Chapter Eleven

The Mongols Co-opt the Turks to Rule All under Heaven

Crippled the Dual-System and Expelled by Chinese Rebellion
MONGOLS CO-OPT TURKS TO RULE ALL UNDER HEAVEN
CRIPPLED THE DUAL-SYSTEM AND EXPELLED BY REBELLION

The “Shiwei-Mongols” of Yuwen-Xianbei provenance unified the Mongolian steppe and destroyed the Manchurian conquest dynasty in North China. The occupation of the Xiongnu homeland by the Xianbei people of western Manchuria occurred the first time in 93-180 in the aftermath of the disintegration of Maodun’s empire, the second time in 402-552 by the Rourans, and the third time in 1206 by Chinggis Khan. The third occupation has lasted until today, resulting in an ethnonymic unification of the entire “Mongolian” steppe, but blurring the ethnic and linguistic demarcation on the steppe.

Chinggis Khan’s family had been outer vassals of the Jin court, and many features of the Mongol military system were derived from its counterpart in the Nüzhen system. A tribe or clan exceeding a thousand fighters was divided into several units of 1,000. Each unit was assigned grazing land, and the families were also put under the same administration, commanded by the hereditary military officers. The Mongol military, just like the Mengan-Mouke army of Jin, was an all-embracing organization, encompassing all the military, administrative, and fiscal functions, and involving the entire population.

Chinggis placed his personal followers and the members of his family at the head of the newly created Mengan units as chiliarchs or at the head of the larger army comprised of many Mengan units as myriarchs. He thus changed the fickle confederation of treacherous tribal armies into a disciplined and centralized army led by commanders personally loyal to him. In order to overcome numerical inferiority, the Mongols effectively co-opted for empire building almost the entire Turkic peoples that had been scattered all over the Eurasian continent. Sharing identical ethnic roots, the Qidans melted into the Mongols, achieving ethnonymic unification of all Xianbei descendants by designating them as “Mongols.” The Mongols borrowed many of the Central Asian administrative and governing techniques, and ruled the Han Chinese mostly with foreigners, without yielding the administrative machine to the Chinese administrators selected from the landed gentry. The Mongol yoke, without the buffer of Han Chinese scholar-officials, provoked such a strong nationalistic sentiment among Han Chinese against the alien conquerors as to be overthrown by mass rebellions, just like the Xiongnu Later Zhao regime in 350.
1. Mongolian Nomads Destroy Manchurian Conquest Dynasty

MACHURIAN WOODSMEN METAMORPHOSE INTO NOMADS

Grousset (1970: 193) suggests that the proto-Mongol peoples included not only the Xianbei, but also the Rouran, the Yetai, and the Avars. The name Mong-ol (蒙兀) first appeared in the Jiu Tangshu, compiled between 940-5. The chroniclers believed that the Mong-ol tribe was a branch of a larger ethnic grouping known as the Shiwei. 1 The Shiwei originated from the Yuwen-Xianbei that had been crushed by the Murong-Xianbei in 344 and split into the Shiwei, Xi, and Qidan branches. The Beishi and Weishu contend that the Shiwei and Qidan both originated from the Yuwen-Xianbei. The Snisbu and Tangshu contend that the Shiwei and Qidan are of the same descent. Because of the cold climate, the livelihood of the Shiwei depended less on farming and rather heavily on raising pigs and cattle. Because they produced no iron, the Snisbu says, the Shiwei people depended on the iron supplied by the Koguryeo. 2

The occupation of the Mongolian steppe by the Xianbei people of the western Manchurian steppe had occurred first in 89-93 CE, and lasted until the death of the great Xianbei leader Tan Shihuai (r.156-80). While the Tuoba-Xianbei were conquering North China, the Rourans from western Manchuria were able to establish a centralized state on the Mongolian steppe by 402 under the leadership of Shelun (r.402-10) that was superseded by the Eastern Turkic Empires (552-630/682-741) and then by the Uigur Turkic Empire (744-840). The 150-year period from 402-552 stands as the second time the Xianbei people occupied and ruled the Mongolian steppe.

According to Grousset (1970: 125), the Kirghiz Turks who had destroyed the Uighur Turks were driven out of the Orkhon area in the early 920s by the Qidan, and went back to their traditional homeland on the upper (i.e., southern) Yenisei River, the Yenisei steppes, leaving the Turkic heartland very much fragmented. The Liaoshi states that Aobaoji (872-926), the founder of the Qidan Liao dynasty, had led a great expedition in 924 into northern Mongolia, reaching the old Uighur capital of Ordubah in on the Orkhon River.

In 901 and again in 904-9, Aobaoji mounted a series of campaigns against the Shiwei in the north, and as a result, Xu Western Manchuria [implying the region at the mouth of the Amur in the west of Greater Xing’an Range, including the Shilka-Argun rivers and the Hulun-Buir lakes].


3 According to the Liaoshi, Aobaoji mounted attacks on the Shiwei in 901, 904, 905, 907, 908, and 909. See also Drompp (2005: 200-1).

4 Grousset (1970: 193) notes that “the Qidan…spoke a Mongol dialect which…by contact with the Tungusic languages, had become strongly palatalized.” According to Jahnnunen (1996: 145-6), the Qidan spoke Para-
Mongolic (a language collateral to the ancestor of all the actual Mongolic languages) that had a dialectical distinction from Proto-Mongolic, spoken by the historic Mongols.

A direct descendant of the Liao imperial family, Yelü Chucai, actively participated in drawing the blueprint for Mongol administrative organization as the chief adviser to Chinggis Khan and his son Ögödei (after 1227).

Ratchnevsky (1991: 6) notes that “Some of Chinggis Khan’s forebears belonged to the forest peoples, having been given the demeaning sobriquet hoi-yin irgen when … a grandson of Kabul Khan and the brother of Chingghis Khan’s father, Yisugei, migrated to the Tayichi’ut.” Ratchnevsky (ibid: 8) further notes that “The transition [from hunting-gathering] to animal husbandry brought the Meng-ku a degree of prosperity.” Janhunen (1996: 161) states that “When it comes to a more restricted geographical source for the historical Mongols, there can hardly be any alternative to Western Manchuria. Supposing that there was a rather close linguistic relationship between the Mongols and Tatar, it is possible that the latter were the very group remaining in the original homeland, while the Kereit and Naiman represented the results of westward expansion.” See also Allsen (1994: 329-33) for the ethnogenesis of Mongols.

Temujin Unifies the Mongolian Steppe

Temujin’s great-grandfather, Kabul Khan, founded the first Mongolian state, likely at the Argun River basin or the Onon-Kerulen area. Altan (Golden) Khan was the nomadic name for the Jin emperor, and the Nüzhen court tried to bring the Mongols into their tributary network (c.1135). A son of Kabul Khan was elected khan, and under his leadership the Mongols inflicted a heavy defeat on the Jin. His state collapsed, however, at the beginning of the 1160s. Ratchnevsky says that “Disunity and conflict were rife among the Mongol tribes; they had neither ruler nor leader… In this period of poverty, misery and decline, Temujin was born [somewhere along the Onon River, c.1162]. The Mongol people longed for unity and for a state of order in which human life and property would be secure.”
Temujin did not owe his power to election. He rose to the leadership of a great nomadic empire from an extremely marginal position. The loyalty of the Mongols to their leaders rested on an individual and personal relationship, for the Mongol tribes at that time, unlike the Xiongnu-Turks in the old days, had no concept of loyalty to hereditary aristocratic chieftains. By 1206, Temujin (c.1162-1227) were able to conquer the Naimans. Khuriltai was summoned to the source of the Onon River and he was enthroned as emperor, receiving the title Chinggis Khan.8

This new steppe empire established by the Shiwei-Mongol of Yuwen-Xianbei provenance was bound to confront the Jin Empire in North China established by the eastern Manchurian woodsmen. After all, the Shiwei had also led the life of typical woodsmen. The homeland of Shiwei was the area south of the Amur River in the general vicinity of the Lesser Xing’an Range, and the Shiwei had eked out a meager existence through a combination of primitive agriculture, pig-raising, hunting, fishing, and pastoralism.9 A branch of these Manchurian woodsmen had metamorphosed into Mongolian nomads within a couple of hundred years. Thus Janhunen (1996: 158) states that if we “accept the hypothesis that the Qidans were linguistically related to the Mongols, we see that the political history of Manchuria involves a regular oscillation of the power between Mongolic and Tungusic elements.”

The ethnonym Mongol, originally peculiar to a small Shiwei-Xianbei tribe, was elevated above other tribes by Chinggis Khan, resulting in an ethnonymic unification over the entire Mongolian steppe. Most Turkic tribes in the now “Mongolian steppe,” including the Önggüd, began to call themselves Mongols.10 According to Janhunen (1996: 160), “the linguistic Mongolization of Mongolia had…taken place during the more than three centuries that separated the fall of the Uighur (840) and the proclamation of the Mongol Khanate (1206).”

2. The Mongols Co-opt the Turks to Rule All under Heaven

CO-OPTING THE TURKS AND ASSIMILATING THE QIDANS

In 89-93 CE, a combined force of Xianbei, southern Xiongnu, and Later Han armies had routed the northern Kabul’s grandfather, Kaidu, laid the foundation for the growth of Mongol tribes. Kabul “gave the name Mangqol to his confederation in memory of an old and powerful nation or tribe (ibid: 7).” The Jin emperor Xizong (r.1135-49) “invited Kabul Khan to court, probably on the occasion of the emperor’s coronation (ibid: 9).” Chinggis’ father, Yisugei, was a brave warrior, but could not unite the Mongol clans (ibid: 14).

See also Barfield (1989: 188).


9 Ratchnevsky (1991: 40) notes: “The generosity with which Temujin treated his own people became widely known …People came individually or in groups from other tribes to enter into his service. …[Although] the tribal rulers stood by Jamuka …the people began to regard him as their champion in the struggle to unite the Mongol tribes.”

10 Franke and Twitchett (1994: 12) note that the Mongols absorbed “Turkic speaking tribes like the Önggüd.”
Elliott (2006: 39) notes that “Chinggis aimed to create a unitary Mongol identity when in 1206 he christened all his followers ‘Mongol.’ [At the time these included [not only the Mongol tribespeople but also Onggirad, Tayichighud, Kereyid, Naiman, and Merkid.” Ratchnevsky (1991: 73) notes that Temujin made alliances with non-Mongol tribes, “sealed by an oath.”


