus in Manchurian history.

Neither the Western nor the Han Chinese specialists on the history of China ever mention the following fact recorded in (the Wanyan section of Book 7, *Buzu*) *Manzhou Yuanliu’kao*: the *History of Jin* states that the founder of the Jin dynasty came from Koryeo (or old Koguryeo land) but the *Chronicle of Great Jin* notes that he had originally come from Silla with the clan name of Wanyan. Since the Silla royal surname of Kim (金 implying Golden) has been transmitted from generation to generation over many dozens of generations, the *Chronicle* continues, the royal surname of Silla without doubt became its dynastic name.67

Both Western and Han Chinese specialists also fail to mention the fact that the emperor Qianlong addressed a quarter of his edict to the people of the Korean Peninsula. 68 The *Heishui* Mohe were described in Tang history as an uncultured people of terrifying fierceness, possessing a deadly poison for arrow tips. Qianlong apparently believed that the Manchus, Crossley (1997: 125) writes, “were rooted in these warlike peoples, but they were also rooted in the peoples of the ancient kingdoms of the Korean Peninsula, whose achievements in ceramics and metallurgy had fostered a local, independent civilization, and the Parhae kings, who had their own script, court rituals, bureaucracy, and multiple capitals.”

The end of Qianlong’s life (1711-99) coincided with the end of tripolar East Asia—the old order. The salaries for bannermen were fixed, even in times of inflation. Banner families began to slide into poverty, and the banner forces’ reputation for invincibility began to erode. While the company quotas for salaried positions and budget were fixed, the banner population steadily increased in peacetime. 69 Michael (1964: xxxiv) states: “When the banner families increased, there were no additional funds… What had been a comfortable salary in the beginning became an insufficient dole for a force whose morale was broken by lack of training and long years of inactivity. … The Manchus had the choice either of permitting the banner population to enter professions and merge with the Chinese population or of continuing to keep them as a group apart in a sort of privileged decay. They chose the latter course and hoped that in this way they would retain the loyalty of a group that had no way out. And indeed…the Manchu garrisons…remained loyal …and…died loyally.” According to Im (1981: 121), about 8,000 banner soldiers garrisoned at Hangzhou were exterminated with their families (save 46 officers and soldiers) by the Taipings in December of 1861. The Manchu commander-in-chief, Crossley (1990: 133) writes, “and most of his officers died in the fighting. More than ten thousand men and women killed themselves as the garrison was lost.” 70

**the sinocentric basics in writing the qing history**

A typical Sinocentric history (or rather a fiction) of the Qing reads as follows: the Qing empire was “given a certain political and cultural cast by the Manchus”; the Qing empire was “controlled by the Manchus”; or the Qing empire was founded by the Manchus but the Qing rulers “remade the court to bring it into harmony with established Chinese values” and the “golden age was represented in the rule of the Qianlong emperor, the most Confucian and sinified” of the Qing rulers.According to Crossley (1999: 3), these are the “basics” that are “accepted” in the field of Qing history.

Under the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), Han Chinese civilization flourished. The Ming emperors, however, had struggled with civil officials for control. The Qing emperors ruled. The centralized bureaucracy with specialized civil and military functions effectively had control, enforcing an elaborate set of laws governing extensive human and non-human resources down to the county level. The thirteen Ming provinces and the two metropolitan regions were restructured into eighteen provinces that constituted the inner territory, known as “China proper.” The territories outside China proper such as Manchuria, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan, says Peterson (2002: 7), “were administered… as categorically distinct…and generally they were under the command of personnel who were not Han Chinese,” involving “institutions and procedures not known under the Ming system of government.”The Qing ruled the peoples in outer territories according to their own tribal traditions (因俗以治), strictly set apart from the Chinese and the Confucian traditions. 71

Until the end of the dynasty, the high ranking positions were almost completely monopolized by the Manchu-Mongol aristocracy, and only the lower ranking positions in mainland China were filled by the Han Chinese gentry scholars. In May of 1911, the very final days of Qing, the Manchu rulers were forced to put up a “responsible cabinet,” but nine out of the thirteen ministers appointed were still the Manchu-Mongol aristocrats. 72 The Manchus promoted their martial traditions and resisted sinification. They both prospered with their own system and perished with their own system.