The initial population of Mongols is estimated to have been no more than 700,000 people. Janhunen (1996: 161)

See Kim (2004: 504).

Janhunen (1996: 145) notes: “The Mongol conquest of the Jin may have been a more serious blow to the Qidan, and towards the end of the Yuan period … the Qidan were becoming extinct as a separate population. … The original core of the Qidan native territory was located…in the basin of the Xilamulun … The present-day inhabitants of this region are Mongols of the Ju Uda League…which spread to the region when the Mongols of the Yuan dynasty had to evacuate the Beijing region.

Quite possibly, it was this…wave of Mongol occupation that absorbed the last remnants of … the Qidan ethnic group.” Janhunen (ibid: 148) continues: “The subsequent fate of all the presumed Qidanic groups was to lose their ethnic and linguistic identity.”

Xiongnu, causing the western migration of a large number of northern Xiongnu as far as the southern Russian steppes. In 630, Tang Taizong destroyed the First Eastern Turkic Empire (552-630), and some Turkic tribes fled west. Before Chinggis Khan united the Mongol tribes in 1206, however, most of the Mongolian steppe was still occupied by the Turks. Now under the combined pressure of both the Mongols and the Manchurian dynasties (Liao and Jin), a large number of the Turks still remaining on the Mongolian steppe were once again forced to decamp towards Central and West Asia, unintentionally opening the route for the Mongol conquest of Eurasia and paving the steppe turnpikes for the trans-continental Mongol empire.

Crossley (2006: 79) states that Chinggis had imposed “upon the diverse groups of what is now the Mongolian steppe,” that included “many Turkic-speaking groups,” the definition of “Mongol,” once they acknowledged “him as the only leader” and affiliated themselves “with Chinggis’s organization.”

In order to overcome numerical inferiority, a nomadic conqueror always tried to draw under his banners all sorts of nomads he collected on his way to conquest. The purely Mongol component of Chinggis Khan’s army amounted to less than 130,000 at the time of his death. Batu (r.1227-55) could successfully wage the European campaigns of 1236-41, occupy the whole of ancient Scythia (including the steppes north of Black Sea and Caucasus), and also enforce suzerainty over the Russian principalities, leading less than 4,000 pure-blooded Mongol troops (that were allocated specifically to him by Chinggis Khan’s dying wish), only by mobilizing the Turks that had settled in those regions a long time ago. The Mongols effectively co-opted almost the entire Turkic peoples that had been scattered all over the Eurasian continent for their empire building.

Sharing identical ethnic roots, the Qidans thoroughly melted into the Mongols and, unlike the Turks, simply disappeared from history after the Mongol rule. The Yuanshí records the Khubilai’s order in 1281 “to place the Qidan households under surveillance,” and it was the last time the Qidan appeared in a historical chronicle. The victorious homecoming of the Mongols resulted in the loss of ethnic identity of the vanquished cousins and an ethnonymic unification of “the entire Xianbei descendants” to form “a single Mongol entity.” The
disappearance of the Qidans is attested by the fact that, several centuries later, as Crossley (2006: 65) states, the Qing rulers regarded all “those living north of Liaodong, in the general Xing’an region, were Mongols, no matter what their ancestry.”

The Shiji used the generic name Donghu to designate the ancestor of almost all the tribes in western Manchuria, including the Xianbei and Wuhuan. Modern anthropologists, on the other hand, believe there were highly diversified ethnogenetic origins for the peoples in western Manchuria. When the entire Donghu came to be dominated by the Xianbei tribe for a long time, the Wuhuan disappeared from history, and the peoples of western Manchuria were called the Murong-Xianbei, Yuwen-Xianbei, Tuoba-Xianbei, etc. According to the Hou Hanshu, even the Northern Xiongnu who were subjugated by the Xianbei in 89-93 had called themselves Xianbei (自號鮮卑). The Yuwen and others were then subjugated by the Murong, and the Murong by the Tuoba. When the Qidan became the most influential tribe, the Tuoba disappeared in the chronicles, probably because the Qidan had subjugated all the Tuoba tribes remaining in western Manchuria, and all the Tuoba started calling themselves Qidan. Thereafter, historians referred to the two simply as Qidan. Likewise, when the Mongol-Xianbei became the rulers of all under heaven, the Qidan-Xianbei disappeared from history. Now we are left with only the Mongols (sans Xianbei).

THE MONGOL MILITARY MACHINE: CENTRALIZED TRIBAL ARMY

The Mongols had been, Franke and Twitchett (1994: 10) note, “frontier dependents of the Jin for many years before Temujin’s rise to power,” and hence many features of the Mongol military system were derived from its counterpart in the Nüzhen military system under the Jin, although Temujin’s bitter experiences with fickle tribal politics full of treachery greatly influenced his military strategy and political organization.

Chinggis Khan united the diverse Mongol tribes, and organized them into a centralized military machine. Rossabi (1988: 6) states: “he assembled a private army (nöküd), composed of loyal and trustworthy friends and allies and divided into groups of a thousand, each constituting a chiliarchy and led by a chiliarch, who superseded the authority of the old tribal and clan leaders.” Chinggis placed his personal followers and the members of his

Mote (1999: 59) notes: “The Mongols effectively eliminated by absorption half or more of the tribal peoples named in the Liao records.”


“Chinggis Khan was “the descendant of a princely family that had received… investiture…from the Jin court…Temujin himself had attended the Jin court…as one of its outer vassals (ibid: 14).”

15 A tribe or clan exceeding a thousand fighters was divided into several units of 1,000, while the Mengan with a smaller number of fighters was supplemented by assembling kinsmen who had been scattered in other clans or tribes, or even by co-opting war captives.

17 See Hsiao (1978: 9-14, 25, 37, 154). According to the Secret History of the Mongols, Chinggis divided his followers into units of 1,000 (mengan), appointing for each a chiliarch (mengan-u noyan), and small units of 100 (ja-un) and 10 (har-ban) commanded by centurions (jaun-u noyan) and decurions (harban-u
family at the head of the newly created *Mengan* units as chiliarchs (*mengan-u noyan*), or at the head of the larger army comprised of many *Mengan* units as myriarchs (*tümen*). Chinggis thus changed the fickle confederation of treacherous tribal armies, united only in a fluid association, into a disciplined and centralized hierarchical force led by commanders personally loyal to him.16

All male adults between fifteen and seventy years of age were liable for military service when needed. Each unit was assigned grazing land, and the families were also put under the same administration that was commanded by hereditary military officers. The hereditary *Mengan* chieftains constituted an officer corps. The chieftains exacted levies from the self-sufficient military families under their jurisdiction and also depended on the spoils acquired in campaigns. After the founding of the Yuan dynasty, officers became a hereditary salaried aristocracy. Chinggis Khan’s army amounted to 95 *Mengan* and 129,000 fighters by the time of his death. They were all composed of Mongols except the five *Mengan* of Önggūd Turks.17 The Chinggis Khan’s Mongol army was, just like the *Mengan-Mouke* of the Nüzhen military machine, an all-embracing organization, encompassing all the military, administrative, and fiscal function, involving the entire Mongolian population.18

Chinggis Khan also created the *Kesig* (*lit.* Guard in Turn), fashioned after the very much strengthened Imperial Guardsmen of the Song dynasty, from among the sons and younger brothers of commanders of proven loyalty, the offspring of aristocratic families all over Mongolia, and the royal hostages offered by surrendered kings to serve as his own bodyguard and also as the personal domestic staff of the imperial household. The *Kesig* was a hostage camp, an academy for young aristocrats promised a future of prominent official positions, a form of privileged apprenticeship for the future ruling class, a key link in maintaining Khan’s personal relationship with aristocracy and, at the same time, a rudimentary executive organ to transform the loose confederation of nomadic chieftains into a centralized autocratic despotism. The quota of 10,000 men for the Imperial Guard had been set up by Chinggis Khan.19

The secret weapon of the Mongolian army was its mobility, discipline, and maneuverability, together with effective coordination acquired from tribal hunting expeditions.20 The


See Hsiao (1978: 3-4, 8-9, 11).

See Hsiao (1978: 34-40). Song Taizu had designated the elite troops, including the offspring of influential families, as the Imperial Guardsmen (*Jinjun* 禁軍) and kept about half of them in the capital region, effectively ensuring the loyalty of influential families and discouraging regional uprisings. The Imperial Guard corps were divided into a couple of mutually independent contingents in order to provide a counter-balance (ibid: 33). Franke and Twitchett (1994: 23) state that: “the *kesig* organization ... assumed the functions of an administrative body [in addition to the bodyguard-household

family at the head of the newly created *Mengan* units as chiliarchs (*mengan-u noyan*), or at the head of the larger army comprised of many *Mengan* units as myriarchs (*tümen*). Chinggis thus changed the fickle confederation of treacherous tribal armies, united only in a fluid association, into a disciplined and centralized hierarchical force led by commanders personally loyal to him.16

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Mongols burned down cities and destroyed farm fields to convert them into steppe. In Eastern Iran, four-fifths of the population was slaughtered. Keenly aware of their numerical inferiority, they had deliberately adopted the terror tactic of massacre to obtain prompt submission and prevent rebellion.

To overcome the shortage of manpower, the Mongol rulers incorporated all sorts of ethnic groups into their armies. The surrendered peoples were obliged to provide auxiliary troops to assist the Mongolian siege and blockading operations. Hsiao (1978: 12) notes that after the “beginning of the conquest… foreign elements were rapidly absorbed into the ranks of the Mongolian army. Not only were there many Turkish cavalymen in Central China…there were many Jin defectors. Owing to the Mongolian shortage of manpower and to their lack of experience in siege techniques, it was necessary for the Mongols to use all the help they could [get] against the Jin. … When Muqali was ordered to re-attack the Jin in 1218, it is said that he had with him 13,000 Mongolian troops and 10,000 Önggüd [Turkic] troops, which he supplemented with an unspecified number of surrendered Chinese and Qidan troops.” After 1268, “the Han armies were put in the hands of local civil officials, [but]…the Mongolian armies were still kept under the control of their commanders (ibid: 14).” The incorporation of non-Mongolian armies did not affect the structure of the Mongol army itself (ibid: 15).

CRIPPLE DUAL SYSTEM AND OVERTHROWN BY CHINESE REBELLION

Ögödei (Ugedei r.1229-41), the third son of Chinggis, destroyed Jin by 1234. After the conquest of Jin, the Mongols had time to collect many civilized advisors and to learn the art of ruling an empire in North China that was already well experienced in alien domination. Khubilai (r.1260-94), the third son of Chinggis’ fourth son Tolui, was able to declare himself the emperor of Yuan (1206-1368) in 1271, eight years prior to the final extinction of the Southern Song.

According to Franke and Twitchett (1994: 41), the Mongols “avoided the dependence on Chinese officials that had characterized the Qidan and Nüzhen empires. … For the first time…Chinese elite, with a few personal exceptions, was excluded from government service.” Hsiao (1978: 51) states that “the Mongols and their Central and Western Asian collaborators, the functions] From the time of Khubilai, the kesig lost some of its previous political importance. … An important function of the guards was…that of a reservoir of reliable manpower at the emperor’s disposal for employment as his personal agent. Even as late as 1346, guard members (kesigden) were dispatched to the provinces as supervising governors (darughachi).”

Meat, the principal diet of every Mongol horseman, could be dehydrated and condensed by freeze-drying it in the cold of winter, and easily be carried in bags before being served (together with some dairy products, vegetables, grains, or roots, if available), simply by boiling it in a portable cauldron.

See Hsiao (1978: 15-6, 74, 174).

11.3. The catapult similar to the one used by the Mongols.
Rawski (1996: 837) states: "Unlike Qidan, Nüzühen, and Tangut, which were neither alphabetic nor phonetic, the early Mongol script (and Manchu, which was based on the Mongol script) was alphabetic." Ledyard (1983: 348) notes: "Uighur literary influence, Central Asian administrative and governing techniques, and Christian and Islamic religious currents penetrated Mongol life before Chinese practices did ... The effect was to provide the Mongols with many services and techniques that insulated them from the need to seek similar things from China which was not the only form of higher civilization they had encountered, and they were therefore less susceptible to its lure."

22 See Jin (1990: 232-6, 242-44), and Mote (1994: 639). Elman (2000: 4) states: the Neo-Confucian "vision was established...in 1240 and began to influence civil examinations thereafter, but it was not politically or educationally empowered as the official classical curriculum until 1313-14 under the Yuan dynasty." It was the Yuan rulers who were so attracted by the ideology as to make the Zhu Xi's version the sole basis for the civil service exam.

Se-mu, both of whom constituted a tiny minority in the entire population, were politically privileged over the conquered majority." The Mongols adopted the Uighur script as their written language.22 The Han Chinese officials in the service of the Mongol government achieved their positions primarily on the basis of personal appointment.

The civil service examination system was introduced on a very small scale as late as in 1315. A total of approximately 1,200 persons passed the Jinsī exam between 1315-35 and 1341-68 with a quota of 25% for each of the Mongols, Se-mu (色目人), Northern Chinese (漢人), and Southern Chinese (南人). As in the previous conquest dynasties, the non-Chinese officials could attain high office without examinations, or at most by submitting to a nominal testing.24

Many Han Chinese, Franke and Twitchett (1994: 41) note, "served as clerks and minor functionaries," while the "gentry from Central and Western Asia" acted as "managers, tax farmers, and intermediaries. Some Chinese literati refused to serve their new masters and deliberately withdrew from public life to live as recluses." The Mongols ruled the Han Chinese, as Wittfogel and Feng (1949: 9) say, "without yielding the administrative machine to the Chinese officialdom. ... So deep was the Mongols' distrust of their Chinese subjects that in the Chinese territories even the local offices were often held by members of the conquering groups" or, worse still, by the illiterate and corrupt petty Chinese functionaries. They paid little attention to "the cultural peculiarities" of the Chinese and treated them "just like slaves."

The Han-ren of North China had been under the rule of many conquest dynasties, and hence they, Hsiao (1978: 51) notes, "were more accustomed to foreign domination and showed little sign of dissatisfaction under Mongol rule." On the other hand, the Nan-ren of South China "showed no loyalty towards the new conquerors," and popular uprisings repeatedly erupted "from the conquest of the Song dynasty to the downfall of the Yuan dynasty."

Until that time, none of the Xianbei-Nüzühen conquest dynasties that had ruled the Han Chinese with the Chinese-style bureaucracy filled with Chinese gentry-officials had ever been destroyed by popular Chinese rebellions supported by ill-treated gentry-scholars. The Mongol yoke, without the buffer of Han
Chinese gentry-officials, had provoked unprecedentedly strong nationalistic sentiments among the Han Chinese against the alien conquerors. The Mongol rulers were thrown out by the Han Chinese rebellions just as occurred in 350 (led by Ran Min of rebel provenance) in the Xiongnu Later Zhao regime (319-53).

**PAX-MONOLICA**

Chinggis Khan usually sent an order of submission to a foreign ruler, before an attack on his state. If the foreign ruler agreed, he would be allowed to retain power, paying taxes and performing other required services. Unlike the Han Chinese courts, however, the Manchurian Jin court flatly refused the Mongol demands that the emperor accept Chinggis Khan as his sovereign and that Shaanxi be evacuated. Instead of yielding to extortions (in the traditional Chinese fashion), they fought the Mongols until the dynasty was itself completely destroyed. The last Jin emperor killed himself in a beleaguered city.

When the Han Chinese confronted the Xiongnu-Turks in the Mongolian steppe, they were able to hold on to North China by paying tributes. When they confronted the Tuoba-Xianbei Wei, Qidan-Xianbei Liao, and Mohe-Nüzhen Jin from Manchuria, they were able to maintain their cultural and political integrity in the south. The Song rulers mistook the Mongol-Xianbei for just another (peace-by-tribute) Xiongnu of the Mongolian steppe, and collaborated with the Mongols in crushing the Manchurian Jin dynasty in 1234. Grossly underestimating their Mongol adversaries, the Song forces further attempted to recover territories in North China that the Nüzhen Jin had seized in 1126, thereby provoking the wrath of the Mongol rulers. The Mongol-Xianbei, unlike the Xiongnu, were the global conquerors with aspirations to rule over “All under Heaven,” and hence they completely wiped out the Song dynasty. The feat of conquering the whole of mainland China was belatedly emulated by the Nüzhen-Manchu Qing from eastern Manchuria.

The Mongols had commenced their drive against the Jin in 1209 and captured the Jin capital of Beijing in 1215, but the Nüzhen royal family fled south to Kaifeng, where they stayed off a final defeat for almost two decades (1214-33). Janhunen (1996: 134) contends that “none of the Mongol conquests in East Asia was easy, for their military actions lasted 20 years against the
See Rossabi (1994: 457-62). Rawski (1998: 244-5) states that "The appointment of hPags pa as state preceptor in 1260 gave [him] ... overall religious authority over the Yuan empire. ... The khan acknowledged the superior spiritual leadership of the religious leader, who in turn acknowledged Khubilai as protector of the faith [cakravartin; reincarnated line of spiritual descent]. ... Under the Yuan, Tibet had been indirectly ruled by Sa skya pa prelates ... who would enlist their patron's military force to enhance their own authority within a weak and decentralized Tibetan polity."

See Eberhard (1965: 133). The descendants of the generals inherited the offices from generation to generation. See Hsiao (1978: 26-7). The Mongol soldiers were ill adapted to farming life, and their families suffered from the chronic absence of male adults and exploitation by corrupt military superiors. The solidarity between the military households and their superiors disappeared. The Nüzhen soldiers of Jin had been allocated land in North China, leading a decent agricultural life to support their military duties, as did the bannermen of Qing much later. According to Hsiao (1978: 20), "the Mongolian soldiers were utterly unable to make a decent living on Chinese land" because, unlike the Nüzhen and Manchus, the Western Xia (1207-27), 24 against the Jin (1210-34), 40 against Korea (1219-59), and 44 against the Song (1235-79)."

By 1221, Chinggis Khan had conquered Central Asia and modern Afghanistan, and the Mongol army reached Crimea. Chinggis Khan died in August 1227 on his final campaign against the Western Xia. In 1271, Khubilai Khan transferred his capital from Karakorum (和宁) in the mountainous region on the upper Orkhon down to Beijing, now called the Great Metropolis, Dadu (大都). The Yuan was the first foreign dynasty to conquer and rule all of mainland China. The Mongols were garrisoned at key points. Manchuria, Mongolia, Turkestan and Tibet were placed under administrative systems different from those employed in mainland China below the Great Wall.

Chinggis had divided his empire into four great territories (niltres). Although the four Mongol dynasties eventually became independent, the Yuan emperor was, at least in theory, the ruler of the entire Mongol empire of Chinggis-khanite apanages, realizing the Pax Mongolica. From Manchuria to the Caspian, an iron discipline was imposed in order to ensure the unmolested travel of caravans.

THE MONGOLS RESIST SINIFICATION

According to Rossabi (1994: 457), Khubilai “himself continued to observe the practices of the Mongols’ shamanistic religion.” The Tibetan Buddhists, however, declared that “the heads of religion and of the state are equal,” and identified Khubilai with the Boddhisattva of Wisdom, portraying him as the Universal Emperor (ibid: 461-2). Ch’en (1964: 419-20) states that Khubilai “named hPhags-pa his imperial preceptor [and head of the bureau to supervise the religion] and made Lamaism the national religion of the Mongols.” The Mongol rulers, however, had enough confidence in their power and authority to patronize all other major religions, including Islam and Christianity. Mote (1994: 643) states that “The Mongolian emperors... patronized all the religions they encountered.”

The Mongol rulers resisted Sinification by conducting their business in the Mongol language, living in tents erected on the palace grounds, spending their summers in Mongolia, and maintaining the tradition of choosing the emperors through bloody competitions. Khubilai Khan discouraged Mongols from
mARRYING CHINESE, AND HE HIMSELF TOOK ONLY MONGOL WOMEN INTO THE PALACE.31

As the Yuan empire was at peace for a long time after the annihilation of the Southern Song, the fighting capacity of the Mongol military households lost every vestige of vigor.32 The Mongol court and nobility were divided, and engaged deeply in succession struggles, each contender striving to control the Imperial Guard that functioned like the Roman praetorian cohorts. By the 1350s, the Han Chinese rebellion raged all over the country.

The Mongols were still very much Mongols when the Yuan dynasty’s days ran out. Barfield (1989: 225) states that “Nomads always preferred a mobile defense…to the risks of holding fixed positions. … When confronted with a determined Ming advance from the south, the Mongols chose to retreat in favor of last ditch resistance. …In nomad fashion, though long removed from steppe life, the Yuan leaders abandoned China in the same casual way their ancestors acquired it.” 33 The Mongol rulers simply fled with their troops, founding the Northern Yuan in their old homelands. Janhunen (1996: 166) notes that the Chinese “linguistic and cultural impact was most effectively avoided by the Mongols, who simply removed their troops from China after the collapse of the Yuan dynasty.” The Mongols, as a result, continued to be a major power for several centuries.34 Surprising because largely unknown, the first emperor of the Northern Yuan was half Korean.