The gentry-scholar elite in downstairs, the Han Chinese who had passed civil service examinations, enjoyed social prestige even when not holding official position. They collaborated closely with the conquest elite in upstairs, centered on imperial relatives, and the Manchu, Mongol, and *Liaodong* Han Chinese bannermen, securing maximal returns under the dual system of a conquest regime. 73 The common people also enjoyed political stability, economic prosperity, and high population growth, at least to the end of the Qianlong emperor’s life. Hence Wang (2009: 147-8) states that “By almost any measure, the Qing was the most successful of conquest dynasties in Chinese history.”74 Rowe (2009: 1) further states thatthe Qing “more than doubled the geographic expanse of the Ming empire…and more than tripled the Ming’s population,” unfolding the “prosperous age (*shengshi* 盛世) called the High Qing in the West (ibid: 63).”

Although the Manchu rulers had forced the Chinese to adopt the Manchu hairstyle and high-collar tight-jacket dress (instead of the traditional loosely hanging robes) for uniformity in physical appearance, they in fact had never tried to build a nation-state through Confucian-style acculturation. On the contrary, they tried to preserve distinctively separate cultural identities for different subject peoples in their multi-cultural, multi-ethnic empire state.

5. Mandarin, the Language of the Liaodong Han Chinese Bannermen: A Linguistic Conquest

The Manchus were very familiar with the *Liaodong* Chinese dialect. On the other hand, many of the *Liaodong* Han Chinese spoke both Manchu and Chinese.Hence, the Qing rulers appointed many of the *Liaodong* Chinese bannermen to positions in the government bureaucracy during the early post-conquest period.75 The spoken language of the *Liaodong* Han Chinese bannermen at once became the Mandarin (*guan-hua* 官話, the dialect spoken by officials). The Tuoba conquerors continued to speak the Xianbei language in their court, but they also spoke Chinese. The Manchu Oing rulers also continued to speak the Manchu language, but also spoke Mandarin.

Those Han Chinese who could pass the provincial examinations by mastering classical Chinese had to master the Mandarin as a second language if they wanted to become a fully effective member of the central bureaucrats (including the local government officials appointed by the central government). Elman (2000: 375) states that Mandarin enabled the literati elite in the Qing Empire to “move effectively [in] local, provincial, and capital circles, while non-elite were limited to local groups that spoke the same dialect.”

The “rote memorization of the Four Books in Mandarin pronunciation” by the Chinese gentry elite all over the empire, who wanted to pass not only the local licencing-renewal examinations but also the *xiangshi* and *huishi*, indeed drew a line of demarcation between the Mandarin-speaking literary bureaucracy and the “classically” illiterate masses who spoke only the vernacular dialects.76 And yet, the examination system was a viable institution that served the administrative needs of a conquest dynasty and also the self-interest of landed-gentry families, cementing the partnership between the conquerors and Han Chinese officialdom in mainland China.

Elman (2000: 375) states: “The institutionalization of the Mandarin dialect used in the Beijing court…as the official spoken language…entailed…cultural and linguistic uniformity among elites.”Mandarin became the standard spoken language for the gentry elite throughout the realm. 77 If the conquest dynasty had primarily “stressed political reproduction of loyal officials to share power in the bureaucracy,” the examination and dynastic school system, in unforeseen ways, perhaps quite unintentionally, induced the “social reproduction of gentry elites (ibid: 240)” and the quasi-hereditary monopolization of bureaucracy by the rich gentry (and merchant) families, because the system was apparently partial to the “families with a strong tradition of classical scholarship and Mandarin-speaking credentials as a result of office-holding (ibid: 244),” and the “candidates already socialized through schooling and family traditions in *guan-hua* and literate in classical Chinese (ibid: 240).”