3. Koryeo Yields to the Stronger and Preserves Its Dynastic Existence

In Koryeo, a group of discontented military generals had revolted in 1170. They chastised the king for allowing the abuses practiced by the civil aristocratic families and the Buddhist establishment; purged a large number of arrogant civilian aristocrats; and then enthroned a new king, commencing a century of military rule. The military rulers fell exactly one hundred years later, in 1270, in the aftermath of the Mongol invasions.

When the Nüzhen Jin came under sustained Mongol attack, the Qidan asserted their independence, but pressure from

Mongols Avoid Sinification until Very End

Mongols had no “agricultural experience before they entered China.”

33 See also Ledyard (1983: 326) and Janhunen (1996: 166).

34 See Franke and Twitchett (1994: 2).


A hastily convened khuriltai at Kaiping
elected Khubilai (世祖 r.1260-94) as the fifth Khan on May 5, 1260. A protracted succession struggle followed, destroying the unity of the Mongol Empire. See also Rossabi in Franke and Twitchett (1994: 421-3).

37 Timur, Manz (1989: 14) notes, “adhered to this restriction with scrupulous correctness, and used simply the modest title of amir (commander).” Timur was illiterate, and “made no secret of his early career as a livestock-thief (ibid: 15).” See also Manz (ibid: 1, 57, 156).

38 Thakston (1996: 30). A great-great-grandson of Timur married a daughter of Yunus Khan, who was in direct descent from Chaghadai, the second son of Chinggis, and from this union came Babur (1483-1530), the founder of Mughal dynasty (1526-1877).

39 The 25th king was Chung-yul (忠烈王, 諡, 昴 b.1236 r.1274-98.1. and 1298.8.-1308); the 26th Chung-seon (忠宣王, 璋 r.1298.1.-1298.8. and 1308-13); the 27th Chung-suk (忠肅王, 燾 r.1313-30, 1332-39); the 28th Chung-hye (忠惠王, 禎 r.1330-32, 1339-44); and the 31st Kong-min (恭愍王, 顓 r.1351-74). Khubilai’s (世祖) prince imperial was his second son, Zhenjin (真金). Zhenjin’s first son was the Prince of Chin (楚王, Kammala 甘麻剌, 1263-1302) who was the father of the 10th emperor (睿宗/泰定帝 r.1323-28) and grandfather of the 11th emperor (天順帝 Asazibao, r.1328). Zhenjin’s the Mongols drove them into Koryeo territory in 1216.35 The Mongol-Koryeo coalition forces destroyed the Qidan in 1219, but after this incident the Mongols demanded heavy annual tribute. The Koryeo military rulers refused to pay tribute on several occasions, inviting thereby a series of Mongol invasions beginning in 1231. Ordering the peasantry to keep fighting in the mountain fortresses, the Koryeo military rulers relocated their capital to the Kang-wha Island in 1232, and stubbornly resisted the Mongols for almost 30 years. The Choi rulers, having grabbed power in 1196, were liquidated by other generals led by Kim In-jun in March 1258, and the new new military leaders decided to dispatch the crown prince to Mongolia for the peace negotiation.

In April 1259, the Koryeo crown prince went to Mongolia and then proceeded to the southern Chinese frontier for an audience with Möngke Khan (憲宗 r.1251-9), only to hear of his death on August 11 at Szechwan. Khubilai commenced the succession struggle against his youngest brother, Arigh Böke, and at this crucial juncture (1260-4), the Koryeo crown prince had wisely decided to go to the camp of Khubilai. This so pleased Khubilai that he exclaimed: “Even the Taizong of Tang could not conquer this far away state, and yet the Koryeo crown prince has come here to follow me! It is the will of Heaven.” Since the Koryeo king (Ko-zong, r.1213-59) predeceased Möngke Khan in June 1259, Khubilai let the crown prince return to Koryeo in February 1260 and succeed to the throne (Won-zong, r.1259-74).36 The final conclusion of peace negotiations, however, had to wait ten more years until after the liquidation of General Kim In-jun, in December 1268, who had been reluctant to leave Kang-wha Island. The civilian leadership was at last able to eliminate the remnants of military rulers altogether by May 1270 and depart from the island with the hitherto neglected king.

SON-IN-LAW (KÜRGEN, KÜRÄGÄN, GÜREGEN, GURKAND) STATE

The Uighur Kingdom of Qocho in the northern Tarim Basin was subordinated to the Western Liao some time after 1130, but rebelled against the Black Qidan and declared their allegiance to Chinggis Khan in 1209. In appreciation of their voluntary submission, the Uighur ruler was allowed to marry one of Chinggis’s daughters and, Drompp (2005: 199) writes, “thus enjoyed a level of prestige and at least symbolic autonomy rivaled
by no other people who had been absorbed by the Mongol state...in stark contrast to the fate of their neighbors the Tanguts [of Western Xia], whose resistance to Mongol rule led to their annihilation.”

Timur (Temür c.1336-1405) was born to the Barlas Turkic tribe that controlled the region of Kish in Transoxania near Samarkand that had been part of the Chagadaiid khanate. Since, by tradition, only Chinggis Khan’s descendants could adopt the title of khan, Timur ruled in the name of a puppet khan. To bolster legitimation through association, however, Timur assumed the title of kürgen (son-in-law) after he kept a wife (in 1397) of his vanquished rival (Husayn) for himself who was a descendant of Chinggis Khan. In India, the Mughal dynasty always called itself Gurkani (Timur’s title Gurkân), the Persianized form of kürgen.

In 1274, the crown prince (忠烈王 r.1274-1308) of the 24th Koryeo King (Won-zong 元宗) married a daughter of Borqizjin Khubilai, who was the third son of Borqizjin Tolui (d.1233) and grandson of Chinggis Khan (Borqizjin Temuzin r.1206-27). The second son and prince imperial of Khubilai, Zhenjin, had been groomed to be the next emperor, but died in 1285 still in his forties, and Zhenjin’s third son became the 6th Yuan emperor (Borqizjin Temur 成宗 r.1294-1307). Now the queen of the 25th Koryeo king became the paternal aunt of the new Yuan emperor. In 1296, the 26th Koryeo king (忠宣王 r.1308-13) married a daughter of the Prince of Chin (the eldest son of Zhenjin) who was a sister of the 10th Yuan emperor (Borqizjin Yisuntemur), but obtained his heir from a commoner, a Mongol woman. In 1316, the 27th king (忠肅王 r.1313-39) married a granddaughter of the prince of Yunnan, the 6th son of Khubilai. When she died, he married a daughter of the prince of Wei, the eldest son of the second son of Zhenjin, in 1324, but it was a Korean queen who gave birth to the 28th and 31st kings. The 28th king (忠惠王 r.1339-44) married a granddaughter of the second son of Khubilai’s 7th son and obtained the 29th king (忠穆王 r.1344-8) from her, while obtaining the 30th king (忠定王 r.1349-51) from a Korean queen. The 31st king, Kong-min (恭愍王 r.1351-74), married a granddaughter of the Prince of Wei. Altogether, six Mongol princesses in direct descent from Chinggis Khan married Koryeo kings, giving birth to two royal heirs. The Mongol mother of the 27th king was a commoner.

Son-in-Law (Kürgen) States of the Mongols
See Yoon (2006: 40-50). Nayan was a great-great-grandson of Otchigin (斡赤斤). The outbreak of rebellion in Manchuria, a region theoretically under Khubilai’s direct jurisdiction, was a challenge to his authority as Khan of Khan, and Khubilai personally led the punitive campaign.

See Rossabi (1994: 436-7). The first Mongol invasion force (of October, 1274) amounted to 25,000 Mongol and Han Chinese soldiers, 8,000 Koryeo soldiers, and 900 ships with 6,700 Koryeo sailors aboard. The second Mongol invasion force (of May 1281) amounted to 3,500 ships and 100,000 soldiers who sailed from South China, and 900 ships with 15,000 Koryeo sailors aboard and 40,000 soldiers (that included 10,000 Koryeo soldiers) who left from a Korean port. The two invasions ended in complete disaster because of heavy storms.

After May, 1274, the Mongol generals encountering the Koryeo king began to observe the protocol proper for an emperor’s son-in-law and, after 1294, proper for a husband of the emperor’s aunt (武宗皇姑 齊國大長公主). The first Mongol Queen was a paternal aunt to the 6th Yuan emperor (r.1294-1307). The 25th Koryeo king, Chung-yul, who had enjoyed the privileges of being the emperor’s son-in-law at first (1274-94), now enjoyed the status of emperor’s uncle at the Mongol court ceremonies, though often irritated by the uncontrolled exercise of power of his young Mongol queen at his

following are the particulars of Koryeo becoming a kürgen state.

In February 1270, the 24th Koryeo king (Won-zong) and the crown prince had an audience with Khubilai Khan. In 1271, the year Khubilai declared himself the emperor of the Yuan dynasty, Khubilai decided to betroth his then-thirteen-year-old youngest daughter to the 35-year-old Koryeo crown prince. The wedding took place three years later, in May 1274, and the crown prince (King Chung-yul b.1236) ascended the throne in July 1274. The Khubilai’s daughter (齊國大長公主 1258-96) gave birth to the heir apparent, Chung-seon, in September 1275.

In 1214, Chinggis Kahn had allotted the area between the Argun River and Hulun-Buir Lakes, in the west, and Greater Xing’an Range, in the east (that had served as the operational base for Chinggis’s forefathers), to his favorite youngest brother, Temüge Otchigin, who could soon expand his domain to the Liaodong area by 1230 (which was lost to Khubilai in 1287 in the aftermath of the rebellion led by the rebel prince Nayan), to the area around the Songhua River, and then eventually to almost the whole of north and west Manchuria. Batar (2006: iii) contends that Khubilai made Koryeo a son-in-law state in order to prevent the encroachment of the Otchigin forces into Liaodong and the Korean Peninsula. Khubilai, however, seems to have intended to rule Koryeo by resuscitating the kingship (that had been radically marginalized under the 100-year military dictatorship) with a transfusion of royal Mongol blood.

The Koryeo court sent marmots, otters, silver, falcons, ceramics, and medicines as tributes, and Khubilai reciprocated. He gave lavish gifts, permitted Koryeo merchants to trade in China, supplied the Koryeo with grain and meat in time of distress, and sent Mongol troops to oust the rebel forces. The Koryeo, on the other hand, constructed hundreds of warships and provided the necessary sailors, soldiers, and provisions to support the Mongol campaigns against the Kamakura shogunate on the Japanese islands in 1274 and 1281.

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own Koryeo court.⁴⁴ Thereafter, a succession of Koryeo kings had princesses of the Yuan imperial house as their primary consorts, seemingly ensuring a slow but sure genetic conquest of the Koryeo rulers.

As a son-in-law (kürgen) state to Yuan, the Koryeo court could maintain its position as sovereign ruler of an independent state and, as an emperor’s son-in-law, the Koryeo king possessed the legal right to vote at the khuriltai. Genetically, however, the Koryeo kings began to converge rapidly with the pure-blooded Mongol princes. The crown princes resided in Beijing as members of the Kesig until called to the kingship, at which time they took Mongol names and wore the Mongol hair style.

The 26th king, Chung-seon, with 50% Mongol DNA, married (in 1296 as crown prince) a daughter of the Prince of Chin, Kammala, the first son of Kubilai’s prince imperial Zhenjin. Chung-seon (1275-1325) ascended the throne in January 1298, only to be replaced by his father, the former king, eight months later in August 1298. The official excuse for his abrupt recall to the Yuan capital was the radical reforms undertaken by him, but the real cause seems to have been marital discord with his Mongol queen. While in exile at the Yuan capital (1298. 8.-1308. 6.), he intrigued with the emperor’s nephew, Yakhudu (a descendant of Tolui) and the grand councillor of the right (Harghasun答剌罕), in 1307, to enthrone Darnabala’s second son (Borozgin Haisan/答剌罕武宗r.1307-11) as the 7th Yuan emperor and make Darnabala’s third son (Borozgin Ayurbalbad仁宗r.1311-20), the heir apparent. Darnabala was the second son of Zhenjin. As a half Allan uruq (Golden Clan) and a kürgen, the Koryeo king (then in exile at the Yuan court) had found himself smack in the middle of court intrigues for the Yuan throne between the faction in support of the Zhenjin’s nephew (the late khaghan’s cousin Ananda阿難達) and the faction in support of Zhenjin’s grandsons. Emperor Wuzong not only made Chung-sun immediately resume the kingship of Koryeo, replacing his father, but also, in 1308, awarded him the title of “Prince of Shenyang (瀋陽王),” promoted to “Prince of Shen” two years later.⁴⁵ The Yuan emperor declared in 1310 that any Shenyang officials who bypassed the Prince of Shen would be punished. When there appeared the 8th emperor (Ayurbalbad), he was forced to hand over the kingship to his son (in 1313), and yet his relation with the

Emperor’s Son-in-Law and Prince of Shen
When the Prince of Wei was exiled to the Jeju-Daechung Islands in 1317-23 (by his youngest step brother, the 8th emperor) on the charge of insurrection, Chung-suk had provided him kind hospitality and became his son-in-law in 1324. Koryeo seems to have been a favorite place for the Yuan court to banish imperial princes. For instance, a Khubilai’s son was banished in 1279, and another son in 1310-2. The last Yuan emperor (r.1333-68) had also been banished to Koryeo in 1330.

According to the History of Koryeo, King Chung-seon had proposed the implementation of the civil examination system to Emperor Renzong (Ayurbalbad) in 1313, and the Yuan court, following his suggestion, instituted the system in 1315. Renzong had offered him the position of the grand councillor of the right, but he declined the offer. Chung-seon was exiled to Tibet in 1320 by the 9th Yuan emperor (Borozigin Sidibala 英宗 r.1320-23), Renzong’s son, but returned to Dadu when his wife’s younger brother became the 10th emperor (Borozigin Yisuntemur r.1324-8).

The 27th king, Chung-suk, was born of a non-royal Mongol queen, but in any case with 75% Mongol DNA now, married the daughter of a Khubilai’s grandson (the Prince of Ying) in 1316. When she died in 1319, Chung-suk married in 1324 a daughter of the Prince of Wei (魏王阿木哥), Darmabala’s first son (庶長子) and Khubilai’s great-grandson. These two Mongol princesses, however, could not bear future Koryeo kings. It was a Koryeo woman, Queen Hong, who bore the 28th and 31st Koryeo kings, reducing both sovereign’s Mongol DNA down to 37.5%.

Seemingly in a retaliation of sorts, Koryeo exported a woman to become the second empress, called Empress Ki, of the last Yuan emperor (Shun’di, r.1333-68, d.1370) in 1340. The first empress had been implicated in treason and purged in 1335. According to Dardess (1994: 580), in view of “the effect of her new status on the complex issue of Yuan relations with Korea,”
many Mongols had opposed making her empress. She gave birth to Ayushiridara who became heir apparent in 1353.

Ledyard (1983: 325) states: “Koryeo was able to preserve its dynastic existence...although...Koryeo’s northern territory...was removed and placed under the direct Mongol administration.”

**TWILIGHT OF THE MONGOL EMPIRE**

Because the Mongols did not have an orderly system of imperial succession, the new emperor had to slaughter a large number of his predecessor’s or rival’s supporters. According to Hsiao (1978: 53), the tradition of “joint family property and the lack of a smooth system of succession forced the Mongolian rulers at Dadu repeatedly to meet serious challenges from their brothers, who often based themselves in the steppe region.” When Mönke, Tolui’s son, proclaimed himself Khagan in 1251, the descendants of Ögödei and Chaghadai “denied the overlordship of Tolui’s house. In 1268, they rallied under Qaidu, grandson of Ögödei, to form a separate Mongolian state in Turkestan and Semireche and fought to challenge” the legitimacy of Khubilai, the nominal Khagan of the Great Mongolian Empire. Hsiao (1978: 53) writes: the “descendants of younger brothers of Chinggis Khan, Nayan and Qadan, echoed them in Manchuria in 1287. Peace was not achieved until 1303, after Qaidu’s death, so that for a prolonged period of time the Yuan had to station large garrisons in the steppe region.” The Yuan dynasty was torn by heavy demand for garrison troops, both in their steppe homeland where the rebellious brothers were watching vigilantly for a chance to challenge the Mandate of Heaven and in discontented South China that had not been accustomed to life under conquest dynasties.

After the rule of the 8th Yuan emperor (Renzong, r.1311-20), there was a rapid turnover of six emperors in a 12-year period until the enthronement of the fifteenth and the last Yuan emperor (Toghon Temür/Shun’di, r.1333-68). In 1360-1, “Alqui Temür, a descendant of Ögödei,” notes Hsiao (1978: 53), “made an attempt to challenge Toghon Temür’s authority from his steppe base.” According to Lattimore (1934: 47), “the Mongols were driven from China in the first place largely because of disputes (especially between Northern and Southern Mongols) over the succession to the throne, and these disputes were continued, after...
See also Lorge (2005: 91-94).

53 See Lattimore (1934: 16, 42).

54 Leading 170 households, Yi Seong-kye’s fourth generation ancestor (李安社) had migrated from Jeon-ju to Samcheok, and then to the Yanji-Tuman area, eventually settling at Ou-dong (斡東/延吉 城子山城). He was appointed in 1255 as the Chief of One Thousand (chiliarch 首千戶) and governor (達魯花赤 daruhachi) of Ou-dong (inhabited by about 5,000 households) by the Otchigin Mongol clan (headed by a grandson of Otchigin, Tagachar 塔察) whose authority extended to eastern Manchuria at that time. Daruhachi were, Hsiao (1978: 154) notes, “appointed by the Mongolian court [as personal representatives of the Khan] to the cities in the newly conquered sedentary regions to exact revenues and maintain order. … [They] were placed above titular officials … Their function was mainly supervisory rather than executive. With few exceptions, only Mongols and the Semu were qualified to serve as daruhachi.” Yi Seong-kye’s great grandfather (李行里) moved south and settled in the Ham-heung area (雙城) in 1290, and was also appointed as the Chief of One Thousand in 1300. As a result, his grandfather Yi Chun (李椿 d.1342) and his father came to rule both the Koryeo and Nüzhen people in the frontier area.

See Yoon (2006: 227-33). The raids of the Japanese pirates became rampant the loss of the empire in China, in wars for tribal hegemony.”

52 The Gobi desert, lying east and west, has always been the natural line of cleavage in tribal history between Inner and Outer Mongolia. 53 The fact that in 89-92 CE, the Southern Turks had joined the Han forces to crush the northern Turks may attest to the importance of the fundamental factors of geography.

Drought and famine had caused a series of popular Han Chinese rebellions after 1325. The Red Turbans Rebellions rose in the 1330s. The bandit leaders appealed to the White Lotus cults, impersonating the Future Buddha, to incite and mobilize the Chinese peasants. At the request of the Yuan court, Koryeo had dispatched a small army, including a general named Choe Yeong, to assist in crushing the Han Chinese rebellions (led by a salt merchant 張士誠) in 1354-5. Koryeo became keenly aware of the decaying might of the Mongol military forces. In 1356, the year Zhu Yuanzhang claimed himself duke of Wu, King Kong-min (r.1351-74) sent an army to attack the Yuan commandery headquarters at Ssang-seong (雙城), Ham-gyeong province, and was able to abolish the Yuan liaison organ, the Eastern Expedition Field Headquarters. The cooperation of Yi Ja-chun (李子春 d.1361), who was a local magnate and father of Yi Seong-kye (李成桂 1335-1408, the founder of Chosun dynasty), had played a decisive role for Koryeo to recover its lost territory. 54

The red-turbaned bandits ravaged North China in 1357-9 and invaded Koryeo in 1359. More than 200,000 bandits invaded Koryeo in October 1361, and captured the capital in November, but they were destroyed and expelled in January 1362 by the 200,000-man Koryeo army led by numerous capable generals including Choe Yeong and Yi Seong-kye. Two Yuan imperial seals were retrieved from the bandits, and were later returned to the Yuan court. 55

Although King Kong-min had a Mongol wife and a Mongol grandmother, he had purged the pro-Yuan faction in 1356, eliminating Empress Ki’s brother, who came to exercise mighty power in the Koryeo court. Eight years thereafter, Empress Ki at last managed to persuade her son, Prince Imperial Ayusiridara, to send an army and replace the King Kong-min, but the Mongol force was annihilated in 1364, marking the end of Mongol power in the Korean Peninsula. 56

The Mongols soon abandoned mainland China and, in
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1368, fled back to their old homelands. According to the *Essentials of Koryeo History*, Shun’di, who in his youth had once been condemned to exile to Koryeo, made preparation to escape to Jeju Island in 1367. The last Yuan emperor seems to have been apprehensive about returning to the Mongolian steppe, the nest haunted by deadly treacherous cousins. He was, indeed, killed in May 1370, within two years after his return to his own homeland.