According to Elman (2000: 167-8), the Han Chinese elite “who passed the palace and the court examinations with highest honors and entered the Halin Academy, where they served as imperial secretaries, were required to learn Manchu, a practice that began in 1647. … Special essay tests in Manchu and translation questions from classical Chinese to Manchu were administered to Hanlin academicians…to ensure that documents and memorials were accurately recorded in the dual official languages.”78

Janhunen (1996: 163-4) states: “the Chinese language has undergone several cycles of differentiation and unification. The most recent phase of unification is connected with the formation and expansion of the group of dialects known as Northern Chinese or Mandarin … Of these, the variety spoken in Greater Manchuria, including Shandong, is Northern Mandarin.” He further states that, “with the expansion of the Qing dynasty, the Liaodong variety of Mandarin was taken to Beijing, from where it was spread all over China as the principal oral idiom between the Manchu and all the other ethnic groups of the empire (ibid: 167).”

The so-called Northern Mandarin was the Chinese dialect spoken by the *Liaodong* Han Chinese bannermen, which was “the *only* Chinese language” readily understood and learned by the Manchu conquerors. Not only the officialdom shared spoken and written language, the members of the Qing ruling class shared linguistic commonalities with each other all over the empire, generating a linguistic cleavage between the rulers and the ruled. 79 As a result, Elman (2000: 374-6) observes, “like European elites in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, who crossed over from their vernacular to classical Latin as the language of instruction in secondary education,” the Mandarin-speaking elites could move with ease in the provincial and capital circles as outsider officials.

The Altaic languages are characterized by a predominantly polysyllabic morpheme structure, absence of tones, and a highly developed suffixal morphology.80 The Chinese belongs to the Tibeto-Chinese language, characterized by features such as monosyllabic morpheme structure, tonal distinctions, and absence of morphology. Linguists, however, have noticed the presence of the Northern Chinese dialect with Altaic typology long before the Ming period. Of the regional varieties of Mandarin, Janhunen (1996: 164-5) observes, “the variety spoken in Greater Manchuria…is Northern Mandarin, and it is interesting to note that its modern territory is closely congruous with the medieval territory of the [Nüzhen] Jin empire of Manchuria and Northern China. … We can perhaps say that Mandarin was formed both upon an Altaic substrate, especially in the north, and under an Altaic superstrate, especially in the south.”

In an article with the rather provocative title of “Mandarin, a Language of the Manchus: How Altaic?,” Okada (1992) contends that “the Mandarin dialect of Beijing in Qing times…was a strongly Altaicized form of Chinese.”81 The northern variety of the Chinese language, called Northern Mandarin, had apparently adopted Altaic typology, and was polished by virture of the ethnically unifying Manchu Banner System.

Mandarin is today the Sinitic language characterized by the least number of tones and the largest share of polysyllabic vocabulary, with a tendency towards suffixal morphology and syntactic constructions of the Altaic type.82 This structural transformation has been termed the Altaicization of Chinese. One may say that the Liaodong dialect, that came to be called Mandarin, was formed upon an Altaic underlying layer. Janhunen (1996: 165) observes that, “with some exaggeration, Mandarin could even be characterized as a Manchurian language.”

The Altaicized *Liaodong* Chinese dialect, or rather the language of Han Chinese bannermen, was taken to Beijing by the Manchu conquerors, and in due course consolidated its position as “the language of civil servants” through the Qing civil service examination system. Called Mandarin, it was retained as the official language of modern China, reminiscent of the English that was retained as the official language of India in her 1950 constitution (and the 1967 amendment). The leaders of modern China, however, never delve into the origin and root of the modern Chinese language. Being immersed in Sinocentric historiography, most historians have failed to notice such a “linguistic conquest.”

<http://www.WontackHong.com/homepage1/data/1140.pdf>

<http://www.HongWontack.com/homepage1/data/1140.pdf>

<http://www.HongWontack.pe.kr/homepage1/data/1140.pdf>

1. See Wontack Hong, *East Asian History: A Tripolar Approach*, Seoul: Kudara, 2012, Chapter 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)