When the family of the Empress Ki assembled Yuan refugees in Manchuria in 1368 with the intention of avenging the downfall of their clique, Henthorn (1972: 129) writes, “King Kong-min dusted off the tradition that Koryeo was the successor to the old state of Koguryeo and thus the rightful sovereign of Manchuria and sent two of his best generals, Chi Yongsu (池龍壽) and Yi Seong-kye. … [the Koryeo army] took the city of Liaoyang [遼城] in November 1370]. The Koreans were unprepared to hold their gains and recalled their armies, although they repeatedly brought up their claim to all lands east of the Liao River. Ming forces soon moved into the area [in 1387], permanently settling the question.”

Ayusiridara (r.1370-8) had commanded the entire Yuan armies by the emperor’s order, in 1367, and succeeded Shun’di in 1370 at Yingchang (應昌). According to the *Xin Yuanshi*, the Koryeo called the new court (across the Gobi, at Helin 和林) Northern Yuan, and King Kong-min (r.1351-74) asserted that, “since he was also a descendant of Khubilai, he was obliged to assist the new emperor in recovering the lost empire.” Ayusiridara was able to rout the Ming army so decisively in 1372 as to make the Ming never again dare to cross the desert. He was later succeeded by his younger brother, who ruled for ten years (1378-87). According to the *Mingshi*, however, Ayusiridara was succeeded by his son in 1378.

The son ruled until 1390 when the throne was usurped and assumed a new dynastic name, Tartar (鞑靼). Lorge (2005b: 108) states that “after the losses of 1372, the Hongwu emperor [Ming Taizu] shifted to a defensive stance with respect to the steppe.” Ledyard (1983: 326-7) states: “the Mongol rulers… maintained themselves as ‘Northern Yuan’ for several decades after 1368 and were not driven from the Liao area until 1387. The lingering of the Northern Yuan presented the rulers of Koryeo with extensive problems. Some conservative forces… managed to promote… relationship with them; for their after 1350. The Muromachi shogunate (1338-1573) lacked the power to constrain the Waegu. Choe Yeong, however, together with Yi Seong-kye, succeeded in destroying the pirates.

58 高麗史節要 卷二十七 元至正二十二年 [1362] 泰正月 殿崩等率兵二十萬…圍京師…太祖[李成桂]以麾下兵三千人先登大破[紅頭賊]…新首凡一十餘萬獲元帝玉璽二顆…一十餘萬奔還渡鴨綠江


57 高麗史節要 卷二十八 元至正二十七年 [1367] 元二月 時元帝欲避亂濟州仍輸御府金帛

58 高麗史 卷四十二 世家 卷四十二
4. Rise of the Chosun Dynasty in the Korean Peninsula

CHOSUN GIVING UP EVEN THE DE JURE CLAIM ON LIAODONG

As the professed successor to Koguryeo, Koryeo used to claim all lands east of the Liao River. The Ming army, however, occupied the Liaodong area in 1387, and further proclaimed in February 1388 their intention to occupy even the northeastern frontier area of Koryeo that had been administered directly under the Yuan commandery. Choe Yeong, who had recently seized power by driving out the rival faction, decided to launch an attack on Liaodong, appointing Yi Seong-kye as deputy commander in April 1388. Yi Seong-kye, however, turned his army back at the Wi-wha Island (in the mouth of the Yalu River) in May, seized power in June 1388, and founded the Chosun dynasty in 1392.

Chosun retained the cis-Yalu territory, but gave up the Liao River basin in order to avoid a confrontation with Ming. Disappointing the irredentists, the rulers of the Korean Peninsula chose stability and peace rather than contesting the Liaodong area. Many Nüzhens joined the Chosun garrisons established in the vicinity of the Yalu, and others entered trade, frequently assuming Korean surnames.

Chosun accepted the suzerain-subject relationship with Ming. Yi Seong-kye had already adopted a friendly posture toward Ming by aborting the invasion of Liaodong and overthrowing the Koryeo dynasty in July 1392. By adhering to the traditional Sa-dae (Respect the Greater) strategy, the Chosun dynasty yielded to the Stronger, now the Han Chinese Ming, and the Chosun was able to maintain its independent nationhood free from the ravages of warfare, and even obtain the Ming’s help in repulsing the Japanese invasion that erupted two hundred years later, on April 13, 1592.

FOUNDING A STATE ACCORDING TO THE NEO-CONFUCIAN IDEAL

During the 14th century, the Koryeo central aristocrats and Buddhist temples had greatly expanded their holdings of landed estates and slaves, depleting state revenues. A group of reform-minded Neo-Confucian scholar-officials used the military part, the Northern Yuan forces kept on the best terms...with Koryeo as a support for their position in Manchuria. ...”
strongman, Yi Seong-kye, to put their ideas into practice. Yi and his supporters ruled indirectly through the puppet Koryeo kings for four years (1388-91), and then established a new dynasty (1392-1910), setting up the structure of government and society according to the Neo-Confucian ideals. Yi Seong-kye and his supporters accomplished at least seven objectives: they wiped out the political influence of the Buddhist establishment; discouraged shamanistic practices; reformed the degenerate social systems; set afire all the existing registers of public and private land in 1390; nationalized every plot of land within the state, uprooting the established landed-aristocracy; implemented an equitable land-tiller system in 1391; and improved the status of slaves while reducing their number.

The founder of Chosun had recognized a far greater number of lineages as nobility than did the true-bone aristocracy of Silla and the small hereditary aristocracy of Koryeo. Since the protected appointments (yin) were strictly limited, the examination system and Confucian academic training became very important for the recruitment of government officials. The new ruling class inherited their status as nobility essentially by passing the Confucian examinations and securing official appointment. The official ideology of the Chosun state had stressed self-cultivation, frugality, and thrift in daily life.

Tae-jong (r.1400-18) put various military groups under the direct command of the king and restructured the central government under the State Council (abolishing the Privy Council), but made the Six Ministries report directly to the throne. During the reign of Se-jong (r.1418-50), the northern boundary along the Yalu and Tumen rivers was secured firmly. The pillaging by Japanese pirates was drastically reduced.

5. Restoration of the Han Chinese Dynasty: Ming (1368-1644)

NATIVE INTERLUDE IN CHINESE DYNASTIC HISTORY

Zhu Yuanzhang (Ming Taizu/Hongwu r.1368-98 朱元璋/洪武) was born in 1328 to a poor peasant family in Haozhou (濠州), northern Jiangsu, about 160 kilometers northwest of Nanjing. Most of his family died of starvation, and he became a Buddhist novice at the age of 16 to get enough to eat. In 1352, Zhu joined the Balkhash region, the Khorochins at the perimeter with Ming Liaodong, and the Buryats of the extreme north...had remained comparatively autonomous.” See also Lorge (2005b: 107).

According to the Chronicle of Koryeo, the Koryeo army mobilized in 1388 amounted to 38,830 regular soldiers and 11,600 corvée auxiliaries, but it was officially called (軍號) a 100,000-man army. It seems that the usual ratio of exaggeration was about 2 to 3 in those days.


Chosun became a highly centralized Neo-Confucian bureaucratic state. The central government appointed all local officials, and instituted a system of checks and balances (i.e., criticism and surveillance) defined by a statutory national code that was designed to prevent the concentration of power and arbitrary decision-making by the king or by any officials. The institutionalization of the new dynasty was finalized by the publication of the State Code (經國大典) in 1485. See Lee (1984: 164-5).

See Lee (1984: 174) and Lee and de Bary (1997: 261-5, 302). Appointed from the newest graduates of the civil service examination, the court diarists took notes, in “straight brush” for posterity, of all the activities of the king and the officials, obliging them to adhere to the ideals of Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucian norms.
King Se-jong launched an expedition in 1419 against Tsushima Island to destroy their base, and then allowed the Japanese to engage in trade at three ports under the strict supervision of Chosun officials. Chosun maintained the Neighborly Relations strategy with Tokugawa Japan. The phonetic script Hangul was invented in 1446, enabling the Koreans to write without using Chinese letters. The progress in agricultural technology (such as improved seeds, wet-farming, and transplanting) enabled the Chosun commoners to enjoy an agreeable level of material comfort.

See Lorge (2005: 108-117). The Red Turbans were led by Han Shantong (韓山童) and his son (韓林兒) in North China and by Chen Youliang (陳友諒) in the central Yangzi River area. See Lorge (2005:116).

Yongle let Zheng He, a Muslim Turk, undertake seven grand diplomatic naval expeditions between 1405 and 1423, visiting 30 countries as far as the African east coast with 26,800 men in the very first voyage. The shipyards near Nanjing alone built 2,000 vessels, including about 100 state-of-the-art treasure ships unprecedented in human history; 370-440 feet in length and 150-180 feet abeam, weighing 3,000 tons apiece with 4-9 masts up to 90 feet high, 16 water-tight compartments, and stern-post rudders. Persuaded by the Confucian bureaucrats, however, a local rebel force associated with the northern Red Turbans in Anhui to become second-in-command, capturing Chuzhou in 1354. The bandit leader (郭子興) died in 1355, and Zhu took over the leadership of the rebel army. Zhu Yuanzhang captured Nanjing (建康) in 1356 and proclaimed himself Duke of Wu, presenting himself as a national leader against the Mongols rather than as a popular rebel. Destroying the rival forces in South China, Zhu Yuanzhang proclaimed himself Prince of Wu in 1364, and then emperor of the Ming dynasty in 1368 when he captured Beijing. The unification of the mainland was completed by 1382.

FROM YUAN MILITARY SYSTEM TO MERCENARY ARMY

Ming Taizu had stationed his sons in the northern border territories, while keeping only the legitimate heir (his deceased eldest son’s fifteen-year-old son, Jianwen 建文/惠帝 r.1398-1402) in the capital, Nanjing. Taizu’s fourth son, Zhu Di (Yongle 朱棣/永樂/成祖 r.1402-24), who was a popular and experienced frontier military commander, killed the boy emperor and then transferred the capital to his former princely fief, Beijing. Many Western Mongols (including the Uriyangqad and Oyirods) helped Yongle in his war against the Nanjing court.

In 1409, Yongle sent a force of 100,000 troops to attack the Eastern Mongols. In 1410, Yongle himself marched with 500,000 troops. He organized an army for a campaign against Oirat Mongols in 1414, and won a victory at the Kerulen River. Yongle mounted another major campaign against the Eastern Mongols in 1422, and led his fifth steppe campaign in 1424, the last Ming expedition on the steppe. He died en route to Beijing. Yongle’s exploits may be compared to those of Qin Shihuangdi and Han Wudi. His successors, however, had absolutely no taste for renewing steppe campaigns. After Yongle’s death, the Ming court reverted to the more traditional Chinese pattern of fixed defenses. The reinforcement of the Great Wall was an expression of the siege mentality of the Ming court that proved to be a futile effort.

Lattimore (1934: 47-8) states that “the Yuan dynasty was followed, in China proper, by that of the Ming which filled the interval between the Mongol Empire and the Manchu conquest. … It is true that Ming generals campaigned far to the north, in Outer Mongolia, and that great victories were recorded. These
victories, however, never amounted to conquest … [T]he armies concerned were not genuine invading Chinese armies … [T]he Chinese operated by backing one Mongol tribal group against another, and claimed their victories as Chinese conquests.”

“Inspired by the Mongol Yuan dynasty’s garrisons and modeled after the *fubing* of Tuoba Wei, Sui, and Tang times,” Zhu Yuanzhang had created two million hereditary military households that were subject to reduced tax and labor requirements. At least on paper, there were 1,198,442 regular soldiers in this system. The army of hereditary military families with assigned lands, Ebrey (1996: 194) explains, “came nowhere near paying for itself or maintaining itself as an effective military force. Soldiers who were not paid deserted or sold their lands.” The Ming government, Hsiao (1978: 7) reports, was “forced to abandon its largely self-supporting, hereditary military class and to rely instead upon mercenaries. The support for this mercenary army… imposed a crushing financial burden on the Ming government and ultimately proved to be an important factor in its downfall.”

For a Manchurian or a Mongolian dynasty, Beijing was ideally located to serve as the dynastic capital because of easy access to tribal troops from Manchuria or the Mongolian steppe. With a vigorous martial leader like Yongle, who understood frontier warfare and tribal politics, a northern capital was an asset. But for a Han Chinese court in the absence of Shihuangdi, Wudi, or Yongle, Beijing was a liability. It was remote from the bulk of China’s resources and, furthermore, put the court directly on a vulnerable frontier defense line, liable to sudden nomadic attack.

The Ming emperors did not campaign on the steppe after Yongle’s death, while refusing for a long while to make peace treaties with the nomads. The Ming rulers reasoned that the Song court had paid huge subsidies to the Qidan, Nüzhen, and Mongols, only to lose first North China and then be completely swallowed by the Mongols. They believed that subsidies had simply enhanced the power of nomads, ultimately leading to the destruction of the Song dynasty. Yongle’s successors prohibited foreign contact altogether, letting the Zheng He’s Armada rot and leaving the world to be explored by Europeans. See Fairbank and Goldman (1992: 137-8).

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The Ming court, however, belatedly recognized the fact that the gifts and subsidies to nomads were cheaper than raising troops or building walls for defense. In 1449, the Ming suffered the embarrassment of Emperor Yingzong being captured by the Oirat Mongols, reminiscent of the Xiongnu encirclement of Han

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Jagchid and Symons (1989: 138) quote a passage in the Ming Shilu: "It was impossible to satisfy their desires... [They] increased their demands each year. Sometimes they asked for many expensive and luxurious things which we did not have. Even so, the court always tried to give those things to them if they were ready in hand. The barbarian chief...if he got...less than what he asked...always got very angry..." See also Elverskog (2006: 20-3).

The quote is from Kim (2004: 550). According to Kim (ibid: 536), the Chronicle of Liaodong (遼東志一 地理志) records that, among the 275,155 households in the Ming pale (c.1400), about 70% were the Han Chinese (漢人), and the remaining 30% were the Koryeo natives (高麗土著民), the Qidan-Mongols, and the surrendered Nüzhens (歸附女眞人). If we apply the ratio of 6.4 persons per household on average, there were about 1.23 million Chinese and 0.53 million non-Chinese. See Kim (ibid: 598-601).

The Ming army occupied Liaodong in 1387. This was 1070 years after the Han Chinese rule over the Liaodong area, with its long-abandoned Chinese settlers, was restored. The Ming, unlike the Mongol Yuan, lacked the power to maintain military control over the whole of Manchuria outside Liaodong and a narrow coastal strip of Liaoxi. The Ming pale was constructed during 1437-42 and 1479-81 to defend the Liaodong area from the intrusion of the Mongol-Xianbei and the Nüzhens. The pale, surrounded by the Bian Qiang (邊疆) that was, "unlike the Long Wall, makeshift fences made of earth, stones, bricks, and woods," delineated the Ming boundary in Manchuria. The Ming court granted honorific titles and tributary benefits to about 200 petty Nüzhen tribal leaders outside the boundary in order to maintain influence in the region and keep them out of the sphere of Koryeo influence.

According to Di Cosmo and Bao (2003: 1-4), even after the downfall of the Mongols, the Nüzhens "continued to entertain lord-vassal relationships with Mongol chiefs... [T]he Ming court... gave their chiefs Ming titles and initiated formal tributary relations... [C]hieftains...had received from the Ming government military titles and authorization letters (or imperial licenses) that allowed them to present tribute... [T]hey represented an important source of revenues for the Nüzhen, and a chieftain who had succeeded in conquering the people of another wei (衛所)...would also appropriate the Ming issued credentials. This type of 'tribal' expansionism would allow an ambitious leader to increase the number of missions taken to China, and with them, his profits. At times the Hada tribes are said to have been able to control all
Lattimore (1934: 48-9) states: "the Chinese power must have been confined, in direct administration, to the most ancient ‘Chinese pale’ … the lower valley of the Liao and the Liaodong peninsula. … Among the Tungusic tribes of the northern forests, it would appear that the Ming Chinese operated by the device (standardized from old) of granting titles and subsidies to certain of the chiefs, and supporting them against possible tribal rivals. The subsidized chiefs were then listed as ‘tribute bearers.’ By this means the Chinese cultural influence penetrated far beyond the limits of true political authority; but unfortunately, it has become the custom to take any kind of evidence of Chinese penetration as proof of government control.”

ENCOUNTER OF THE FUTURE RULERS OF CHOSUN AND MING

Zhu Yuanzhang had chastised the newly established Chosun (1392-1910) court on account of some “disrespectful” expressions included in diplomatic correspondence addressed to him. In June 1394, Yi Seong-kye (太祖 r.1392-98) dispatched his fifth son, Bang-won (李芳遠), to resolve the discord with the Ming Taizu. On his way to the Ming capital (京師/金陵 modern-day Nanjing), Bang-won, who would become Taizong (太宗 r.1400-18) six years later by eliminating his young step-brother (世子 芳碩), dropped in Beijing to visit the King of Yan (燕王), who would become Emperor Yongle (永樂帝/成祖 r.1403-24) eight years later by eliminating his young nephew (建文帝 r.1398-1402). Suh Keo-zeong (徐居正 1420-88) made a brief record of their encounter in an essay (筆苑雜記, 1487). The two future rulers (潛龍), perhaps because of their inborn militant nature, could apparently have a heart-to-heart talk. Prince Bang-won had a premonition of the rise of Yan King in the near future, and Yan King took the Chosun prince into his confidence. Emperor Yongle kept telling the Chosun envoys that he recognized the greatness of Taizong at first sight.

CHOSUN SAVED FROM THE JAPANESE INVASION BY THE MING ARMY

Toyotomi Hideyoshi (豊臣秀吉 1536-98) succeeded in unifying the Japanese islands by 1590, bringing an end to the Warring States period that began in 1467 (with the outbreak of bribes in goods and cash to ensure another year of amicability, and wringing high prices for their horses … in the legalized extortion that constituted the Ming ‘tributary’ system with the Nüzhens and the Mongols. Putative tributaries were accustomed to write the court in advance notifying it of their desires, specifying such and such a title (inevitably accompanied, it was understood, by cash payment), so many bolts of silk, and certain items of clothing. … More than one headman had brought along his mother to personally collect their booty. The results were further drain on the strained resources of the Ming empire.” And yet the Nüzhens harbored all sorts of “grievances” against the “arrogant” Ming rulers. Even the early Chosun rulers insisted on sending three “tribute missions” a year, but the Ming court ordered (in 1393) that only one “tribute mission” be sent every three years.

76 The Neo-Confucian founders of the Chosun dynasty (開國功臣) had controlled the top decision-making Privy Council (都評議使司) on the basis of the codified ideal of the Confucianist government (朝鮮經國典) compiled by Chung Dojeon (鄭道傳). Bang-won liquidated Chung Dojeon, assassinated the designated heir, Bang-seok, disposed of the rival claim of his older
brother, Bang-gan (芳幹), and took the throne for himself, removing the caretaker brother (芳果/定宗, r.1398-1400). Taizong abolished the private armed forces, instituted centralized military command, and converted the Privy Council into a State Council with six ministries reporting directly to the throne. See Lee (1984: 172-3).


78 Lorge (2005: 133) notes: “Japanese units were forced to travel in large groups and stay in fortified positions because of incessant ambushes.”

79 明史 卷二百三十八 列傳第一百 二十六 李成梁 高祖英 自朝鮮內附
萬曆元年 建州都指揮王杲…成梁…斬之 十年 其子阿台…射死…世廕指揮僉事…如松…成梁長子…二十年 反寧夏…盡滅…朝鮮倭患

See Lorge (2005: 131-5). Li Rusong was the eldest son of Li Chengliang (1526-1615). Crossley (1997: 49-52) notes: “Li Chengliang’s formal rank was military governor of Liaodong from 1570 to 1591, and from 1601 to 1609. His ancestors [were] Koreans who had migrated to Liaodong...”

80 Since the Ming, Spence (1990: 18-9) writes, “regarded Korea as a loyal and dependent ally to be protected at all costs, Chinese troops were sent in force to help the hard-pressed Koreans. The war might have continued, at the Ónin War). He then decided to ship the now useless warriors and potential trouble-makers to the Korean Peninsula in 1592, declaring that they were on their way to conquer Ming China. He presumably wanted to obtain new territories to reward his restless generals and, according to Ledyard, “his post-war plans included the installation of the Japanese emperor (Go-Yōzei 後陽成/周仁, r.1586-1611) in Beijing and the establishment of his own headquarters at the Chinese port of Ningbo (寧波/明州), from which he would rule all of Japan, Korea, China, the Ryūkyūs, Taiwan, and the Philippines.” 77 In 1591, he had asked the Chosun court to voluntarily comply with his megalomaniac project to build a pan-Asian empire, but his demand was rejected out of hand. The invasion began in April 1592, exactly 200 years after the founding of the Chosun dynasty. The Neo-Confucian Chosun, long dominated by scholar-officials, was utterly unprepared for the invasion force totaling over 158,000 veteran warriors brandishing harquebuses. The Japanese land forces had quickly swept over nearly the whole peninsula, but they soon began to be harassed by guerrilla attacks in the rear, while the Japanese navy was thoroughly destroyed by Admiral Yi Sun-sin (b.1545/d.November 19, 1598) that blocked the coastal supply routes. The regional guerrilla forces sprang up spontaneously all over the country, and rallied around capable leaders. 78

In 1592, the Ming army of Liaodong had been engaged in the campaign against the Mongol rebellion in Ningxia, and only a small 5,000-man force was available to help Chosun repel the invaders. By January 1593, however, the Ming court could dispatch a 40,000-man expeditionary force, well-equipped with cannon, led by Li Rusong (d.1598), of Korean descent and born in Liaodong. 79 The ravages inflicted on the Chinese coastal provinces by Japanese pirates after 1358 had incurred the ill will of the Chinese toward the Japanese even before the founding of Ming in 1368. 80 Toyotomi Hideyoshi died on September 18, 1598, leaving a deathbed order for the complete withdrawal of the invasion forces. While the Ming and Chosun were fully engaged in the War against the Japanese invasion forces, the Nüzhens of Manchuria grew in power and were soon to conquer the Ming.

In the Japanese Islands, the Tokugawa clan had defeated the followers of Hideyoshi and established a new military regime. The Tokugawa shogunate (徳川幕府 1603-1867) asserted that
they had settled scores on behalf of the Korean people, and requested the Chosun court to maintain friendly relations. Even though diplomatic relations with the new ruler of the Japanese Islands were restored in 1609, the animosity of the Korean people against the Japanese remained alive long thereafter. The Japanese were never permitted to go beyond Pusan, and the shogun was obliged to communicate with the Chosun court either through sporadic Chosun emissaries to Edo or through the medium of Tsushima, a Tokugawa island domain that also maintained a semi-tributary relationship with Chosun.

Toyotomi Hideyoshi had unified the Japanese Islands in 1590 and then let his army invade the Korean Peninsula in 1592, only to be defeated there. His regime was destroyed by Tokugawa Ieyasu (德川家康 1543-1616) at the Battle of Sekigahara (関ケ原の戦) in 1600. Tokugawa's regime officially adopted the policy of seclusion ("closed country") in 1633-9 and rigidly maintained it until 1853.\(^8\) On the Japanese Islands, the megalomaniac thesis of Hideyoshi in 1592-98 was followed by the isolationist antithesis of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1639-1853, arriving at the synthesis of "Japanese ethos and Western technology" in the name of the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912). In mainland China, the Ming, who had helped the Chosun repulse the Japanese invaders, prohibited foreign contact altogether after the death of the exploratory Emperor Yongle. The state itself became bankrupt and was destroyed by the Manchus by 1644. Oddly, it was the ravaged Chosun in the Korean Peninsula that avoided any dynastic change and survived another 312 years, until 1910.

The anti-Buddhist founders of the Chosun dynasty took Ming China as the Neo-Confucian ideal. After being saved by the Ming army, the Korean tendency to look toward the Han Chinese Middle Kingdom over the shoulder of their Manchurian cousins was very much magnified, casting a long shadow to cause an enduring cognitive dissonance about their identity.

**THE MOGOLS IN WEST ASIA ADOPT ISLAM AND SPEAK TURKIC**

In 1229, two years after Chinggis's death, his third son Ögedei (Ogedei, 1186-1241) became the Khaghan (the Khan of Khans); his grandson Batu (c.1207-55; son of his first son, Jochi) became the Khan of the Golden Horde; his second son, Chaghadai (c.1185-1242), received jurisdiction over Central Asia; terrible cost to all three countries, had not domestic turmoil in Japan, coupled with effective disruption of Japanese supply lines by the Korean navy, led to the recall of Japanese troops...in 1598.\(^7\)

"Because his mother and his two wives were Christians...Hulegu...nourished respect within the Christian communities across the Middle East and...his Christian vassal kingdoms, Georgia and Armenia (ibid: 181)."

Morgan (2009: 164-6), however, writes about the massacres of millions (claimed by the contemporary chroniclers) that had been inflicted not only by the Tolui’s campaign of 1219-23 in eastern Iran but also by his son Hülegü in Baghdad.

11.7. Arghun (r.1284-91), the grandson of Hülegü, seated alongside his wife.

83 See Manz (1989: 10) and Morgan (2009: 168-9). Manz (ibid: 7) notes that, in the western part of the Mongol empire, the spoken language of the ruling class was gradually replaced by Turic: “Unlike the official conversion to Islam, which was a public and political act, the Mongols’ adoption of Turkic is hard to trace and date.”

and his fourth and the youngest son, Tolui (c.1190-1233, Khubilai’s father, r.1227-9), was granted lands in North China and in the Mongol homeland. The Mongol campaigns against Russia started in 1237. Rossabi (1988: 10) states: “Representatives of all four Chinggisid lines, together with one hundred fifty thousand Mongol, Turkic, and Persian troops, took part in the campaigns.”

The Batu’s Mongol army captured Moscow in 1238, struck at Poland in 1241, and then turned south toward Hungary. Batu, however, withdrew his troops to Russia upon hearing of the death of Ögödei on December 11, 1241.82 Ögödei’s son, Güyüg, became Khaghan in 1246 but died in 1248. With Batu’s support, Tolui’s first son, Möngke (r.1251-9), became Khaghan in 1251.

In 1253, Möngke ordered his younger brother, Hülegü, to conquer the Islamic cities of Baghdad, Damascus and Cairo. He ordered another younger brother, Khubilai, to conquer Dali and then Song. Hülegü conquered and reconquered everything along a distance of several thousand kilometers from Karakorum to face Ismailis the Assassin at Alamut in northern Persia in 1256. The Imam of this heretical Shiite sect had wielded enormous political power by luring young men with hashish as a foretaste of “paradise full of earthly delights,” and then ordering these eager-to-die youths to wage Jihad and assassinate the alleged enemies of Islam. The Mongols bombarded the Ismaili stronghold and climbed up the steepest escarpment, exterminating the Hashshashin by early 1257.

Ever after overthrowing the Umayyad caliphate (661-750) and founding the new city of Baghdad in 762, the caliphs of the Abbasid dynasty ruled the entire Muslim world. Hülegü mobilized the Armenian, Georgian, and various Turkic tribal armies to supplement the Mongols, and captured Baghdad in February 1258, executing the 37th successor to the Prophet Muhammad. The Crusaders from Antioch and Seljuk sultan’s army from Anatolia assisted the Mongols’ assault on Damascus.83 By 1259, Hülegü’s army reached the Mediterranean, as did the Batu’s army via Europe in 1241. The (chiefly Turkish) slave army of the Mamlük sultanate that ruled Egypt (from 1250 until the Ottoman occupation in 1517) with a puppet caliph in Cairo, however, defeated the Mongols near the Sea of Galilee on September 3, 1260. The Mongols apparently reached their limit in the West, leaving the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa...
unconquered. Hülegü (c.1217-65) founded the dynasty of Il-Khan (
Subordinate Khan in Persian, 1256-1353) encompassing modern-
day Iran, Iraq, part of Syria, and eastern Anatolia.

The Mongols of Mongolia and Zangaria retained the
Mongolian language and shamanism (until they converted to
Buddhism). The Mongols had co-opted the Turks but, in the west,
the Turks were far more numerous than the Mongols. All the
Mongols in the west began to speak Turkic and officially adopted
Islam. After almost 40 years of Buddhist rule, Manz (1989: 7)
writes, “in 1295 the Il-khan Ghazan (r.1295-1304) made a public
confession of Islam … His actions were imitated later by Özbek
Khan of the Golden Horde (r.1312-41), then in the Chaghadayid
khanate, within the western section under Tarmashirin Khan
(r.1326-34), and within the eastern section a generation later,
under the Khan Tughluq Temü r (r.1347-63).” According to
Quataert (2005: 15-6), the Turco-Mongolian Islam, unlike Persian-
Arabic Islam, retained many shamanist rituals and practices.

Manz (1989: 3) states that the Mongols created a new
culture combining the “heritage of their subject populations --
both the Turkic nomads…and the settled peoples of…agricultural
regions. The spoken language of this new culture was Turkic, its
religion Islam and its political legitimation Mongolian.” Timur (c.
1336-1405) and the Ottoman Turks reconquered the territories of
the previous Mongol Empire and more, not as alien conquerors
like the Mongol sultans and Seljuk Turks but as semi-indigenous
Islamic forces. The Seljuks that Turkicized Anatolia were
replaced in 1390 by the Ottoman Turks, who went on to conquer
Byzantium in 1453, and reassembled under their rule the territory
of the old East Roman empire and more.

85 Even the Buddhism that came to
be practiced by the Mongols had
retained many shamanist rituals.
According to Buyandelger (2009: 66-7),
“to attract converts, the lamas took on
the roles of shamans by offering rituals
of healing, magic, and exorcism…in
which lama oracles would go into a
trance similar to Mongol shamanistic
spirit possession. … incorporating the
local rituals of worshipping mountain
cairns (ovoos) and…introducing deities
that protected livestock and life.
Buddhism also substituted the
shamanic guardian and ancestor deities
with personalized lamaist deities. The
lamas taught tarani (incantations) for
individual protection, destruction of evil,
good luck, and healing illness.” See

86 Manz (1989: 1-2) notes that, from
1382 to 1405, Timur’s armies “criss-
crossed Eurasia from Delhi to Moscow,
from the Tian Shan…to…Anatolia,
conquering and reconquering… While
the Seljukid and Mongol sultans had
ruled as outsiders, Timur successors
ruled as indigenous leaders.”